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The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a 
theoretical economic explanation for the traditional and emerging governance 
structure of the U.S. beef industry, and then explain why a complete vertical integration 
has not yet occurred in the beef sector. The traditional USDA beef grading system has 
facilitated limited concern for beef quality and little incentive to invest in beef 
quality control. According to transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights 
theory (PRT) in the industrial organization literature, open market operations are 
found to be the appropriate governance mechanism in the specific circumstances of 
the beef industry. With increasing consumer concern for relative quality and 
consistency of beef products, beef processors have attempted to market a higher 
proportion of superior quality beef and to further differentiate beef products with 
criteria other than USDA grades. In order to transmit signals about the value of beef 
quality to upstream producers and align their incentives, beef processors have 
adopted ex post output measurement (e.g., grid pricing) and ex ante input control 
mechanisms (e.g., certification and process verification programs). Such measures 
have induced transaction-specific investments in successive vertical sectors of the 
industry. As explained by TCE and PRT theories, these have called for new 
governance structures such as marketing agreements for fed cattle transactions and 
strategic alliances. By TCE, the degree of idiosyncrasy of specific investments by 
each of the vertically-related sectors of the beef industry is not high enough that 
transaction costs could be further reduced by vertical integration. Further, PRT 
implies that vertical integration may not be an efficient governance structure for the 
beef industry because beef quality improvement requires specific investments by 
each of the relevant sectors of the beef industry (e.g., beef processing, cattle feeding, 
and cow-calf production), which give rise to holdup problems from each side of 
various transactions. 
The second purpose of this dissertation is to examine optimal behavior of 
commercial cattle feeders under alternative cattle feeding contract provisions, and 
the implications for contract choice by cattle owners and feeders under traditional 
and value-based pricing methods for fed cattle. A multitask principal-agent model is 
developed to theoretically analyze optimal incentive structures for cattle feeding 
contracts under alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk preferences of cattle 
owners and feeders. In order to evaluate theoretical economic predictions of the 
multitask model, a dynamic biophysical growth model for beef cattle is adopted from 
the animal science literature and employed to simulate feedlot and carcass 
performance outcomes of a large sample of feeder steers for various ration-implant 
strategies typically used in cattle feeding. The biophysical model has the advantage 
of representing the effects of a relatively rich mix of ration and implant strategies by 
feeders on an equally rich mix of quantity and quality characteristics of fed beef. 
Simulated feedlot and carcass performance data are then combined with historical 
price series to calculate stochastic costs and returns of cattle owners and feeders with 
various degrees of risk aversion. The optimal (profit and expected utility 
maximizing) cattle feeding contract parameters for owners and corresponding 
production technologies (ration-implant strategies) chosen by feeders are then 
determined by performing a generalized search on a feasible contract parameter 
space under various levels of risk aversion. 
The optimization results validate the main hypotheses of the multitask model 
as well as hypotheses about the benefits and implications of grid pricing. The main 
results of this research can be summarized as follows. First, carcass yield and quality 
improving inputs are substitutes in the production technology of feedlots. Second, 
overall beef quality improves under grid pricing with optimal owner and feeder 
behavior. Third, the power of the optimal incentive scheme for cattle feeding (i.e., 
the degree of the incentive for cost saving) is lower under value-based grid pricing 
than under traditional live- and dressed-weight pricing methods. Fourth, the power of 
the incentive scheme increases with the degree of cattle owners’ risk aversion. Fifth, 
compared to traditional pricing methods, value-based grid pricing better aligns the 
incentives of cattle owners and feeders under feeding contract structures in current 
use (yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts or cost-of-gain contracts). Sixth, 
asymmetry in the premium-discount structure in current grids and the additional risk 
associated with carcass yield and quality under grid pricing are the main reasons for 
continued use of live-weight pricing and apparent slowness to adopt grid pricing. 
Seventh, more balanced premiums and discounts in grid pricing may be required to 
achieve further expansion of grid pricing and overall improvement of beef quality 
and consistency. Eighth, if cattle feeders can limit the contract parameter space to 
traditional forms of contracts and owners choose the contract parameters, then 
typical forms of cattle feeding contracts can be rationalized by optimal behavior 
under plausible levels of risk aversion. Finally, the introduction of grid pricing 
decreases (increases) the tendency toward cost-of-gain (yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost) 
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With increasing consumer concern about the quality and consistency of beef 
products, a major challenge for the beef industry is to efficiently produce and maintain a 
high proportion of superior quality beef (highly palatable lean meat). This is extremely 
difficult in a vertically segmented industry. The final quality of beef primarily depends on 
animal characteristics (e.g., genetic breeding) as well as on the actions of the parties in 
three major sectors of the industry: cow-calf production, feedlot operation, and beef 
packing. Therefore, efficient production of high quality beef requires proper 
identification of individual animals as they move from one sector to another and efficient 
production and management practices in all the successive stages of production. This in 
turn depends in large part on how integrated are the different stages of production.  
According to transaction cost economics literature, the efficiency of production is 
highest when the production system is fully integrated in one firm (Williamson, 1979). 
While the beef industry has undergone some major structural changes in the last 20 years, 
these changes have had more to do with the consolidation of firms within the packing and 
feeding sectors than with changes in the nature of the interface between the sectors 
(Barkema et al., 1993). In this situation, a frequently asked question is why the beef 
supply chain is not vertically integrated. The first purpose of my dissertation is to provide 
a theoretical economic explanation for the existing and emerging governance structure of 
the beef industry with the help of existing literature on industrial organization.   
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In the absence of vertical integration, beef industry participants have adopted a 
variety of alternative production, marketing, and organizational practices in recent years. 
The value-based grid pricing of fed cattle, with premiums (discounts) for higher (lower) 
yield and quality of beef, has become the most popular among the new marketing 
practices. It represents a potential to improve market coordination through a sophisticated 
quality-based pricing mechanism that sends more precise signals about the relative value 
of yield and quality of beef to the upstream firms in the production process. Recent 
market studies indicate that cattlemen are likely to continue adopting such value-based 
pricing systems at an increasing rate.  
With the emergence of value-based grid pricing systems, another commonly 
raised question is whether, in the absence of vertical integration, such a mechanism is 
able to align the incentives of beef industry participants so that market efficiency and the 
well being of agents improves. The second purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
whether a grid pricing system can better align the incentives of cow-calf producers and 
cattle feeders with the existing cattle feeding contracts and thus improve their overall 
welfare. This issue is examined first by modeling optimal incentive structures for cattle 
feeding contracts under alternative fed cattle pricing methods, and then empirically 
evaluating the welfare of the contracting parties with the traditional lot-average and 
modern value-based pricing methods under existing cattle feeding contracts. Further 
detail of the background and motivation of this study is presented in the following 
section. Then specific research objectives are described. The organization of this 




1.2 Background and Motivation 
Over the last two decades beef consumption in the United States has declined 
steadily both in terms of aggregate quantity and as a share of total U.S. meat consumption 
(Hueth and Lawrence, 2003). For example, per capita consumption of beef declined from 
72.2 pounds in 1980 to 64.3 pounds in 2000 (USDA). The share of beef in per capita 
meat consumption declined from 42.9 percent in 1980 to 35.6 percent in 2000. The 
market share of beef in per capita total meat expenditure declined from 53.9 percent in 
1980 to 39.8 percent in 1998 (Field and Taylor, 2002). The market share loss between 
1980 and 1998 cost the beef industry about $12.8 billion in consumer expenditures (Field 
and Taylor, 2002). While per capita consumption of pork remained almost the same over 
the last two decades, chicken consumption increased significantly during the same 
period. Per capita consumption of chicken increased from 33.1 pounds in 1980 to 52.6 
pounds in 2000. Chicken’s share in per capita meat consumption increased from 19.7 
percent to 29.1 percent during the same period. Existing agricultural economics literature 
suggests that this is primarily due to reduction in the price of chicken relative to beef and 
increased consumer health concerns regarding the consumption of red meat (Hueth and 
Lawrence, 2003). However, relative improvements in the quality and consistency of 
chicken products are also cited as important contributing factors (Purcell, 2000; 
Schroeder et al., 2000). Researchers argue that coordination among the vertical sectors is 
behind this success of the broiler industry (Hayenga et al., 2000).  
 The broiler industry is essentially entirely vertically coordinated through 
ownership or contracts. Over the last 50 years, more than 90 percent of broilers were 
produced under contract with the remainder produced by integrated firms (MacDonald 
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and Korb, 2006; Hayenga et al., 2000). The hog industry appears to be following a 
similar course as it takes up a more vertically coordinated production system. Total hogs 
produced under contract in the U.S. increased considerable from 31 percent in 1994-95 to 
63 percent in 2001-02, with specialized hog operations showing even larger increases 
(MacDonald and Korb, 2006; McBride and Key, 2003). The beef industry has lagged 
behind the broiler and hog industries in adopting vertical coordination mechanisms. As of 
2003, three-fourths of feeder cattle were still acquired by feeders or packers through 
livestock auctions on a cash basis, while the rest were fed in custom feedlots on the basis 
of contracting or joint ownership programs (MacDonald et al., 2004). A 2000 survey of 
the fifteen largest beef packing firms shows that two-thirds of fed cattle slaughtered in 
1999 were cash market acquisitions (Hayenga et al., 2000). The rest of the fed cattle were 
procured through short-term marketing agreements (not more than 14 days prior to 
slaughter). However, vertical integration by ownership of an entire beef supply chain is 
rare. While some tentative explanations are found in the existing literature, a clear 
explanation in terms of economic theory is needed for the virtual independence of the 
vertical sectors of the U.S. beef industry.  
In the absence of vertical integration, beef industry participants are currently 
trying to sort out whether vertical coordination of the kind observed in the broiler and 
hog industries is necessary to regain the lost market share. In the mean time, legislation 
proposed in Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to ban or limit the extent of 
contracting and vertical integration in cattle markets has obscured the future of such 
coordination in the beef industry (U.S. Congress, 2002). In this situation, it is not at all 
surprising that beef industry participants are looking for some alternative ways to 
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improve coordination within the industry. In recent years, a variety of novel production, 
marketing, and organizational practices have been adopted by beef industry participants 
in an apparent attempt to improve beef quality and increase overall profits. Individual 
cattle management systems, value based grid pricing of fed cattle, short- and long-term 
marketing agreements, and strategic alliances are examples of such innovations. The 
most widely adopted of these marketing practices is the so-called grid pricing 
mechanism. Grid pricing is a common mechanism in nearly all of the alliances. Alliances 
are a type of organization where different individuals and companies from different 
sectors of the beef industry operate somewhat independently of one another but still share 
in risks and profits through contractual arrangements (Field and Taylor, 2002).  
A recent survey of cattle feeders suggests that traditional lot-average pricing 
methods for fed cattle such as live-weight and dressed-weight pricing are being 
increasingly replaced over time by grid pricing (Schroeder et al, 2002). Under grid 
pricing mechanisms, fed cattle are priced individually with premiums and discounts for 
various carcass traits. In addition, when carcasses are priced on the grid, packers record 
and report the distribution of carcass quality for a given lot of animals upon the request 
by the cattle owners (Hueth and Lawrence, 2003).1 While grid pricing does not 
essentially introduce any formal vertical linkage, it is an attempt to improve vertical 
coordination by sending upstream in the production process more precise signals 
concerning the relative value of alternative carcass attributes.  
Grid pricing mechanisms also offer cow-calf producers a new opportunity to 
recoup their costly investments in genetics and cow-calf management, and increase their 
                                                 
1 In alliances, packers report the carcass quality of each individual animal for a fixed charge of 




profits by retaining ownership of the cattle until they are ready for slaughter. However, 
by retaining ownership of the cattle beyond weaning, producers may also assume 
substantial price, production, and holdup risks. Price roll-backs are of particular concern 
as the value per hundredweight (cwt.) of live beef decreases as the weight of the animals 
increases. Cow-calf producers assume additional production risks (animal performance 
risks) and holdup risks (due to potential opportunistic behavior of feedlot operators) by 
retaining ownership of the cattle through an additional production stage. Death loss 
during the backgrounding and finishing stage can also have significant impacts on 
profitability. Finally, cash flow for the producers may be strained with retained 
ownership. Therefore, it is important for cow-calf producers to understand the costs as 
well as the benefits of holding the title of the animal through the feeding stage.  
Cow-calf producers who retain ownership of their cattle through slaughter 
typically feed the weaned calves in commercial feedlots by making contractual 
arrangements (both formal and informal). A feedlot operator performs multiple tasks 
during the feeding phase, which affect the feedlot and carcass performance of the cattle 
(e.g., the rate of gain, feed efficiency, final carcass weight, and yield and quality grades 
of the carcass). Given that the feedlot operator’s actions are unverifiable and unseparable, 
there arises a potential holdup problem.2 While transaction cost economics and property 
rights theory literature prescribe vertical integration for the resolution of such holdup 
problems, a majority of the cattle in the United States are fed in commercial feedlots on 
the basis of custom feeding contracts. There are two major types of contracts for cattle 
                                                 
2 The holdup problem refers to the inability of an economic agent to fully capture the returns from his/her 
ex ante relationship-specific investments because of the opportunistic behavior on the part of his/her 
trading partner in ex post bargaining (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Given that the relationship-specific 
investments are sunk in nature and are non-contractible and outputs are non-verifiable, the uncertainty 
about the future behavior of the trading partner may lead to sub-optimal levels of ex ante investments.   
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feeding in practice: yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost (with or without markup) and cost-of-gain 
contracts. Given the potential holdup problem, there is a need for formal analyses of the 
issues related to the optimal incentive structure for cattle feeding contracts with retained 
ownership of cattle through slaughter, as well as the welfare implications of modern 
value-based grid pricing systems.      
 
1.3 Specific Research Objectives 
 The research topics of this dissertation are premised on the hypothesis that some 
sort of vertical coordination between the stages of the beef industry is necessary for the 
beef industry to produce high quality beef and compete more efficiently with chicken and 
pork for consumer demand. In the absence of a complete vertical integration of the beef 
supply chain, this study explores whether the industry can potentially achieve this goal 
through recently adopted practices of value-based marketing of fed cattle. The specific 
objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. Analyzing the organizational details of the U.S. beef industry and reviewing 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature, provide a plausible rationale in 
economic theory for the existing governance structure of the beef supply 
chain. 
2. Theoretically examine the optimal incentive structure for cattle feeding 
contracts with retained ownership of cattle through slaughter and marketing 
fed cattle using alternative fed cattle pricing methods including: 
i. Live-weight pricing, 
ii. Dressed-weight pricing, and 
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iii. Grid pricing. 
3. Empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model.  
4. Empirically examine whether the modern value-based grid pricing method for 
marketing fed cattle is able to align the incentives of cattle owners and feeders 
with existing cattle feeding contracts. Also, evaluate the welfare impacts of 
the grid pricing system on the cattlemen with the two predominant cattle 
feeding contract forms: 
i. Yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost (with or without a markup) contracts, 
and 
ii. Cost-of-gain (or flat rate per pound of gain) contracts. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation consists of seven chapters. The next chapter presents an overview 
of the nature and extent of vertical coordination in the U.S. beef industry. The existing 
forms of cattle feeding contracts and fed cattle pricing methods are also discussed. 
Chapter 3 attempts to explain why a complete vertical integration has not yet occurred in 
the U.S. beef industry. The issue is addressed from the perspective of the industrial 
organization literature on vertical coordination, focusing on incomplete contract theory in 
particular. First, theoretical and empirical research in transaction cost economics and 
property rights approaches of incomplete contract theory are reviewed. Second, 
agricultural economics research employing incomplete contract theory are summarized. 
Finally, implications of incomplete contract theory for the vertical coordination in the 
U.S. beef industry are analyzed. In particular, this summary provides understanding of 
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the potential role of value-based grid pricing in beef quality improvement given that 
vertical integration has not occurred in the beef industry.  
Chapter 4 presents a multitask principal-agent model for cattle feeding contracts 
under alternative fed cattle pricing systems and risk preference scenarios. The model 
captures the organizational details of cattle feeding and fed cattle marketing, and yields 
several comparative static results. The main prediction of the theoretical model is that a 
relatively lower powered incentive scheme is optimal for cattle feeding when beef quality 
is not measurable before slaughter and fed cattle are priced in the grid. The multitask 
model also suggests that the power of the incentive scheme increases with the level of the 
cattle owner’s risk aversion and decreases with the feeder’s risk aversion level and the 
degree of substitutability of the feeder’s actions under certain conditions.  
In order to evaluate the predictions of the multitask model, a dynamic biophysical 
growth simulation model for beef cattle is adopted from the animal science literature. A 
detailed description of the growth model is presented in Chapter 5. The biophysical 
growth model is capable of systematically predicting the outcomes of feeding each 
individual animal when nutrient content of feed, weather, and the animal’s genetic and 
biological information are available. The growth model is employed to simulate feedlot 
and carcass performance of a large lot of feeder cattle under alternative production 
technologies. Predictive efficiency of the model is evaluated by comparing the simulated 
and actual outcomes. Describing necessary data and simulation procedures, the cattle 
growth simulation outcomes under alternative production technologies and the results of 





In order to determine the optimal incentive schemes for cattle feeding under 
alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk aversion scenarios, the cattle performance 
data generated by the biophysical growth simulation model are combined with historical 
price data. Optimal incentive schemes for cattle feeding and corresponding production 
technologies under alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk aversion scenarios are 
presented and analyzed in Chapter 7. The empirical results confirm the principal 
predictions of the theoretical model and justify the convergence of the empirical contract 
payment schemes to typical forms. More importantly, the results show that overall beef 
quality increases under grid pricing with optimal owner and feeder behavior, grid pricing 
better aligns the incentives of the cattle feeder and owner with the current structures of 
cattle feeding contracts, and possibilities exist for further expansion of the grid pricing 
system with sensible adjustment of the premiums/discounts scheme in the grid. However, 
conditioning prices on ex post information may not be beneficial for risk-averse agents 
because incorporating this information in contracts adds greater risks in the pricing. A 
summary of the results are presented in the concluding section of Chapter 7. Finally, 
Chapter 8 presents general conclusions and reflections of this study.    
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF VERTICAL COORDINATION  
IN THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the term beef industry implies that beef production is a unified operation 
subject to an overall management program, it includes several distinct production stages 
such as breeding, weaning, feeding, and marketing cattle with the eventual processing 
and merchandising of retail products to consumers. Typically, each of these production 
stages are performed by specialized sectors: seedstock firms control genetic selection and 
breed development; cow-calf producers (ranchers) manage cow/calf herds and raise 
young cattle from birth to weaning; yearling-stocker operators add weight to weaned 
calves prior to their shipment to feedlots; cattle feeders feed weaned or backgrounded 
animals high energy rations until they are ready for market, and packers slaughter, cut 
and process carcasses in their plants. Removing much of the bone and excess fat from 
primal and sub-primal cuts, packers sell the beef in boxes to purveyors and distributors, 
or directly to retailers. Figure 2.1 provides a schematic representation of the beef supply 
chain.  
While every individual segment of the beef industry specializes in the production 
of its end product, consumers value palatable lean beef products which are the final 
output for the entire industry. Therefore, economic efficiency in the beef industry 
requires cost-efficient production of an output mix that appropriately reflects the value 











Figure 2.1: Vertical sectors of the beef industry. 
 
palatability are tenderness, flavor, and juiciness. While consumers rate tenderness as the 
most important attribute, quality of beef is evaluated by the combination of all three 
attributes. Marbling (flecks of intramuscular fat distributed in muscle tissue) has a 
positive relationship to all three attributes of beef palatability. The higher the marbling, 
the more palatable the beef is. Scientific research shows that breeds vary in muscle fiber 
color, which is related to the ability to deposit marbling. Factors other than marbling that 
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affect tenderness of beef include age of the animal, feedlot gain, rate of carcass cooling, 
carcass weight, fat cover, aging of carcass or retail cuts, and electrical simulation (Field 
and Taylor, 2002). Although method of cooking, cooking temperature, and serving 
method also affect tenderness, animal characteristics (breeds) and management practices 
at the farm, feedlot, and packing plant are the primary contributors to the tenderness of 
beef. 
As the final quality of beef products depends on the actions of the parties in 
different segments of the industry, efficient production of high quality beef requires 
proper identification of individual animals as they move from one sector to another and 
efficient production and management practices in all the successive stages of production, 
which in turn depends largely on how integrated different stages of production are. Lamb 
and Beshear (1998) and Schroeder and Mark (1999) suggest that much of the beef 
product quality problem has resulted from poor coordination of the vertical beef 
production and marketing system. The following section of this chapter presents a brief 
overview of the nature and extent of vertical coordination along the beef supply chain. 
The existing forms of fed cattle pricing methods are described in subsequent sections.  
 
2.2 The Nature and Extent of Vertical Coordination in the Beef Industry 
 The U.S. beef industry has been going through some major structural changes 
since the 1980s. The changes, however, have had more to do with the concentration of 
firms within the packing and feeding sectors than with vertical integration. The most 
noticeable concentration in the beef industry has occurred in the packing sector. As of 
2000, the number of packing plants was half of what it was in the 1980s (Field and 
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Taylor, 2002). Four large packing plants, such as IBP, ConAgra, Excel, and Farmland 
National Beef, slaughter approximately 80 percent of the steers and heifers and handle 
approximately 85 percent of the boxed beef annually. These packers controlled only 
about one-third of the total fed cattle slaughter in 1980 (Field and Taylor, 2002). 
Economies of scale have been cited as the primary reason for such concentration 
in the beef packing sector. Concentration has also occurred in the cattle feeding sector, 
but less dramatically than in the packing sector. The number of feedlots has decreased 
from 122,000 in 1970 to 41,000 in the mid 1990s, and is projected to decrease further to 
21,000 in 2010 (Field and Taylor, 2002). In 2000, the largest 25 cattle feeding companies 
operated 106 feedlots and marketed 38 percent of total fed cattle (Field and Taylor, 
2002). Concentration is least apparent in the cow-calf management sector. Still, more 
than 50 percent of the total breeding cows are owned by only about 10 percent of cow-
calf operations that have an inventory of more than 100 head (Field and Taylor, 2002).  
However, different forms of vertical coordination are in practice such as 
integration by ownership, strategic alliances, fed cattle procurement through forward 
contracts and marketing agreements, and contract cattle feeding. The extent of such 
coordination methods are discussed in detail below.  
 
Integration by Ownership 
 There are only a few examples of vertical integration by ownership of two or 
more sectors. National Beef Packing, the fourth largest beef packer in the U.S., is jointly 
owned by Farmland, a farmer-owned cooperative. Farmland also owns a large 
commercial feedlot named Supreme Feeders. U.S. Premium Beef, a closed cooperative, is 
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comprised primarily of cow-calf producers and cattle feeders. Harris Ranch, originally a 
cattle producer located in California, owns a beef slaughter plant. Monfort, the third 
largest beef packer, was started by a cattle feeder in Colorado. However, the total number 
of cattle fed by these farms represents a relatively small and stable share (around 3 
percent) of total cattle slaughter per year. Other beef packers also purchase feeder cattle 
and feed them in different feedlots by making custom feeding arrangements. The beef 
packers’ practice of feeding their own cattle in their own or others’ feedlots is known as 
‘packer feeding’. Table 2.1 shows the percentages of slaughtered steers and heifers 
owned and fed by the 15 largest beef packers in their own or others’ feedlots during 
1988-97.  
                 contracts, and marketing agreements, 15 largest beef packers, 1988-97.
Forward Contracts and
Year Packer Feeding  Marketing Agreements Total
(%) (%) (%)
1988 5.0 14.3 19.3
1989 5.2 17.2 22.4
1990 5.0 13.9 18.9
1991 4.5 12.7 17.2
1992 4.1 15.3 19.4
1993 4.1 13.3 17.4
1994 4.0 16.5 20.5
1995 3.3 17.8 21.1
1996 3.3 18.8 22.1
1997 3.7 14.9 18.6
Average 4.2 15.5 19.7
Source: Hayenga et al. (2000), based on data obtained from the Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA). 




 Hayenga et al. (2000) suggest that the primary reasons producers integrate into 
beef packing are to capture packing margins. However, closed cooperatives like U.S. 
Premium Beef and others have acquired packing plants to improve transmission of value 
signals to producers, and also to develop branded beef products and capture increased 
margins associated with higher wholesale prices for branded and processed products.  
 
Forward Contracts and Marketing Agreements for Fed Cattle Procurement 
Fed cattle procurements by beef packers through forward contracts and marketing 
arrangements with feedlot operators have been in practice for a long time. The USDA 
Grain Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) defines forward 
contracts as contracts entered into two or more weeks prior to slaughter. A marketing 
agreement is defined by GIPSA as “an oral or written agreement between a packer and a 
seller in which the seller agrees to ship all or part of its slaughter cattle to the packer 
when the cattle are ready for slaughter, with price determined at or after slaughter.” 
Forward contracts and marketing agreements represented 14.0-19.4 percent of the 4 
largest beef packers’ annual slaughter and 12.7-18.8 percent of the 15 largest beef 
packers’ annual slaughter during 1988-97 (Table 2.1).  
The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the USDA collects and reports the 
number of cattle delivered weekly to beef packers that are marketed on a non-cash basis. 
Non-cash deliveries include fed cattle sold using forward contracts, marketing 
agreements, grid pricing, packer fed cattle, and cattle delivered against futures contract 
positions. The AMS data shows that non-cash fed cattle deliveries as a percentage of total 
weekly market volume have increased over the last decade in major cattle feeding states. 
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For example, in Colorado, Kansas, and Texas, non-cash fed cattle deliveries represented 
less than 30 percent of weekly slaughter volume during the early 1990s, but often 
exceeded 60 percent in the late 1990s (AMS-USDA, 2000). While other states show 
similar trends, the Southern Plains states tend to have higher percentages of non-cash 
deliveries relative to Northern Plains states like Nebraska. Most of this increase in non-
cash fed cattle marketing is a result of an increase in the number of fed cattle marketed 
through formula pricing (Hayenga et al., 2000). Formula pricing refers to establishing a 
transaction price using a formula based on some other price as a reference. Usually, 
average price (cost) of fed cattle purchased by the packing plant or highest reported local 
cash price for the week prior to or the week of slaughter is used as the reference in the 
formula..  
 Hayenga et al. conducted a survey on the fifteen largest beef packing plants in 
April 2000. Percentages of fed cattle procured by the respondent firms (10 out of 15) 
through various methods in 1999 are reported in Table 2.2. Survey respondents reported 
that 36 percent of total fed cattle slaughtered in 1999 were purchased in the cash market 
on a live weight basis, and 29 percent on a carcass weight or grid basis. Thus, two-thirds 
of cattle slaughtered were cash market acquisitions. Long term (more than 14 days) 
formula priced contracts linked to cash market (live cattle or wholesale beef prices 
reported by USDA, plant cost average, or retail beef prices) or futures market prices 
accounted for 19 percent of 1999 fed cattle procurement by the respondent firms. Only 5 
percent of the cattle slaughtered in 1999 by these firms were fed by themselves. Another 
4 percent of the fed cattle were purchased via short-term contract arrangements based on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange futures (basis contract, or fixed price based on futures 
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market prices, with deliveries typically several months in the future). The other 3 percent 
percent of the cattle were acquired through risk and profit sharing contract arrangements 
with cattle feeders. 
   
Table 2.2: Use of various methods for fed cattle procurement by the 15 largest 
                 beef packing firms in 1999, results of a 2000 survey. 
Procurement Method Percentage
Cash market purchases on live weight basis 36
Cash market purchases on dressed weight or grid basis 29
Formula-priced contract purchases based on a reported live cash 
   market, reported dressed price, plant average, CME cattle futures 
    price, quoted boxed beef or retail beef price 20
Packer-fed cattle 5
Fixed price or basis contract purchases based on CME futures 4
Risk sharing contract purchases 3
Other purchases 4
Soutrce: Hayenga et al., (2000).  
 
The two most important reasons cited by the packers to enter into contracts and 
marketing agreements with cattle producers were to “secure higher quality cattle” and to 
“secure more consistent supply of quality cattle” (Hayenga et al., 2000). Risk 
management, reducing plant operating costs by improving utilization rates of slaughter 
plant capacity, and assuring food safety were the next most important reasons. Packers 
perceptions were that producers’ primary incentives to enter into contracts and marketing 
agreements were to secure a quality premium/discount matrix followed by enabling 
producers to obtain a higher price for quality cattle (Hayenga et al., 2000). 
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A recent survey of cattle feeders located in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas 
indicates that use of marketing agreements for cattle delivery is increasing over time 
(Schroeder et al, 2002). In 1996, 23 percent of survey respondents’ fed cattle were sold 
under some type of marketing agreement. This increased to 52 percent in 2001. The 
survey also reports that producers’ primary motivations to enter into marketing 
agreements were to obtain yield and quality grade premiums and to get increased access 
to data (Schroeder et al, 2002). 
 
Contract Cattle Feeding  
There are two basic types of cattle feeding operations: the farmer feeder and the 
commercial feeder. The two types are generally distinguished by feedlot size and type of 
ownership. Farmer feedlots are usually defined as having less than 1000-head capacity, 
and are owned and operated by an individual farmer (or a family). Farmer feeders 
typically manage several different enterprises at the same time with cattle feeding being 
only one of those. Commercial feedlots are defined as specialized cattle feeding 
operations having more than 1000-head capacity and may be owned by an individual, a 
partnership, or a corporation, with the last type being more common as feedlot size 
increases. While farmer feeders often feed their own farm-born calves, both types of 
feedlot operators may acquire feeder cattle from cow-calf producers, stocker operators, 
investors, and beef packers by direct purchase, joint ownership programs, and custom 
feeding contracts.  
The National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) estimated that 
approximately 37 percent of the cattle placed in the U.S. commercial feedlots (with more 
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than 1000-head one-time capacity) in 1999 were fully owned by the feedlots (USDA, 
2000). Only 8 percent of the cattle were acquired by the feedlots through joint ownership 
programs, while the other 55 percent were acquired by custom feeding contracts (USDA, 
2000). The report of a survey conducted through Beef magazine indicates that cattle 
ownership by all types of feedlots averaged 37 percent and 41 percent in 1995 and 2000, 
respectively (Ward et al., 2002).  Retained ownership of feedlot cattle by cow-calf 
producers and stocker operations accounted for 36 percent in both years. Investor 
ownership of feedlot cattle changed slightly, from 14 percent in 1995 to 15 percent in 
2000, while packer ownership remained stable at 1 percent (Ward et al., 2002).  
Feuz and Umberger (2001) report that approximately 71.3 percent of the cattle 
placed in Nebraska feedlots in 1999 were fully owned by the feedlots, 7.5 percent were 
partially owned by the feedlots (joint ownership), and 21.2 percent were acquired through 
custom feeding contracts (Table 2.3). The upper panel of Table 2.3 shows that smaller 
feedlots owned a relatively larger share of the cattle in their lots and large feedlots owned 
a relatively smaller share of the cattle. Feuz and Umberger further report that 48.2 percent 
of the custom fed cattle were owned by cow-calf producers or stocker operators, and 51.7 
percent of them were investor owned (Table 2.3). The share of packer fed cattle was very 
low (0.15 percent). A more recent survey indicates that approximately 54 percent of the 
cattle in North Dakota feedlots were custom fed (Rime et al., 2006).  
Cattle feeding under joint ownership programs usually involve a feedlot operator 
and a cow-calf producer or an investor. A common form of joint ownership program is 
that the two parties share the ownership of the cattle and the feeding cost, and they split 
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net profit or loss by a negotiated method (e.g., 50-50 division of net profit or loss). In 
another type of joint ownership program, net profit or loss is divided according to the  
 
Table 2.3: Percent of cattle placed in Nebraska feedlots by type of ownership and 
                 by operation capacity, 1999. 
< 1000 1000-5000 > 5000 All Feedlots
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Cattle Ownership
    Fully owned by feedlots  96.08 62.91 43.10 71.27
    Partially owned by feedlots 1.79 11.13 10.48 7.53
    Custom fed 2.13 25.96 46.43 21.20
Custom Fed Cattle
    Retained ownership 67.50 45.38 47.81 48.15
    Investor owned 32.50 54.62 51.75 51.70
    Packer owned 0 0 0.44 0.15
Source: Feuz and Umberger (2001). 
Feedlot Capacity (No. of Animals)
 
 
basis of each party’s inventory. In either of these joint ownership programs, price and 
production risks are borne by both parties.  
Custom cattle feeding refers to contractual arrangements between feeder cattle 
owners and feedlot operators for feeding the cattle until they are ready for slaughter. 
Under such arrangements, feeder cattle are shipped to the feeder’s premises where the 
feedlot operator provides all other inputs (e.g., shelter, feed, labor, equipment and other 
needs of the animals during the feeding period) to raise the cattle and is reimbursed 
according to the payment method specified in the contract. Custom feeding contracts are 
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typically classified on the basis of the payment method. There are two major types of 
custom feeding contracts in practice: yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts and cost-of-
gain (or flat rate per pound of gain) contracts (Weimar and Hallam, 1990; Madsen, 1996).  
 
Yardage-Fee-Plus-Feed-Cost Contracts 
 Under a yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contract, a cattle owner pays the feedlot 
operator a two-part fee for feeding the cattle. The fee is based on a fixed yardage charge 
per animal per day (e.g., $0.25/head/day) plus reimbursement for the amount of feed 
consumed, with other costs such as veterinary and labor costs included in the yardage 
charge (Weimar and Hallam, 1990). Sometimes the reimbursement for feed is calculated 
using the actual market price or a standardized price per pound of feed delivered to the 
cattle. In other cases, feedlots charge a fixed price for feed per animal head per day. 
Some contracts specify the responsibilities of extra death loss (over 3 percent). However, 
the risks associated with fluctuating fed cattle prices, feed prices, and performance of the 
cattle in the feedlot is borne by the cattle owner (Weimar and Hallam, 1990). 
 A variant of the yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contract is the yardage-fee-plus-feed-
markup contract. This contract involves a smaller yardage fee (e.g., $0.05/head/day ) but 
includes a percentage markup on feed costs, or a fixed amount per ton of feed provided to 
the cattle (Weimar and Hallam, 1990). As the variability in feed cost is magnified by the 
markup, the cattle owner’s return from the contract will be more variable than a simple 






Under a cost-of-gain contract, the owner reimburses the feeder for his service on 
the basis of an agreed amount per pound of weight gained by an animal during the entire 
feeding phase. The fee per pound of gain is determined prior to feeding the cattle and is 
usually based on feed costs, cost of equipment and overhead, death loss, and shrink. 
Sometimes a sliding scale is used as another method of payment. In this method, the 
payment is based on weight gain for different weights. For example, the owner may pay 
the feeder $16 for the first 100 pounds of gain, $17 for the second 100 pounds, $20 for 
the third hundred pounds, and $24 for the fourth hundred pounds (Madsen, 1996). The 
payment increases with successive gain because the weight of the animal increases at a 
decreasing rate while under continuous feeding. Some contracts also specify a bonus per 
hundredweight of gain paid by the owner to the feeder if the cattle gain on the average 
more than certain number of pounds per head per day. 
The risk characteristics of a cost-of-gain contract are primarily determined by 
animal performance. This contract assigns risks of feed price and feed efficiency of the 
animals to the feeder. Even if the animals’ feed conversion rates are affected by their 
genetic breed or poor weather condition, the loss is borne by the feedlot owner. However, 
fed cattle price risk is borne by the cattle owner. 
 
Vertical Beef Alliances 
Sporleder (1992) defines an inter-firm alliance as an agreement for cooperation 
among independent firms designed to serve a strategic purpose. He further suggests that 
vertical alliances are around the middle point of a continuum between open market 
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transactions and vertical integration and are preferred when participating firms believe 
that “malleable vertical control” is more beneficial than “no control” (open market 
operation) or “full control” (vertical integration). Vertical alliances have been emerging 
in the beef industry since the 1990s. The common stated goal of such alliances is to 
increase overall profits by improving the flow of products and information along the 
vertical segments of a beef supply chain. Members of vertical beef alliances operate 
somewhat independently of one another but still share in risks and profits on the basis of 
a contractual arrangement when cattle and beef products meet certain specifications.  
While alliances can differ widely from one to another, most current vertical 
alliances in the beef industry can be categorized into three major types: marketing 
alliances, breed alliances, and specialty beef alliances (closed cooperatives). Marketing 
alliances are organizations that provide producers (cattle feeders and cow-calf producers) 
access to a beef processor’s value-based pricing mechanism and carcass information in 
exchange for a nominal fee. Alliances in this category include Angus America, Angus 
Gene Net, Farmland Supreme Beef Alliance, U.S. Premium Beef, Western Beef Alliance, 
etc. Breed alliances represent initiatives to increase markets for specific breeds. Several 
purebred cattle associations have established programs to encourage commercial 
cattlemen to use their breed’s bulls by providing additional marketing angles for their 
progeny. The American Hereford Association (Certified Hereford Beef), American 
International Charolais Association (Beef-Charolais), Red Angus Association of 
America, American Gelbvieh Association (Gelbvieh Alliance), and North American 
Limousin Foundation are examples of breed alliances. Specialty beef alliances are 
member-owned closed cooperatives that attempt to bring together all income generating 
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segments of the beef industry by combining producers, processors, and retailers into one 
coordinated business. Examples of this type of alliance are natural or implant-free beef 
production cooperatives such as Coleman’s Natural Meats, Laura’s Lean Beef, Maverick 
Ranches Beef, and B3R Country Meats. A common characteristic of these three types of 
alliances is that they all use some kind of a value-based grid or formula pricing system to 
determine the value of each individual carcass. The process of determination of the 
premiums and discounts for incremental yield and quality, however, depend on the type 
of the alliance.   
 Cattle-Fax estimates that as many as 60 different beef alliances are currently 
operating in the U.S. Field and Taylor (2002) provide information about 38 beef alliances 
and their production and marketing practices. A 2000 survey by Beef magazine shows 
that approximately 40 percent of beef producers were involved or planned to be involved 
in some type of marketing alliance (Field and Taylor, 2002). Beef magazine’s Alliance 
Yellow Pages report information about 33 beef alliances obtained from a voluntary 
survey in 2000 and 2001. Peck (2001) reports that fed cattle slaughter by alliances 
increased from 3.9 million head (10.7 percent of the total slaughter) marketed in 2000 to 
4.7 million head (13.2 percent) in 2001.  
 A survey of cattle feeders located in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas 
conducted in early 2002 revealed that about 11 percent of respondent firms marketed at 
least some of their cattle through some form of an alliance in 1996 (Table 2.4). The 
participation increased to 45 percent by 2001 (Table 2.4). About 55 percent of the 
respondents anticipated that they would market some of their fed cattle through alliances 
by 2006. The survey further revealed that the average percentage of each of the 
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respondent’s fed cattle that were marketed through an alliance was about 4 percent in 
1996 and 20 percent in 2001. The respondents anticipated that they would market about 
31 percent of their fed cattle through an alliance in 2006. The respondent feedlots 
indicated that their primary motives to enter into marketing agreements with beef packers 
were to acquire yield and quality grade premiums as well as to obtain detailed carcass 
data.3 Securing a cattle buyer was another important motive for the respondent feedlot 
operators who were involved in an agreement of some type in 2001.  
 
Table 2.4: Fed cattle marketing through marketing agreements and beef 
                  alliances, results of a 2002 survey on cattle feeders in Iowa, Kansas, 
                  Nebraska, and Texas.
Marketing Method 1996 2001 2006*
(%) (%) (%)
Marketing agreement with beef packer 25.1 33.7 37.4
Marketing agreement with an alliance 11.3 45.2 55.3
Marketing agreement with beef packer 14.2 25.0 26.3
Marketing agreement with an alliance 4.2 20.1 30.7
*Information for 2006 represent anticipation of the respondent feeders. 
Source: Schroeder et al. (2002).
(Percentage of respondents marketing at least 
1% of their fed cattle using the metthod)
(Average percentage of the respondent's fed 




                                                 
3 Detailed carcass performance data are helpful for cattle feeders in evaluating adopted feeding strategies, 
identifying problem areas, and making appropriate adjustments for improvement in production efficiency. 
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2.3 Fed Cattle Pricing Methods 
Existing fed cattle pricing methods can be divided into two groups: lot-average 
pricing and value-based pricing. Lot-average pricing includes live weight and dressed 
weight (in-the-beef) pricing methods. Value-based pricing includes grade-and-yield 
pricing and grid pricing. While live-weight, dressed-weight, and grade-and-yield pricing 
methods are used in spot market transactions, grid pricing is used in non-spot 
transactions, such as in short-term marketing agreements with packers and in alliances.4  
 
Live-Weight Pricing 
 The live-weight pricing method is used in conventional open outcry livestock 
auctions, where cattle are sold in lots (typically 100 head) on a live weight basis. Buyers 
(mainly packers) in a cattle auction place their bids on the basis of the expected value of 
the beef when processed. When calculating the expected value of the cattle, packers start 
with a base Choice carcass price and add or subtract expected quality and yield grade 
premiums or discounts associated with quality traits the particular lot of cattle are 
expected to yield when processed (Schroeder and Davis, 1999). The adjusted carcass 
price is converted to a live animal price by multiplying it by the expected dressing 
percentage including a 4 percent shrink in the live weight of the cattle. This live price is 
credited with by-products and hide values and adjusted for slaughter costs, transportation 
costs, and the packer’s profit margins to establish an estimated live animal bid price 
(Schroeder and Davis, 1999). However, live-weight pricing establishes a uniform price 
                                                 
4  Spot market transactions are defined as those where the price, along with any premiums or discounts for 
carcass characteristics (dressed weight and/or grade and yield), are negotiated at the time ownership is 
transferred.  With non-spot transactions, these are negotiated some time in advance of the actual sale.  Grid 
pricing differs from grade-and-yield pricing because the premiums and discounts for grade and yield, as 
well as any rule governing the base price, are negotiated ahead of the actual sale.  
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per hundred pounds of live weight. Thus, the total amount paid for a lot of animals is 
simply the total live weight of the cattle multiplied by the price. 
 
Dressed-Weight Pricing  
An alternative to live-weight pricing methods is dressed-weight pricing. In 
dressed-weight pricing, the buyer pays one price for each hundred pounds of dressed 
weight for all cattle in a lot; the amount paid for a lot of cattle is the total dressed weight 
multiplied by the price. While dressed-weight pricing compensates for higher yield (the 
amount of lean meat versus fat, and bone in the carcass) using the exact dressing 
percentage, it does not take account of differences in carcass quality (marbling, lean 
color, and firmness and texture of lean tissue). Typically, transportation costs are borne 
by the seller when cattle are priced using the dressed weight method. 
 
Grade- and-Yield Pricing 
Grade-and-yield pricing, is a value-based pricing method, which was introduced 
in the 1980s (Ward, 1987). Unlike live-weight or dressed-weight pricing where a single 
average price applies for the entire sale lot, in grade-and-yield pricing each individual 
animal is priced on the basis of actual dressed weight with adjustments for yield and 
quality grades of the carcass. In particular, grade-and-yield pricing starts with a specified 
dressed-weight base price for a carcass with USDA Choice quality grade and Yield 
Grade 3. Carcasses with yield and quality grades below this benchmark receive discounts 
from the base price. For example, a grade-and-yield pricing system may specify that 
carcasses with quality grade USDA Select will receive a discount of $11/cwt while 
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carcasses with quality grade USDA Standard will receive a discount of $18/cwt (Field 
and Taylor, 2002). Carcasses with yield grade 4 or 5 typically receive the same amount of 
discount in grade-and-yield pricing (Feuz et al., 1993). Carcasses lighter than 600 lbs or 
heavier than 900 lbs are also discounted in this method. However, grade-and-yield 
pricing does not offer any premium for yield grade or quality grade higher than the 
benchmark (Feuz et al., 1993).  
Transactions under grade-and-yield pricing may be called spot transactions 
because the base price and discounts are determined by direct negotiation between buyers 
(packers) and sellers (cattle owners) at the time of fed cattle transactions. As soon as the 
base prices and discounts are settled, the ownership of animals is immediately shifted to 
packing plants for slaughter. Actual yield and quality grades of each individual carcass 
are then measured and the revenue is calculated according to the predetermined base 
price and agreed premiums and discounts for yield and quality grades. However, grade-
and-yield pricing is being gradually replaced by the modern grid pricing system that 




Grid pricing is the modern value-based pricing method characterized by non-spot 
transactions such as marketing agreements and contracts. Instead of using a predetermined base 
price as in the grade-and-yield pricing method, grid pricing uses a base price that is determined 
after the transaction is negotiated between the buyer and seller. Typically, transactions under grid 
pricing are negotiated approximately two weeks prior to slaughter. At the time of transaction 
negotiation, both the buyer and seller are uncertain about the base price. Rather, they agree on a 
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price which is to be revealed one or two weeks after the agreement. The base price in a typical 
grid is often calculated from an average price reported by the Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS) of the USDA or from average prices paid by the packer for cattle purchased on the spot 
market during the week of slaughter or the previous week. Thus, in contrast to grade-and-yield 
pricing, the base price and premium-discount schedule as well as the actual carcass yield and 
grade are unknown at the time of transaction negotiation. More importantly, grid pricing offers a 
series of premiums and discounts for various carcass traits which are not included in grade-and-
yield pricing.  
Most grids consist of a base price with specified premiums and discounts for 
quality and yield grades, weight groups, and carcass and cattle types. Typically, the base 
price is for a USDA Choice, Yield grade 3, 600-900 pound carcass. Table 2.5 represents 
a basic pricing grid with ranges of premiums and discounts for various carcass attributes. 
The horizontal axis of the upper panel of Table 2.5 shows the ranges of premiums and 
discounts for various yield grades and the vertical axis shows the ranges of premiums and 
discounts for different quality grades of carcasses. The lower panel of Table 2.5 shows 
the ranges of discounts for lighter and heavier carcass weight groups and undesired 
carcass and cattle types. Once the base price is known for the grid, the net price can be 
computed for an individual carcass with adjustments for premiums and discounts. If the 
distribution of carcasses by quality and yield grades from a sale lot of fed cattle is known, 
the net price for the sale lot can also be easily computed.  
In general, with the grid pricing method, higher quality cattle receive higher 
prices and lower quality cattle receive lower prices, thereby improving pricing accuracy 
and rewarding cattlemen who market desirable types of cattle. It also improves 
information linkages between meat packers and fed cattle sellers by rewarding desirable 
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carcass traits and penalizing undesirable traits. However, in order to capture the benefits 
of grid pricing, cattle producers need to know the quality of their cattle and how the base 
and premiums in grids are determined (Feuz et al., 2002).  
 
                 ($/cwt. Carcass Basis)
Quality Grades 1 2 3 4 5
Prime 6 - 14 5 -12 4 - 10 (1 - 10) (7 - 15)
CAB 3 - 9 2 - 7 1 - 5 (6 - 13) (12 - 18)
Choice 2 - 4 1 - 2 Base (11 - 14) (17 - 19)
Select (0 - 23) (2 - 24) (4 - 25) (15 - 39) (21 - 44)
Standard (8 - 29) (10 - 30) (12 - 31) (23 - 45) (29 - 50)
Light Carcass (lighter than 600 lbs.)
    400-500 lbs (19 - 29)
    500-550 lbs. (12 - 21)
    550-600 lbs. (1 - 6)
Heavy Carcass (heavier than 900 lbs.)
    900-950 lbs. (0 - 2)
    950-1000 lbs. (4 - 11)
    >1000 lbs. (13 - 22)
Dark Cutter1 (23 - 34)
Hard Bone2 (20 - 31)
Dairy Type (0 - 8)
Bullock (17 - 28)
1Color of the lean muscle in the carcass has a dark appearance, usually caused by relatively long
period of stress to the animal prior to slaughter. 
2Appearance of overly matured carcass with dried out white bones and minimal cartilage.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative.  
Source: The Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS) of the USDA. 








Establishing Base Prices in Grids 
 A variety of methods have been used to establish base prices in grid marketing. 
Results of a survey of cattle feeders conducted by Schroeder et al. (2002) revealed that 78 
percent of fed cattle sold by the respondents on a grid during 2001 used local cash fed 
cattle market prices or adjusted plant average prices to establish base prices. The second 
most popular technique for establishing base prices is direct negotiation (11 percent of 
fed cattle marketed using a grid). Other techniques for establishing base prices relied on 
formulas using wholesale boxed beef prices (8 percent) or live cattle futures prices (3 
percent). Schroeder et al. (2003) examined the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with these alternative methods of establishing grid base prices. They recommend that grid 
base prices should be established using wholesale boxed beef prices because this aligns 
the incentives of the transacting parties. They also recognize that variability the in firm-
to-wholesale marketing margin markedly affects the relationship between wholesale and 
firm-level prices.   
 
Carcass Premiums and Discounts 
 As shown in Table 2.5, most grids start with a base price and adjust that price for 
each individual carcass according to the USDA quality and yield grades, carcass weight, 
and carcass and cattle types. While grid pricing offers significant price premiums for 
certain quality attributes, the discounts for undesirable attributes are much larger (Table 
2.5). Thus, one discounted carcass may offset the premium earned by several. This 
method is much more discriminating with regard to beef carcass quality traits than 
average live- or dressed-weight pricing. There are five quality grades: Prime, Certified 
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Angus Beef (CAB), Choice, Select, and Standard. The factors used to determine quality 
grades are (1) bone maturity, (2) marbling, (3) lean color, and (4) firmness and texture of 
lean tissue. A major difficulty with current premiums and discounts for quality grades is 
the discrete nature of the grades and that measurement of the quality attributes is 
subjective in nature. For example, the difference in value between a Choice and Select 
750-pound carcass with a $7 per hundredweight Choice-to-Select spread is greater than 
$50 per head, while a fine (subjective) line separates the two on a continuous quality 
scale.  
 Yield grades refer to pounds of boneless, closely trimmed retail cuts (BCTRC) 
from the round, loin, rib, and chuck. Yield grades are determined from four carcass 
characteristics: (1) amount of fat over the rib-eye muscle, measured in tenths of inches; 
(2) Kidney, pelvic, and heart (KPH) fat, which is usually estimated as a percentage of 
carcass weight; (3) area of rib-eye muscle (REA), which is measured in square inches; 
and (4) hot carcass weight. Yield grades are a continuous measure, but they are grouped 
into discrete whole numbers for most grids. Official USDA yield grades range from 0.1 
to 5.9, but are typically estimated by graders and recorded as whole numbers for 
determining premiums and discounts in grids, i.e., yield grades 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. As a 
result, like quality grades, some price differences can be large. Hot carcass weights are 
also continuous, but are usually grouped into discrete categories in most grids, resulting 
in similar magnitudes of value differences. 
The report of the 2002 survey of cattle feeders in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and 
Texas suggest that live-weight and dressed-weight pricing methods are being replaced by 
grid pricing over time (Table 2.6). In 1996, the share of fed cattle that respondent feedlots 
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marketed using live or dressed weight methods was 90 percent, but this share declined to 
54.7 percent by 2001 (Table 2.6). Fed cattle marketed using grid pricing methods by the 
respondent cattle feeders increased from 8.1 percent percent to 43.5 percent during the 
same time period (Table 2.6). The respondents anticipated that their use of grid pricing 
for fed cattle marketing would further increase to about 60 percent by 2006. The revealed 
motive of the cattle feeders for adopting grid pricing was primarily to obtain yield and 
quality grade premiums and to get access to detailed carcass data (Schroeder et al., 2002).  
 
Table 2.6: Use of various pricing methods for marketing of fed cattle, results of a 
                 2002 survey on cattle feeders in Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas.
Pricing Method 1996 2001 2006*
(%) (%) (%)
Spot transactions
    Live weight 53.5 28.8 18.3
    Dressed Weight 36.5 25.9 17.7
    Total 90.0 54.7 36.0
Grid Market (non-spot) Transactions
    Grid (Base: Cash mkt. or plant average) 6.9 33.7 32.5
    Grid (Base: Futures price) 0.4 1.0 5.6
    Grid (Base: Boxed beef price) 0.3 2.8 11.2
    Grid (Base: Negotiated) 0.5 5.9 10.4
    Total 8.1 43.4 59.7
Other Non-spot Transactions
    Fixed Price Contracts 0.7 1.2 1.8
    Futures (Basis) Contracts 0.8 0.6 1.1
    Other 0.4 0.1 1.4
    Total 1.9 1.9 4.3
All Transactions 100 100 100
*Information for 2006 represent anticipation of the respondent feeders. 
Source: Schroeder et al. (2002). 
(Average percentage of the respondents' fed 
cattle marketed using the metthod)







 This chapter presents a detailed description of the nature and extent of vertical 
coordination in the U.S. beef industry. Different forms of vertical coordination such as 
integration by ownership, strategic alliances, contracts, and marketing agreements are 
observed along the beef supply chain. However, the extent of vertical integration by 
ownership of two or more segments of the beef supply chain is very low and stable. 
While distinct vertical sectors of this industry still rely heavily on spot market 
transactions, the use of short-term marketing contracts or agreements with beef packers 
and alliances is increasing over time. Such non-spot market transactions usually involve 
value-based pricing of fed cattle. Increased profit margins by acquiring yield and quality 
grade premiums and obtaining detailed carcass data for further improvement in 
production efficiency are cited as the primary motives of the cattlemen for entering into 
non-spot marketing arrangements.  
 More than half of the feeder cattle are currently fed in the U.S. feedlots on the 
basis of various contractual agreements. Increasing use of value-based pricing systems 
indicates that retained ownership of cattle through slaughter and contract feeding 
practices are likely to increase further. Reviewing relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature, the next chapter attempts to explain the existing as well as emerging 
governance structures of the U.S. beef industry.  
CHAPTER 3 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACT THEORY AND THE  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE BEEF INDUSTRY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The neoclassical analysis of production and distribution tends to assume that the 
operation of markets is costless. This theory is very useful for analyzing how a firm's 
production choices respond to exogenous changes in the economic and physical 
environment, and the consequences of strategic interactions between firms under 
conditions of imperfect competition. However, it does not explain how production is 
organized within a firm, how conflicts of interest between the firm's various owners, 
managers, workers, and consumers are resolved, or, more generally, how the goal of 
profit-maximization is achieved (Hart, 1989).  
 Principal-agent theory recognizes conflicts of interest between different economic 
actors in a firm, and formalizes these conflicts through the inclusion of information 
asymmetries and the problems of unobservability (e.g., Stiglitz, 1974; Grossman and 
Hart, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  This theory investigates the nature of optimal 
incentive schemes that align the objectives of different actors. In this way, principal-agent 
theory modifies neoclassical theory significantly, but it still fails to answer the questions 
about organizational forms.  
Theories that describe firms in organizational terms and deal with specific 
investment and optimal allocation of asset ownership can be categorized into two groups: 
transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985; and Klein et al., 
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1978), and property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, and 
Hart 1995). Both of these approaches deal with a firm’s make-or-buy decision through a 
setup where contracts are incomplete (complete contingent claims contracting between 
trading partners is impossible due to bounded rationality), and contracting parties are 
bilaterally dependent through asset specificity. However, these two approaches are 
different in their formal settings and implications.  
Theoretical developments and empirical research in transaction cost economics 
and property rights theory are presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively . Section 3.4 
discusses the agricultural economics literature that applies incomplete contract theory. 
Section 3.5 analyzes the existing as well as emerging organizational structures of the U.S. 
beef industry in the light of transaction cost economics and property rights theory. While 
this chapter provides some rationale for why vertical integration has not yet occurred in 
the beef industry, its purpose is to provide a clear understanding of the potential role of 
value-based grid pricing in the absence of vertical integration.     
 
3.2 Transaction Cost Economics  
Coase (1937) pointed out that markets do not operate costlessly. He argued that 
accomplishments of market transactions often involve various types of costs such as the 
costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts, which can be termed as transaction 
costs. Coase proposed that, the higher is the cost of transacting in the market, the greater 




Alchian and Demsetz (1972) take Coase’s conjecture a step further. In the light of 
Coase’s proposition, they subscribe to a theory of the firm based on the cost of managing 
resources in the team production process, which asserts that, ceteris paribus, the lower is 
the cost of managing the greater will be the comparative advantage of organizing 
resources within the firm. They identify the essence of the classical firm as a contractual 
structure with (1) production by joint inputs owned by several owners, (2) a residual 
claimant or monitor of the team who (a) is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, 
(b) has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with other 
input owners, and (c) has the right to sell his contractual residual status. 
In order to align the goals of the monitor and the team, Alchian and Demsetz 
propose assigning the team’s net earnings to the monitor, net of payments to other input 
agents. This reduces the monitor’s incentive to shirk his duties since that directly affects 
his payment stream. Team members maximize their returns by employing the monitor 
who reduces shirking not only by the prices he agrees to pay to the owners of the inputs, 
but also by observing and detecting the actions or uses of these inputs. The arrangement 
is simply a contractual structure subject to continuous renegotiation with the central agent 
(firm’s owner and employer) without any authoritarian control. The contractual structure 
arises as a means of enhancing efficient organization of team production. In particular, 
the ability to detect shirking among owners of jointly used inputs in team production is 
enhanced (detection costs are reduced) by this arrangement and the discipline (by 




Williamson (1979, 1985) expands the definition of transaction costs to include the 
behavioral dimensions of opportunism and bounded rationality of economic agents. 
Opportunism refers to the possibility that economic agents act in a self-interested way 
“with guile,” as Williamson puts it. That is, agents may not be entirely honest and truthful 
about their intentions and might attempt to take advantage of unforeseen circumstances 
that give them the chance to exploit others. Although all agents need not be regarded as 
opportunistic to an identical degree, it is difficult to ascertain which ones are less 
opportunistic than others ex ante. Bounded rationality refers to the fact that decision 
makers have limited memories and limited cognitive processing power, which also differ 
among individuals. No matter how intelligent or knowledgeable an individual decision 
maker is, s/he cannot consider all the feasible courses of actions, especially when 
uncertain behavior of other agents also affects the outcome. Under these assumptions, 
transaction costs refer to both ex ante and ex post costs of arms-length transactions.5 
Williamson argues that the firms’ objective is to minimize the production costs net of 
transaction costs and that minimizing transaction costs is the primary motivation for 
adopting different governance structures.  
Williamson identifies three critical dimensions for characterizing transactions: 
uncertainty, the frequency with which transactions recur, and the degree to which 
transaction-specific investments in human and physical capital are incurred. These three 
dimensions determine the magnitude of transaction costs under alternative governance 
structures. Williamson describes three main types of governance structures of 
                                                 
5 Conceivably, ex ante costs of transactions refer to search and information costs, drafting, bargaining and 
decision costs, and cost of safeguarding an agreement, while ex post costs include monitoring and 




transactions: market governance, trilateral governance, and transaction-specific (bilateral 
and unified) governance. He then indicates how and why different types of transactions 
can be matched with alternative institutional settings in a discriminating way.  
Williamson classifies frequency of transactions into three categories: one-time, 
occasional, and recurrent. Because one-time transactions are rarely observed, he 
maintains only occasional and recurrent frequency distinctions. Williamson also divides 
transaction-specific investments into three classes: nonspecific, mixed (semi-specific), 
and idiosyncratic investments. Transactions that do not require specific investments in 
physical or human capital are termed as non-specific or standardized transactions. On the 
other hand, transactions that require an extremely high level of specific investments (the 
opportunity cost of which is much higher in alternative uses) are termed as specific or 
idiosyncratic transactions. Semi-specific transactions with mixed (semi-specific) 
investments fall between the nonspecific and idiosyncratic extremes. Comparing 
transaction costs under alternative institutions, Williamson determines the appropriate 
governance structures for all three types of transactions across occasional and recurrent 
frequency distinctions. Figure 3.1 presents Williamson’s governance structures for 
alternative transaction types.  
Williamson claims that a traditional open market is the appropriate governance 
structure for nonspecific transactions of both occasional and recurring frequencies. With 
recurring nonspecific transactions, both parties only have to consult their own experience 
in deciding whether or not to continue a trading relationship. Little transaction costs are 
involved in switching to an alternative partner since no specific assets are required and 
the market is full of homogeneous, well defined, standard agents. Nonspecific but 
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occasional transactions are ones for which the parties in an exchange relation are less able 
to rely on their own experience to safeguard against opportunism. However, given that 
the good or service is of a standard kind, agents can rely on formal or informal rating 
services or experience of others which provides incentives for parties to behave 
responsibly. Abundance of market alternatives is mainly what protects each party against 
opportunism by the counterpart.   
When transactions require mixed (semi-specific) or idiosyncratic (specific) 
investments and are occasional in nature, trilateral governance such as contracting with 
third party assistance is the appropriate institution form. Once the principals to such 
transactions have entered into a contract, strong incentives are established to see the 
contract through to completion. The interests of the principals in sustaining the 
transaction relation are especially great for highly idiosyncratic transactions. Traditional 
market governance cannot sustain these types of transactions, and setting up a 
transaction-specific (bilateral) governance structure to guard against opportunism is 
costly. Therefore, an intermediate institutional form is evidently needed. Third party 
assistance to resolve disputes and evaluation performance often has advantages over 
litigation in these situations.  
The two types of transactions for which specialized governance structures are 
commonly devised are recurring transactions requiring mixed and highly idiosyncratic 
investments. The non-standardized nature of these transactions makes primary reliance 
on market governance hazardous, while their recurrent nature permits the cost of the 
specialized governance structure to be recovered. Williamson distinguishes two types of 
transaction-specific governance structures: bilateral structures (where the autonomy of 
41 
 
the parties is maintained) and unified structures (where transactions are removed from the 
market and are organized within the firm subject to an authority relation). Partnerships 
and alliances are examples of bilateral structures. Unified structures involve complete 
vertical integration. 
 




Bilateral Governance Unified Governance








Williamson suggests that a bilateral governance structure such as joint ownership 
or a strategic alliance is appropriate for semi-specific (mixed) transactions. Because the 
degree of asset specificity is less complete in such transactions, outside procurement may 
be favored by scale-economy considerations. Outside procurement may also be better 
than vertical integration in eliciting cost control for a steady-state supply. However, a 
problem arises when contract negotiations or adaptations become necessary. Outside 
procurement often involves affecting adaptation across some market interface, which can 
be accomplished only by mutual agreements. Therein rests the potential conflict. On the 
one hand, both parties have an incentive to sustain the relationship in order to avoid the 
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sacrifice of valued transaction-specific economies. On the other hand, each party 
appropriates a separate profit stream and cannot be expected to accede readily to any 
proposal to adapt the contract. In order to successfully accomplish needed adaptations, 
the parties must have some way of declaring admissible dimensions for adjustment such 
that flexibility is provided under terms in which both parties have confidence. This can be 
accomplished by recognizing the hazards of opportunism and how those vary with the 
type of adaptation proposed, restricting adjustments to those where the hazards are least, 
and performing adjustments with an attitude that is conducive to a long-term relationship.  
Incentives for trading decrease as transactions become progressively more 
idiosyncratic. This is because, as the specialized human and physical assets become more 
specialized to a single use and, hence, less transferable to other uses, economies of scale 
can be fully realized by the buyer. Thus, the decision centers on choosing the organizing 
mode with superior adaptive properties. Vertical integration becomes an obvious choice 
in these circumstances. The advantage of vertical integration is that adaptations can be 
made in a sequential way without having to consult, complete, or change inter-firm 
agreements. Since a single entity spans both sides of the transactions with an objective of 
joint profit maximization, price adjustments in vertically integrated enterprises are more 
complete than in inter-firm trading. Likewise, quantity adjustment can also occur at any 
needed frequency to maximize the joint gain of the transaction. 
Williamson also attempts to explain how the governance of transactions is 
affected by increasing the degree of uncertainty.  Non-specific transactions have little 
value for continuity because new relations can easily be arranged. Uncertainty does not 
alter that fact, so open market transactions continue and the market mechanism governs 
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all transactions regardless of the level of uncertainty. For mixed or idiosyncratic 
investments, uncertainty is important because parties have a larger stake in working out 
mutually agreeable contract terms. As uncertainty increases, unified governance 
structures (vertical integration) replace bilateral structures (partnership/alliances) in 
recurrent transactions.  
Klein et al. (1978) add further content to the analysis of transaction cost 
economics by arguing that when transactions are characterized by specific investments in 
physical or human capital, a contractual relationship between a separately owned buyer 
and seller is plagued by opportunistic and inefficient behavior in situations in which there 
are large amounts of surplus to be divided ex post. And, because of the impossibility of 
writing a complete, contingent contract, the ex ante contract does not specify a clear 
division of this surplus. In that situation, the transaction should be organized within the 
firm by integration, assuming that integration yields the outcome that would arise under 
complete contracts. 
 
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics 
Empirical economic research that applies transaction cost economics (hereafter 
TCE) examines whether and when particular contracting practices provide efficiency 
benefits. Early empirical work in this area focuses on the presence of transaction-specific 
investments as the critical determinant of vertical integration and long-term contracting 
(see Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Masten 1984; 
Joskow, 1985, 1988, 1990; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Masten and Saussier, 2000). 
While not exhaustive, six distinct types of asset specificity are predominantly featured in 
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these empirical TCE applications: physical asset specificity, site specificity, human asset 
specificity, temporal specificity, brand name capital, and dedicated assets. Empirical 
results of these studies lend support to TCE suggesting that substantial efficiency gains 
from specific investments might be prime motives for long-term contractual relationships 
and vertical integration.  
A number of recent papers also examine the effects of various types of asset 
specificity on organizational forms. In an examination of the semiconductor industry, 
Monteverde (1995) finds that the decision to integrate product design with manufacturing 
is systematically related to required investments in specific human capital. Weiss and 
Kurland (1997) investigate the ways that inter-organizational relationships (e.g., 
distribution channels) hold together and find that the level of specialized investment 
made by downstream partners influences manufacturers’ decisions to terminate these 
relationships. Human asset specificity is also at issue in Hamilton’s (1999) examination 
of prenuptial contracts. Couples signing such contracts tend to choose joint ownership of 
property when wives are particularly important to the “household enterprise.” Ulset 
(1996) also finds that asset specificity, proxied by sunk costs, significantly affects the 
decision of Norwegian IT firms to integrate commercial research and development 
(R&D) projects.  
An interesting historical examination of vertical integration and relationship-
specific investment is Bindseil's (1997) analysis of the provision of physical assets to the 
London and New York Stock Exchanges. Bindseil explains the historical emergence of a 
vertically integrated exchange by the increasingly specific nature of the physical assets 
that were required to perform trades. He argues that the vertical integration of the 
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professional traders’ association into the asset-providing firm became the optimal form of 
governance. 
Another set of studies explore the interaction of asset specificity with other 
transactional characteristics that are hypothesized to affect governance choice (see Lyons, 
1995; Regan, 1997; Joshi and Stump, 1999; and Saussier, 2000). Lyons (1995), for 
example, finds specific investments are more influential than scale or scope economies 
for in-house production over market procurement for the purchasing of inputs in the 
United Kingdom’s motor vehicle, electronics and metal processing industries. Taken 
together, these empirical papers support the view that asset specificity in combination 
with other transactional considerations is an important determinant of vertical integration.  
 A large body of empirical TCE research examines long-term contracting and, in 
particular, the structure and duration of contractual relationships. Crocker and Masten 
(1988) examine the distortions in contract terms occasioned by non-price competition for 
natural gas in the presence of wellhead price regulation. They observe that deviations 
from optimal contract incentives significantly raise the cost of being bound to long-term 
agreements and shorten the duration of contracts. Pirrong (1993) argues that although 
transactions costs are important in bulk shipping markets, the considerations that 
influence contracting practices in these markets are somewhat different than those usually 
emphasized in TCE. Examining the markets for the shipment of fourteen separate bulk 
commodities, he finds that asset specificities in ocean shipping are considerably less 
acute than in other industries such as mine mouth coal plants and auto-body 
manufacturing. Thus, even if the costs of physically redeploying assets are low (as is the 
case in bulk shipping), spot trading may be less efficient than exchanges governed either 
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by more formal, enduring bilateral relationships or by direct ownership, unless the 
number of buyers and sellers of the assets is relatively large . These findings present a 
challenge to transaction cost theory.  
However, more recent empirical studies have reestablished the validity of TCE. 
Saussier's (2000) analyzes the duration of contracts between private firms and the French 
state-owned power utility (EDF) for the transportation and unloading of coal to EDF 
power plants. Using detailed contract data, Saussier finds that the amount of site, physical 
and human asset specificity associated with a given transaction, as well as the presence of 
dedicated assets, significantly increases the duration of EDF coal contracts while greater 
uncertainty significantly decreases the duration of these contracts. Adler and Scherer's 
(1999) examination of defense procurement contracts similarly suggests that transaction 
cost factors, including asset specificity, incompleteness, and uncertainty have a 
significant influence on the specific type of contract that is employed. Dahl and Matson’s 
(1998) analysis of the U.S. natural gas industry contracts and regulatory action presents 
similar findings between contract duration and specific transaction cost factors. Other 
notable studies that confirm the predictions of TCE include Masten and Saussier (2000) 
and Libecap and Smith (1999). 
 
3.3 Property Rights Theory 
While the transaction cost approach aids understanding when the cost of 
contracting between separately owned firms is high, it does not clearly explain the costs 
and benefits of organizing transactions within the firm. Moreover, it does not provide a 
sufficiently clear definition of integration for its costs and benefits to be assessed. 
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Grossman and Hart (1986) develop a theory of costly contracts emphasizing that 
contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is too 
costly for one party to specify a long list of the particular rights it desires over the other 
party’s assets, it may be optimal for the party to purchase all rights except those 
specifically mentioned in the contract. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights. 
Integration is the purchase of the assets of one of the parties by the other for the purpose 
of acquiring the residual rights of control. 
Grossman and Hart argue that the relevant comparison is not between the 
nonintegrated outcome and the complete contract outcome but instead between a contract 
that allocates residual rights to one party and a contract that allocates them to another. 
Hart and Moore (1990) extend the theory of Grossman and Hart by analyzing a 
framework which is broad enough to encompass more general control structures 
(partnerships or cooperatives) than simple ownership. In addition, Hart and Moore 
specialize the meaning of residual control rights relative to Grossman and Hart by 
defining the sole right possessed by the owner of an asset as his ability to exclude others 
from the use of the asset. Hart and Moore demonstrate that, if investments are non-
contractible and outcomes are non-verifiable, then the inability to fully capture 
incremental payoffs in ex post bargaining may lead to suboptimal levels of ex ante 
investment, which is known as the holdup problem. The development of property rights 
theory (hereafter PRT) is attributed to the works of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart 
and Moore (1990). 
 As a solution to the holdup problem, PRT considers the ex ante distribution of 
property rights over the physical assets. Allocation of ownership rights determines the 
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bargaining power of agents over the returns to investment which enhances the 
productivity of the assets. This in turn determines incentives to invest.  
There are three ways ownership of the assets can be assigned ex ante: to agent A, 
to agent B, or to both agents jointly. Single-agent ownership entitles the agent in question 
to use the asset to trade with an outsider, which strengthens the agent’s bargaining 
position in ex post negotiation. This gives the owner a greater incentive to invest in the 
relationship. Joint ownership, by contrast, prevents either agent from using the assets for 
third party trading (outside options) without the other’s permission. According to PRT, 
joint ownership of an asset is suboptimal because it provides lower investment incentives 
for every co-owner.     
The PRT approach, however, asserts that when ownership rights of the assets are 
assigned to a single agent, they are lost by the other, and this inevitably creates 
distortions.  They show that, to the extent that the marginal and average values of 
investments move together, the allocation of ownership rights will affect the level of 
investment by changing the average investment return. If firm A owns firm B, firm A 
will use its residual rights of control to obtain a large share of the ex post surplus, and this 
will cause firm A to overinvest and firm B to underinvest. Thus, integration shifts the 
incentives for opportunistic and distortionary behavior, but it does not remove these 
incentives. However, the main implication of the PRT approach is that integration is 
optimal when one firm’s investment decision is particularly important relative to the 
other firm’s investment decision, whereas non-integration is desirable when both 
investment decisions are somewhat important.   
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Whinston (2003) notes that predictions of the PRT approach differ significantly 
from those of the TCE approach, and that the existing empirical evidence that supports 
the TCE approach sheds little light on the empirical relevance of the PRT approach. The 
TCE approach seeks to determine whether firms A and B should be separately owned and 
operated or if the ownership and operation of two stages should be unified. If 
independent, then each stage appropriates its net receipts but opportunistic behavior can 
arise during contract execution. In contrast, PRT views vertical integration in a 
directional way; either A buys B or B buys A, otherwise they remain independent and 
each stage appropriates its net receipts. The most significant difference between the TCE 
and PRT setups is that the TCE approach holds that maladaptation (opportunism) in 
contract execution is the principal source of inefficiency, whereas the PRT approach 
excludes ex post maladaptation by assumptions of common knowledge and costless ex 
post bargaining. All of the inefficiency in the PRT approach is concentrated in the ex ante 
investment. In addition, the TCE approach maintains that each generic mode of 
governance differs in incentive intensity, administrative control, access to the courts, and 
informal organization, while the PRT approach assumes that incentive intensity, 
administrative control, and informal organization are unchanged by ownership and that 
courts are irrelevant (because of costless renegotiation).  
Since its inception, the PRT approach has been under attack. Maskin and Tirole 
(1999a) argue that as long as agents are able to perform dynamic programming (by the 
assumption of unbounded rationality, which is always invoked in the incomplete contract 
literature) transaction costs are irrelevant. In particular, they show that even if transaction 
costs prevent agents from describing physical contingencies ex ante, they do not 
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constrain the set of payoffs that can be reached through contracting in the absence of 
contract renegotiation. Evaluating Maskin and Tirole’s (hereafter MT) critique, Hart and 
Moore (1999) provide a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete. 
Applying MT’s irrelevance theorems in their model, Hart and Moore (1999) show that 
the optimal contract without describability of trades cannot be worse than the optimal 
contract with describability. More importantly, they find that the assumptions behind 
MT’s irrelevance theorems are quite restrictive, and that describability matters if the 
assumptions are relaxed. 
Chiu (1998) argues that outside options do not always confer as much bargaining 
power upon agents as the PRT approach suggests. He shows that the presence of a 
nonbinding outside option has no effect on the bargaining outcome at all. More 
importantly, because the presence of a binding outside option makes the agent the 
residual claimant of his investment, he may have a greater incentive to invest when 
owning fewer assets. While dealing with similar issues, De Meza and Lockwood (1998) 
suggest that if genuine outside options are available, then asset ownership may 
discourage investment. Rajan and Zingales (1998) develop a more general theory of 
power in organization and show that asset ownership has adverse effects on the incentive 
to specialize. They argue that regulation of access to critical resources can be a better 
mechanism than allocation of asset ownership because the power acquired by agents from 
access is more contingent on their making the right investment. 
Revisiting the proposition of PRT that joint ownership is suboptimal, Maskin and 
Tirole (1999b) argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership 
with put options. Cai (2003) and Matouschek (2004) investigate the situations in which 
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joint ownership is optimal. Cai offers a theory of joint ownership by extending the 
property rights theory of the firm to situations where parties can endogenously choose the 
degree of specificity of their investments. He shows that when specific and general 
investments are complements, the standard PRT results are obtained and joint ownership 
is suboptimal. But, when specific and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership 
is optimal as long as trade takes place within the relationship. Matouschek shows that 
joint ownership is optimal if the managers’ expected gains from trade are large and that 
either integration or non-integration is optimal if the expected gains from trade are small. 
While both the PRT and TCE approaches play down the role of natural risk in the 
organization of the firm, Hanson (1995) views the choice of ownership structure as 
involving a trade-off between minimizing holdup risk and spreading natural risk.  
A growing theoretical literature has suggested contractual solutions to the hold-up 
problem where two parties can mitigate the incompleteness of their contract by 
incorporating a scheme for renegotiating the terms of trade ex post into their initial non-
contingent contract (Hart and Moore, 1988; Aghion et al., 1990; Chung, 1991; Hermalin 
and Katz, 1993; Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995) or by stipulating an efficient remedy to 
breach, such as expectation damages (under this rule, an agent may unilaterally decide to 
breach a contract if he pays the other agent an amount sufficient to give her what her 
profit would have been under performance, measured ex post) or specific performance 
(MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Zhu, 2000). Rogerson 
(1992), De Fraja (1999), and Che and Chung (1999) show that investment sequentiality 
makes these contractual solutions immune to the additional complication of two-sided 
direct externalities introduced by Che and Haush (1999). Some studies have introduced a 
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third party, viewed as an outsider who does not invest (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Spier 
and Whinston, 1995) or an insider who invests (Fares, 2004), in the bilateral relationship. 
In either case, the contracting parties extract rents from the third party by increasing 
expectation damages and thus reducing the possibility of breach. 
Another solution to the holdup problem is self-enforcing relational contracts, 
which are informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct sustained by the value of 
a future relationship. Relational contracts within and between firms help circumvent 
difficulties in formal contracting only if they are self-enforcing, i.e., the long-run value of 
the relationship must be greater than the short-run value of reneging such that neither 
party wishes to renege. Self enforcement depends crucially on continuity in the 
relationship. Formal modeling of relational contracts usually takes the form of a repeated 
game.  
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002, hereafter BGM) develop a repeated game 
model showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ 
from those between firms (nonintegration). They consider a production chain where an 
upstream party uses an asset to produce a good that can be used either in a downstream 
party’s production process or in an alternative use where the upstream party’s actions 
affect the value of the good in both of these uses. Employing Grossman and Hart’s (1986) 
terminology of integration (i.e., when the upstream party owns the asset, the transaction 
is called nonintegrated, and when the downstream party owns the asset, the transaction is 
called integrated) and assuming that ownership of the asset conveys ownership of the 
good, BGM examine whether choosing appropriate asset ownership (integration or 
nonintegration) can make a given promise self-enforcing. The main proposition of BGM 
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is that integration affects the parties’ temptations to renege on a relational contract, and 
hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. It immediately follows 
that firms cannot mimic the spot market outcome after a transaction is brought inside the 
firm because the reneging temptation is too great. This proposition has two principal 
implications: first, vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply 
prices because this reduces reneging temptations in such situations and, second, high-
powered incentives create greater reneging temptations under integration than under non-
integration. 
 
Empirical Research in Property Rights Theory 
 Whereas empirical applications of TCE have been growing exponentially since 
the 1980s (the number of published studies exceeds 500, Williamson 2000), Oliver Hart 
reports that “Unfortunately, there has to date been no formal test of the property rights 
approach…” (Hart, 1995, p. 49). This is mainly because the data relevant to PRT are 
limited and inaccessible. Williamson (2000) points out that the shift from ex post 
maladaptation to ex ante investment distortions is responsible for PRT making limited 
contact with the data. However, a few recent studies attempt to test the property rights 
model using firm-level data.  
  Hanson (1995) uses aggregate data on Mexican apparel subcontracting to test a 
version of the Grossman and Hart model incorporating natural risk. He examines a 
garment manufacturer’s choice of how to divide ownership of physical assets between 
himself and a subcontractor in the presence of natural and holdup risks. From the risk-
adjusted holdup model, Hanson predicts that the manufacturer concentrates ownership 
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(subcontracts a relatively small share of production) when natural risk is low and 
decentralizes ownership (subcontracts a relatively larger share of production) when 
holdup risk is low. Empirical results from a Tobit estimation technique support the 
predictions from his risk-adjusted holdup model that manufacturers subcontract a high 
share of production when demand is highly variable and a low share when they make 
large relation specific investments.  
  Woodruff (2002) provides a test of PRT using data on manufacturer-retailer 
integration in the Mexican footwear industry. Drawing a distinction between the 
transaction cost approach and property rights approach, he notes that efficient ownership 
depends not only on the degree of specificity of investments (as TCE suggests), but also 
on the importance of those investments in determining the profits of the trading 
relationship (as PRT suggests). Empirical results from a probit model provide support for 
prediction from the property rights framework that independent ownership is more likely 
in segments with high fashion turnover. 
 Baker and Hubbard (2003) find that independent ownership of long-haul trucks in 
the US decreased following technological changes allowing greater contracting scope. 
More recently, Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) examine the structure of ownership and 
control rights of more than 100 alliances by Internet portals and other firms between 1995 
and 1999. Their empirical tests provide support for predictions of two property rights 
models: the PRT model, which predicts that assets in a bilateral relationship should be 
owned by the party whose marginal effort has the greatest impact on the value of the 
relationship; and Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) model of contracting for innovation, which 
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suggests that relative bargaining power, in addition to the marginal impact of effort, is an 
important determinant of the allocation of property rights.  
 
3.4 Agricultural Economics Research Employing Incomplete Contract Theory 
 There has been little systematic analysis of the organization of agriculture from 
the incomplete contracting perspective. Masten (2000) notes that “agricultural 
transactions provide a rich and largely unexplored area for application and refinement of 
transaction cost theory” (Masten 2000, p. 190). Barry et al. (1992) recognize the 
theoretical developments in TCE and urge that “agricultural economists have important 
potential contributions to offer in evaluating the changing structure of relationships in 
agriculture” (p 1224). 
 A number of case studies analyze different forms of vertical coordination in 
agriculture employing TCE. Hendrikse and Veerman (2001a) analyze the relationship 
between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative and the requirement of the 
domination of control by the members from a transaction costs perspective. Masten 
(2000) examines the nature of agricultural production, processing, and distribution. He 
argues that physical and human asset specificities play a less important role in 
agricultural transactions in comparison to the temporal and location specificities.  
Hennessy and Lawrence (1999) examine the vertical transaction relations between 
growers and processors in the U.S. hog industry in the context of existing theories on the 
nature of the firm. Knoeber examines the governance structure of fruit and vegetable 
processing and dairy processing (1983), and broiler production contracts (1989) from a 
TCE perspective. Other notable studies include Read’s (1983) analysis of the evolution of 
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organizational arrangements in the U.S.-Caribbean banana trade, Gallick’s (1996) study 
of the relations between tuna harvesters and processors, and Cozzarin and Westgtren’s 
(2000) and Cozzarin and Barry’s (1998) studies of the choice of organizational form in 
industrialized hog production.  
 Several empirical studies examine the extent and use of contracting in agriculture. 
Allen and Lueck (1992a) investigate how the choice between crop sharing and fixed rent 
contracts is related to the level of production risk associated with particular crops. Allen 
and Lueck (1992b) also examine oral and short-term rental contracts in US farmland 
employing TCE. Lajili et al. (1997), Alston and Higgs (1982), and Allen and Lueck 
(1993; 1996) are other notable empirical studies on agricultural contracting issues.  
Studies on agricultural policy issues that make use of TCE reasoning include Frank and 
Henderson’s (1992) analysis of downstream food markets, Globerman and Schwindt’s 
(1986) and Goedecke and Ortmann’s (1993) study of forestry, and Vatn’s (1998) 
examination of environmental taxes. Recently, Huffman and Just (2004) have analyzed 
land tenancy contracts, both in developed and developing countries, applying modern 
agency theory. 
Two notable studies on the beef industry which employ the TCE approach are 
Purcell (1990) and Purcell and Hudson (2003). Purcell studies the growth of long-term 
contracting and the prevalence of integration between feedlots and beef processors due to 
site specificity. Based on TCE, agency theory, and the resource theory literature, Hudson 
and Purcell develop a conceptual framework for strategic alliances in the beef industry 
and analyze strategies for sharing feeding and packing margins. 
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Whereas the literature applying TCE to explain the changing structure of 
agriculture has been growing, the potential of PRT has yet to be well recognized by 
agricultural economists. Recently, in the light of PRT, Johnson and Melkonyan (2003) 
have developed a model explaining the consolidation pattern in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry. Hendrikse and Veerman (2001b) formulate a theory regarding 
the choice of governance structure in agricultural chain production from a property rights 
perspective.  
 
3.5 Implications of Incomplete Contract Theory for the Traditional and Emerging  
      Governance Structures of the Beef Industry 
 
While increasing trends in some forms of vertical coordination such as short-term 
marketing agreements and forward contracts for fed cattle procurement, alliances, and 
custom cattle feeding contracts have increased in recent years, distinct vertical sectors of 
the U.S. beef industry still rely heavily on spot market transactions. Field and Taylor 
(2002) suggest that although contractual arrangements are likely to become predominant, 
vertical integration by ownership is unlikely in the beef industry for two main reasons. 
First, since the cow-calf and stocker sectors are land-based and have low margins, players 
further down the supply chain are unlikely to be interested in assuming the related risk 
and debt. Second, the size and scope of the beef industry is too cumbersome to facilitate 
total ownership. Lawrence and Hayenga (2002) suggest that greater length and breadth of 
the multiple stage supply chain and little differentiation in intermediate and final products 
are the main reasons for the beef industry sectors to rely on spot market transactions. 
They further mention that most cattle producers prefer independent decision making in 
their production management and marketing decisions. 
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Ward (1997) identifies several impediments to vertical integration in the beef 
industry. First, the extent of physical and human capital required to organize breeding, 
cow-calf operations, intensive feeding, and slaughter and packing within one firm is 
immense. Second, diversity of physical and human capital needed for distinct production 
stages increases the difficulty in managing a vertical beef production unit. Third, with the 
diverging genetic base and the relatively long biological cycle of beef cattle, controlling 
quality and consistency of beef products is difficult. Finally, since beef is primarily 
marketed in fresh form as a commodity rather than as differentiated products, the 
economic incentive to vertically integrate, develop value-added products, and use product 
differentiation as a profit opportunity is weak.   
Ferrier and Lamb (2007) argue that federal regulation of beef production has 
played a critical role in shaping the structure of the industry from the ranch through the 
feedlot and the supermarket. The USDA beef grading system began as a voluntary one-
year experimental program in 1927 and marked the first national effort to create federal 
quality assurance standards for beef products. The voluntary beef grading system was 
formalized by the Agricultural Marketing Service Act of 1946, and its original format has 
remained basically unchanged despite adjustments in terminology and individual grade 
requirements (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). The USDA grading system assigns two grades to 
beef: yield grade (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and quality grade (Prime, Choice, Select, Standard, 
Commercial, Utility, Cutter, and Canner). Grading of beef products according to the 
USDA yield and quality grades has grown substantially since about 1950 (Pierce, 1976). 
Currently, nearly all beef products sold through commercial outlets in the US are subject 
to USDA grading (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). Ferrier and Lamb suggest that the embodied 
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incentive structure of the USDA’s beef grading system encouraged product homogeneity 
at the expense of product differentiation, which led to the eventual commoditization of 
the intermediate and consumer products.  
While the above explanations are valuable, incomplete contract theory offers 
further insights for analyzing traditional as well as emerging governance structures of the 
beef industry. According to the incomplete contract theory literature (such as for TCE 
and PRT), when transactions between two parties involve specific investments, they may 
engage in opportunistic behavior in an attempt to appropriate the quasirents generated by 
the specific investments.6 This gives rise to a potential holdup problem, which leads to 
efficiency losses in production and market transactions because the specific investments 
in different stages become suboptimal in the presence of opportunistic behavior. Such 
circumstances call for an efficient governance structure under which first best outcomes 
can be achieved if possible. While complete contingent contracts designed to eliminate 
the incentive for opportunism could restore efficiency in production and transactions, 
contracts in reality are often incomplete because of unforeseen contingencies and the 
costs of writing and enforcing contracts. Considering the degree of idiosyncrasy of 
transaction-specific investments and the nature of transaction relations, TCE and PRT 




                                                 
6 Throughout this section, specific investments refer to the investments that are only valuable (or are much 
more valuable) in the context of a specific transaction relation between two parties (i.e., the investments 
have high opportunity cost without the transaction relation). Investment specific to an industry not 
necessarily be transaction-specific in that sense.  
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Traditional Governance Structures: Spot Market Transactions 
Historically, open market operations have been the predominant transaction 
mechanism for cattle and beef products. Supermarket retailing in the US grew rapidly 
after World War II (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). Organized primarily as resale outlets for 
finished food products, supermarkets sought consistent supply of uniform retail beef cuts 
differentiated by USDA grades. In order to meet supermarkets’ demand, meat packers 
eventually absorbed many of the processing activities of the butchers. Starting with Iowa 
Beef Packers (IBP) in the 1960s, meat packers began dividing carcasses into individual 
cuts, sorting various cuts according to USDA grades, packing them into separate boxes, 
and shipping “boxed beef” to supermarkets (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). Thus, with the 
USDA grading system in place, supermarket retailing provided incentive to beef packers 
for investing in beef processing and ex post sorting of carcasses according to quality 
grades and retail cuts. Such investments were unlikely to be specific to a particular 
transaction relation as there were several national (e.g., A&P, Kroger, Piggly Wiggly, 
Safeway, Supervalue, etc.) and local supermarket chains. Moreover, given that USDA 
grades captured the quality of beef, supermarkets could advertise and sell boxed beef of 
the same grade as homogenous products. According to TCE, a market mechanism is the 
appropriate governance structure for transactions of such homogeneous products.  
With the emergence of supermarket retailing of beef products of various USDA 
grades and cuts, beef packers did not have an incentive for investment in product 
differentiation by other criteria. Nonetheless, ex post sorting of carcasses induced ex ante 
sorting of live animals in fed cattle markets. Historically, beef packers acquired fed cattle 
through transactions in open outcry auction markets with numerous buyers and sellers. 
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With the growth of the USDA grading system, beef packers (usually through 
commissioned buyers) started subjectively evaluating the probability of carcass grades 
based on the physical appearance of the live cattle and building those probabilities into 
their bid prices.7 However, because of the high sunk costs of slaughter and packing 
plants, beef packers have been primarily concerned with the capacity utilization of their 
plants by means of a consistent supply of fed cattle, which have been secured through the 
use of traditional livestock auction markets.  
With the coarse fed cattle grading system in place (e.g., 20%-35% Choice, 35%-
65% Choice, 65%-80% Choice, etc.), and fairly narrow price differentials across grades, 
cattle producers have had little incentive to invest in beef quality improvement. Cattle 
producers have been motivated primarily by the goal of producing more beef at a lower 
cost. Technological developments in agricultural production and animal husbandry have 
helped achieve this goal. With the development of high yielding variety seeds and 
availability of improved fertilizer, corn yield increased dramatically by the mid-1950s. 
Availability of cheap corn allowed feedlots to use corn extensively in feedlot rations, 
which, in turn, increased average daily gain and harvest weight of feedlot cattle (Ferrier 
and Lamb, 2007). On the other hand, average live- and dressed-cattle weights further 
increased and feed conversion ratios decreased with the development of artificial 
insemination and new hybrid breeds in the 1960s (Field and Taylor, 2002).8 Animal 
science research shows that hybrid breeds, such as Beefmaster and Brangus, produce a 
                                                 
7 Typically, each individual lot of fed cattle in auction barns is graded according to the probability of 
Choice carcasses such as 20%-35% Choice, 35%-65% Choice, 65%-80% Choice, etc. 
 
8 Beefmaster, Braford, Brahmousin, Brangus, Nellore, Red Brangus, Santa Gertrudis, Simbrah, etc. are 
commonly used hybrids in the United States for beef production (IMS, 2001). 
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less tender meat than the traditional European breeds, but tend to perform adequately 
within the USDA grading system (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007; Wheeler et al. 1994, 1999).  
Thus, commercial cattle feeders have paid little attention to quality control, but 
more attention to feedlot performance of the cattle (e.g., feed efficiency and average daily 
gain) and animal turnover rates. Apart from the genetic potential, feedlot performance of 
an individual animal also depends crucially on feeding and animal health management 
practices. Commercial cattle feeders therefore invest in specialized production and 
management skills which improve feed efficiency and average daily gain. Such 
investments traditionally have not been specific to any transaction relation and, thus, 
provide no incentive for feeders to enter into non-market transaction relations with beef 
packers or cow-calf producers.     
 For cow-calf producers, beef cattle production is typically one of many on-farm 
production activities. Traditional cow-calf operations have been relatively small but, in 
some cases, have somewhat flexible investments in grazing land (often rented or leased) 
and specialized but liquid investments in their breeding animals. Thus, even though some 
of the investments by the cow-calf sector are specialized (for example, as in the case with 
poultry or hog contracting where contractor-specific standards are often required on 
production barns), they are not specific to a particular transaction relation. Incomplete 
contract theory (TCE and PRT) implies that open market transactions are the appropriate 
governance structure for traditional cattle transactions in such circumstances.  
A steady rise in beef demand beginning from the end of World War II until the 
mid-1970s also suggests that open market mechanisms had been, at least in part, 
successful in transmitting signals about consumer preferences to upstream producers. 
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However, demand for beef began to decline by the end of the 1970s and continued to 
decline through the late 1990s (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). Researchers argue that the 
erosion in beef demand was due mainly to increasing consumer concern for quality and 
consistency of meat products and a decline in beef quality relative to the quality of other 
meat products such as chicken and pork (Purcell, 1999; Schroeder et al., 1998; and Lamb 
and Beshear, 1998). Ferrier and Lamb (2007) further argue that the fairly coarse USDA 
grading system is responsible for the decline of relative beef quality because it provides 
incentives to cattle producers to introduce larger and heartier cattle breeds that produce 
less tender beef while performing reasonably well on the USDA grading system.  
While beef producers were looking for a solution to the problem of declining beef 
demand, the Beef Promotion and Research act of 1985 allowed “generic advertising” of 
beef at the national level. But, the effects of generic advertising in raising beef demand 
were found to be only marginal (Brester and Schroeder, 1995: Coulibaly and Brorsen, 
1999; Kinnucan et al. 1997). In such circumstances, beef processors have made further 
attempts to improve the overall quality and consistency of beef products and introduce 
superior quality retail beef cuts differentiated by criteria other than the traditional USDA 
grades (e.g., branded and process-verified beef products). A consistent supply of superior 
quality beef products, in turn, requires a consistent supply of high quality fed cattle with 
the advertised product differentiation to processing plants. But, with a fairly narrow price 
differential across lot-average fed cattle grades in conventional auction markets, cattle 
producers have had little incentive to supply high quality animals given requirements for 
specialized and costly investment in animal quality control. Beef processors, therefore, 
have adopted a variety of non-spot fed cattle procurement methods to secure a consistent 
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supply of animals with desirable characteristics in their plants. Such initiatives have 
introduced new governance structures in the beef industry such as short-term marketing 
agreements for fed cattle transactions and strategic alliances.  
 
Emerging Governance Structures: Marketing Agreements and Strategic Alliances 
In an attempt to provide a clear signal about the quality of their products to 
consumers, and also to identify their products and differentiate their offerings from 
competitors, beef processors have adopted several certifications (or brands) and process 
verification programs. Such programs require ex ante control of inputs (including the 
animal) in different stages of production in addition to ex post sorting of outputs 
(carcasses) into narrowly identified quality groups that provide the necessary consistency. 
Alternatively, beef processors have adopted value-based grid pricing mechanisms to 
supplant traditional lot-average pricing methods for fed cattle procurement. Under grid 
pricing, each individual animal is valued according to ex post measures of yield and 
quality of the carcass. Thus, grid pricing is a way to control beef quality by ex post output 
measurement.  
 
Certification and Process Verification Programs: Ex Ante Input Control in Addition to 
Ex Post Output Measurement 
 
Apart from the traditional USDA quality grades, beef processors have introduced 
an additional quality grade for beef products of certain brands qualifying for USDA 
certification programs (e.g., Certified Angus Beef and Certified Hereford Beef). The 
USDA certification programs require animals to meet independent quality standards (e.g., 
breed, age, and weight) at the time of slaughter. The quality standards are typically set by 
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beef packers (or private producer organizations) and are inspected by USDA graders at 
the time of slaughter. The rank of the quality grade of such certified (branded) beef 
products typically falls between Prime and Choice.  
The use of USDA certification programs increased dramatically in the mid-1990s 
(Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). At the same time, beef processors also introduced process-
verified beef products. A process verification program is typically characterized by 
process criteria set by a beef packer (or a producer organization) and the USDA agents 
auditing the entire production process by inspecting the ranches, feedlots, and packing 
plants to ensure that process criteria are met (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). Most process 
verification programs specify the breed and age of the animal, the source of the animal’s 
origin, feed mix to be used, and that growth hormones are not to be used. Thus, process 
verification programs explicitly control inputs.  
The trademark for each certification and process verification program and its 
standards are owned and controlled by a private party (e.g., a beef packer or a producer 
organization such as the PM Beef Group of Kansas City or US Premium Beef), while the 
Agricultural Marketing Service of the USDA administers the program by acting as the 
independent inspector (Ferrier and Lamb, 2007). However, introduction of branded and 
process-verified beef products typically involves significant investments in the 
development of new market outlets, advertising, promotion, and related reputation risks. 
Such investments have little value in alternative uses and thus can be termed as 
idiosyncratic following TCE. 
USDA certification programs involve highly specialized investments by different 
sectors of the beef industry. While beef packers make significant investments in brand 
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development and promotion, most large certification programs require cattlemen to 
deliver cattle of specific breeds (e.g., Angus or Hereford) and carcasses to meet at least 
the Choice grade standard. Moreover, the standards of each certification program are 
specific to the owner of the trademark, and are thus often different than others. For 
example, the requirements for breed, age, and weight of the animal and minimum carcass 
quality standards may be different in alternative branded beef programs. When cattlemen 
raise cattle targeted to a particular certification program, their cattle will likely not qualify 
for other certification programs. Thus, cow-calf producers’ investment in producing 
calves of a particular breed and post-natal management and feedlot operator’s 
investments in raising those cattle are transaction-specific. Compared to the certification 
programs, the degree of idiosyncrasy of the cattlemen’s specialized investments is thus 
even higher with process-verification programs, because such programs require specific 
inputs in every stage of the production process.  
Transaction cost economics implies that, when the levels of specialized 
investments by the vertically-related beef sectors are very high (idiosyncratic), vertical 
integration is the appropriate governance structure for recurrent transactions between the 
parties, and contracting with third party arbitration or monitoring is appropriate for 
occasional transactions.9 When the level of specialized investments is moderate (mixed 
or semi-specific), joint ownership or an alliance is appropriate for recurrent transaction
and contracting with third party arbitration is appropriate for occasional transactions. This 
s, 
                                                 
9 According to TCE, vertical integration is also appropriate when recurrent transactions are conducted 
under a high degree of uncertainty. Also, for occasional transactions, the need for a more elaborate 




classification of governance structures appears to fit well the emerging organization of 
(non-spot) transactions in the U.S. beef industry.  
Since the goal of the packers in breed alliances and closed (natural/implant-free) 
cooperatives is to market branded or process-verified beef products, the level of their 
specific investments is higher compared to the marketing alliances.10 The levels of other 
alliance members’ (cow-calf producers’ and cattle feeders’) specific investments are also 
higher compared to other cases. For example, as a member of such an alliance, a cow-calf 
producer must adopt a particular genetic/breeding program and follow specific pre- and 
post-natal production practices. Similarly, member feeders also must adopt a prescribed 
nutritional and health management program. While TCE suggests a unified governance 
structure in this case, members in breed alliances and closed cooperatives are still 
independent business entities. Usually, they share the joint surplus of their cooperative 
activities on the basis of a rule (equity or non-equity based) set by themselves. A 
plausible explanation for this particular organizational form may be that the degree of 
idiosyncrasy of the alliance members’ specific investments is still not high enough so that 
transaction costs could be further reduced by vertical integration.        
However, input control systems like certification and process verification 
programs are difficult to develop and administer because of the high degree of asset 
specificity and relevant holdup issues. Moreover, because of a diverse genetic base of 
beef cattle, their long biological cycle, and the small scale of beef production herds, 
monitoring producer actions that influence beef quality is prohibitively expensive (Ferrier 
and Lamb, 2007). Most beef quality improvement programs in the United States are, 
                                                 
10 A significant amount of investment is required for product development and promotion, the opportunity 
cost of which is very high as such investments are not recoverable elsewhere.  
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therefore, oriented primarily towards ex post measurement of carcass attributes with 
greater accuracy rather than ex ante input controls in successive production stages. 
 
Value-Based Grid Pricing: Ex Post Measurement of Carcass Attributes 
With value-based grid pricing, producers are compensated according to ex post 
measures of yield and quality of carcasses (e.g., marbling, fat thickness, rib eye size, 
etc.), reflecting USDA grades. In contrast to traditional lot-average pricing methods, grid 
pricing offers premiums (discounts) for higher (lower) quality attributes of each 
individual carcass, thus improving pricing accuracy and rewarding cattlemen who deliver 
desirable types of cattle. However, ex post measurement of carcass attributes requires 
investment in physical capital (e.g., equipment and devices for measuring carcass 
attributes) and human capital (e.g., skills for grading carcasses). Although such 
investments are somewhat specialized, they usually are not specific to a particular 
transaction relation. For example, the scale for measuring rib eye area and the certified 
USDA grader can be used repetitively in measuring and grading carcasses obtained from 
different producers. 
Pricing of fed cattle based on ex post carcass attributes provides an opportunity 
for the producers (feedlot operators and cow-calf producers) to realize potential returns 
against their costly investments in superior quality animal production. The grid pricing 
system provides incentives for feedlot operators to procure better quality feeder cattle and 
adopt appropriate feeding and animal health management practices that ensure efficient 
weight gain by the cattle with a desirable percentage of carcass fat. Such activities require 
specialized investment in physical as well as in human capital. For example, proper 
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identification and monitoring of individual animals in the feedlot requires additional 
investment in physical capital (e.g., digital ear tags and scanners), while investments in 
human capital are required for proper feedlot management practices (e.g., special training 
of cattlemen for beef cattle nutrition and Total Quality Management practices) and 
documentation. The opportunity costs of some of those investments are likely to be high 
because they may not have much value in alternative uses. For example, investment in 
digital ear tags and keeping biological history and performance records of each individual 
animal are sunk costs once these tasks have been completed.  
With the grid pricing system, cow-calf producers have a higher incentive to 
produce calves with greater feedlot and carcass performance potential, which also 
requires specialized investment. Cow-calf producers’ investments in pre- and post-natal 
management (e.g., genetic selection, breeding, and feeding in the post-weaning period) 
determine initial marbling and lifetime growth potential of an animal. But, producers are 
yet to find the right breed of beef cattle that consistently and efficiently produces superior 
quality meat.11 While cow-calf producers have been searching for the appropriate breed 
using planned crossbreeding programs, a cow produces only one calf per year and about 
24 months of growth are required to learn whether the breeding process resulted in beef 
with desirable quality traits (Ward, 1997). Thus, with a long biological cycle and a wide 
genetic base for beef cattle, cow-calf producers’ costly investments in breed development 
for a particular set of incentives do not have alternative uses.  
                                                 
11 While technological development contributed to the improvement in beef production efficiency, the 
genetic base of beef cattle widened with the scientific research in seedstock breeding (Field and Taylor, 
2002). Currently, there are more than 250 breeds of beef cattle in the world. More than 60 of these breeds 




The grid pricing system typically involves short-term marketing agreements in 
which the cattle owners (the feedlot or cow-calf producer) are not locked-in with the 
packers until two to four weeks prior to slaughter. The cattle owners (the feedlot 
operators or cow-calf producers) can choose between competing grids and traditional 
pricing methods (live- and dressed-weight pricing) before committing to such an 
agreement. Typically, cattle owners compare the pricing schemes in several available 
grids and choose the one that fits their cattle. Since several competing packer grids are 
available, the frequency of marketing agreements between a particular cattle owner and a 
packer is most likely to be occasional. Moreover, transactions of fed cattle on the basis of 
grid pricing are typically characterized by a mix of generalized and idiosyncratic 
investments by the cattle owner. Examples of generalized investments include feedlot 
operators’ investments in facilities, equipments, and feed, and cow-calf operators’ 
investments in herd management. Feedlot operators’ investment in and use of disposable 
ear tags for identifying and monitoring individual animals and cow-calf producers’ 
investment to increase initial marbling during the post-weaning period are idiosyncratic, 
because traditional live- and dressed-weight pricing do not offer any return against such 
investments.. Thus, according to TCE, grid pricing of fed cattle through a short-term 
marketing agreement is an appropriate governance structure given the nature of 
investments and frequency of transactions. 
Ward and Bliss (1989) suggest that beef packers have an incentive to procure fed 
cattle through long-term marketing agreements and forward contracts to maintain year-
round slaughter schedules. Cattle feeders may also have an incentive to enter into such 
contracts or agreements to secure a market outlet for their cattle. However, cattle feeders 
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have been less willing to enter into such long-term transaction relations with beef packers 
mainly because of the uncertainty about the performance potential of feeder cattle with a 
diverse genetic base. Since cattle are traditionally fed in open lots, climatic conditions 
influence animals’ performance (e.g., feed efficiency and average daily gain). As a result, 
the extent of use of long-term marketing agreements and forward contracts has remained 
low and stagnant during the last two decades.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, fed cattle are also priced on the basis of a 
grid in marketing alliances (commercial beef carcass alliances) between beef packers, 
cattle feeders, and cow-calf producers. Members of such an alliance make frequent 
transactions among themselves. However, the levels of their specific investments are 
likely to be the same as in short-term marketing arrangements. This is because in both 
types of organizations (marketing alliances and marketing arrangements) the goals of the 
beef packers (procure high quality cattle through an incentive scheme) and cattle owners 
(earn quality premiums for marketing high quality cattle) remain the same. Typically, the 
alliance manager supervises the transaction between the parties in exchange for a fee. 
Thus, following TCE, the difference in the forms of these two organizational structures is 
simply a result of the differences in the frequency of transactions.  
Compared to certification and process verification programs, the degree of 
idiosyncrasy of specialized investment is much lower with grid pricing. The development 
and implementation of a grid pricing system is also less expensive. Moreover, grid 
pricing can be applied more widely in the industry whereas branded and process verified 
beef programs are highly specialized. Thus, as an alternative way to improve beef quality, 
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grid pricing (ex post output measurement) appears to have a greater potential than 
certification and process verification programs (ex ante input control measures).  
 
Other Forms of Governance 
In the case of retained ownership of their cattle until slaughter, cow-calf 
producers usually feed them in commercial feedlots on the basis of contractual 
arrangements or joint ownership programs. Such transactions may also be characterized 
by semi-specific investments by one or both parties and occasional or recurrent 
frequencies. In the case of occasional frequency, contract cattle feeding with monitoring 
minimizes transaction costs according to TCE. Joint ownership programs are optimal for 
recurrent transactions. Both forms of such governance structures are observed in reality.  
A possible source of transaction costs in the beef industry is site-specificity of 
vertical business entities. The cost of transportation (freight charges and shrink) of feeder 
cattle from ranch to feedlot and fed cattle from feedlots to packing plants have led some 
feedlots and packing plants to locate near one another. Also, because feeder animals and 
feed grains are the principal inputs in the feedlot, the location of cattle feeding operations 
is generally concentrated where calves are raised or in places where feed grains are 
produced.12 Such investments are thereafter not moveable except at prohibitive costs. In 
such situations, recurrent transactions between the parties are most likely and they may 
engage in opportunistic behavior giving rise to a potential holdup problem. A unified 
governance mechanism is suggested by TCE as the most efficient organizational form in 
                                                 
12 In the 1960s, the economies of specialization and scale in cattle feeding, and increased feed grain supply 





this situation. But, there is little empirical evidence of integration between packers and 
feedlots or feedlots and cow-calf operations.13  
While TCE seems unable to explain why the vertical beef sectors are not 
integrated even in the case of site-specificity, PRT provides a plausible explanation. It 
predicts that integration may not be efficient when the investment decisions of all the 
parties in a transaction are somewhat important, because there may be holdup from both 
sides. In such situations, independent operation and spot market transactions may be 
preferable to both parties. However, with independent vertical segments and spot market 
transactions, the holdup problem remains unsettled and PRT does not yield a solution.  
The subsequent property rights literature that seeks contractual solutions (with a 
provision for renegotiating the terms of trade ex post) to the holdup problem may be 
helpful to better understand the organizational structure in this case. Recent property 
rights literature (e.g., BGM) postulates that ownership of the asset conveys ownership of 
the good (the asset could simply be the legal title of the good) and examines whether 
appropriate ownership of the good can make a given promise self-enforcing. From this 
perspective, in the absence of integration of the beef supply chain, retained ownership of 
cattle in combination with contract cattle feeding and value-based pricing of fed cattle 
may enforce the first best outcome.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a theoretical economic explanation for the traditional and 
emerging governance structures of the US beef industry. First, relevant theoretical and 
                                                 
13 Very recently, there have been a few attempts to fully integrate the beef production process with a single 
firm coordinating genetic selection, feeding practices, slaughter and fabrication, and marketing (Hueth and 
Lawrence, 2003; GIPSA-USDA). Those attempts are, however, minor in the overall beef industry. 
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empirical industrial organization literature, such as TCE and PRT, are revisited. Then, the 
historical and contemporary governance structures of the beef industry are analyzed in 
the light of TCE and PRT perspectives. Open market mechanisms have been the 
predominant form of governance structure for transactions of intermediate and final 
products of the industry. Analyzing the organizational details of the beef industry, 
traditional transactions are characterized by generalized investments (not specific to 
particular transaction relations). Accordingly, with the traditional USDA grading system, 
breeders and feeders have had limited concern for beef quality and little incentive to 
invest in beef quality control. According to TCE and PRT, open market operations are the 
appropriate governance mechanism in this situation. 
However, as demand for beef started to decline with increasing consumer concern 
for relative quality and consistency of beef products, beef industry participants have 
attempted to market a higher proportion of superior quality beef and to further 
differentiate beef products with criteria other than USDA grades. Spot market 
transactions of cattle have been found to be inadequate in transmitting signals about the 
value of beef quality to upstream producers and unable to align the incentives of 
successive vertical sectors in the supply chain for the case of differentiated products. In 
this circumstance, some beef processors have adopted ex post output measurement (e.g., 
grid pricing) and ex ante input control (e.g., certification and process verification 
programs) mechanisms as alternative ways to control beef quality. In terms of TCE and 
PRT, such measures have induced transaction-specific investments in successive vertical 
sectors of the industry. As explained by TCE and PRT theories, these have given rise to 





strategic alliances. Following TCE, I argue that the degree of idiosyncrasy of specific 
investments by any of the sectors of this industry is still not high enough so that 
transaction costs could be further reduced by vertical integration. Following PRT, I 
further argue that vertical integration may not be an efficient governance structure 
because beef quality improvement requires specific investments by all relevant sectors of 
the beef industry (e.g., beef processing, cattle feeding, and cow-calf production) which 
cause holdup from each side in a transaction.  
As an alternative way to control beef quality, grid pricing appears to have a 
greater potential than certification and process verification programs, which are 
characterized by highly specific investments and holdup issues. Moreover, grid pricing 
can be applied much more broadly in the industry whereas branded and process 
verification beef programs are highly specialized. Thus, the remainder of this dissertation 
focuses on analysis of grid pricing in contrast to traditional pricing methods. 
While TCE and PRT appear to be useful in explaining the changing governance 
structure of the beef industry, a mathematical model incorporating the insights of 
incomplete contract theory might also be helpful in formalizing the analysis. However, 
this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The next chapter presents a multitask 
principal-agent model that examines the optimal incentive schemes for cattle feeding 






A MULTITASK MODEL FOR CATTLE FEEDING CONTRACTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The analysis of Chapter 3 suggests that, in the absence of vertical integration in 
the beef industry, value-based grid pricing may be applied as an alternative way to 
improve overall quality and consistency of beef products. Grid pricing provides an 
opportunity for cow-calf producers to retain ownership of animals until slaughter and 
realize potential returns against their costly investments in genetic selection, breeding, 
feeding, and health management in the post-weaning period. In cases of retained 
ownership of animals through slaughter, cow-calf producers typically have feeder cattle 
fed in commercial feedlots on the basis of contractual arrangements.  
Commercial cattle feeders undertake several tasks when feeding beef cattle. 
While the primary duty of a feedlot operator is to add weight to the live animal, a cattle 
feeder is also responsible for the growth rate, feed efficiency, and potential yield and 
quality of the carcass. These outcomes crucially depend on the nutrition and health 
management practices adopted by the feeder during the entire feeding phase. Consistent 
supply of a balanced diet with appropriate energy and protein content and the use of 
growth promoting implants are the two most important choices of the commercial cattle 
feeder. Feeding a high-grain ration during the finishing stage increases the rate of weight 
gain and carcass quality but decreases carcass yield. On the other hand, the use of a 
growth-promoting implant increases the rate of gain, feed efficiency, and yield but at the 
cost of carcass quality (Tedeschi et al., 2004; Field and Taylor, 2002; Duckett et al., 
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1996). Thus, a potential moral hazard problem arises when the feeder’s actions are not 
observable or verifiable to the owner and beef quality is not measurable upon delivery of 
the fed cattle. While these complex interactions determine the cattle owner’s net returns 
under alternative fed cattle pricing methods, the feeder’s optimal choice of actions vary 
with the incentive provisions of alternative cattle feeding contracts. This chapter attempts 
to characterize the optimal contracts for cattle feeding under alternative fed cattle pricing 
methods and risk aversion scenarios. 
In the classical moral hazard problem, a risk-neutral principal contracts with a 
risk-averse agent to perform a task. The agent chooses an action, which affects the 
performance outcome. The principal cares only about the outcome, but the action is 
costly to the agent. The principal compensates the agent for incurring the cost. When the 
agent’s action is not observable to the principal (i.e., actions are hidden), it is the best for 
her to align the incentive of the agent by making compensation contingent to the 
performance outcome (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Since the outcome is typically a 
noisy signal of the agent’s action, such a compensation scheme is most likely to entail a 
loss in efficiency. Under uncertainty about the outcome, this moral hazard problem 
demonstrates the basic trade-off between risk sharing and incentives: if the agent is risk 
averse, then more incentives come at the cost of a risk premium that the principal must 
pay the agent (Mirrlees, 1974, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hurt, 1983).     
In most real world contracting problems, however, an agent typically performs 
several tasks. So the basic contracting problem can no longer be reduced to a simple 
trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) suggest 
that, when there are inseparable multiple tasks, incentive pay serves not only to allocate 
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risks and induce higher efforts, but it also serves to direct the allocation of the agent’s 
attention among various tasks. Their main argument is that if the agent’s performance is 
easy to measure in one task but not in the others, then a payment scheme with an 
incentive for the first task may lead the agent to allocate full attention towards that task 
and ignore the others. For example, if volume of output is easy to measure but the quality 
is not, then a system of piece rates for output may lead the agent to increase the volume 
of output at the expense of quality. Considering a normally distributed performance 
measure together with constant absolute risk-averse preferences for the agent and linear 
incentive contracts, Holmstrom and Milgrom show that the desirability of providing 
incentives for any one activity decrease with the difficulty of measuring performance in 
any other activities that make competing demands on the agent’s time and effort. In other 
words, when activities for multiple tasks are substitutes, an incentive for any given task 
can be provided either by rewarding that activity or by reducing the incentive for the 
other tasks.     
Since commercial cattle feeding is characterized by a multiple-task problem, a 
multitask principal-agent model for optimal cattle feeding contracts is developed 
following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), as described below in detail. The model 
captures the organizational details of cattle feeding and fed cattle marketing in current 
practice. In contrast to the model developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom, this model 
incorporates complementarities among multiple inputs in the production and cost 





4.2 The Model 
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which a feeder cattle owner (hereafter 
the principal in this section) makes contractual arrangements with a feedlot operator 
(hereafter the agent in this section) to feed the cattle until they are ready for slaughter. 
Upon agreement between the two parties on the terms of the contract, the principal 
delivers the cattle to the agent’s premises. The agent then starts feeding the cattle by 
choosing a two-element vector of actions a = (a1, a2) at cost c(a) = aTCa/2 per hundred 
pounds of live weight gain, where C = (cij) with i, j œ {1, 2}. The quadratic cost function 
of the agent is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex in 
both of its arguments. The off-diagonal elements cij = cji, i ≠ j, in the symmetric matrix C 
is a measure of the degree of complementarity (substitutability, if the sign is negative) 
between the agent’s actions. When cij = 0, i ≠ j, the agent’s actions are technologically 
independent.  
The agent’s actions a primarily affect yield y and quality q of the beef procured 
from each hundred pounds of live weight. The actions are not directly observable or 
verifiable by the principal. Neither does the principal observe the final yield and quality 
of beef upon delivery of the fed cattle. However, she observes the additional weight 
gained by the cattle at the end of the feeding period and the number of days that the cattle 
were on feed. Based on this information and also on some other objective or subjective 
measures, the principal makes an assessment of potential yield and quality of beef.14 Let 
the measures of yield and quality be linear functions of the agent’s actions given by y = y0 
+ m11a1 + m12a2 + 1ε = y0 + Dy  and q = q0 + m21a1 + m22a2 + 2ε = q0 + Dq, where y0 and q0 
                                                 




are threshold levels of yield and quality (e.g., choice, yield grade 3), Dy and Dq are 
incremental yield and quality of beef, parameters mij with i, jœ {1, 2} represent 
coefficients of production corresponding to the actions of the agent, and 1ε  and 2ε  are 
random disturbances representing random biophysical responses or errors in 
measurement of yield and quality.15  
The agent’s actions a1 and a2 are assumed to be yield and quality improving, 
respectively, such that mii for i œ {1, 2} are positive. The production coefficients mij for i 
∫ j are measures of complementarity (or substitutability, if the sign is negative) between 
the actions in the production functions. The linear production functions for y and q nest 
two standard cases: (i) one dimensional effort (m12 = m22 = 0) where attempts to improve 
yield also increase the quality of beef, and (ii) unproductive multitasking (m12 = m21 = 0) 
where the attempt to increase yield is costly but does not affect the quality of beef, and 
vice versa. For analytical simplicity, I assume that M is symmetric (m12 = m21) and positive 
definite.      
In matricial form, if ε  is a vector of random variables that have a bivariate 
normal distribution, incremental effects of the feeder’s actions can be represented simply 
as  
( , )Ty q M a εΔ Δ = +   where ),0(~ ΣNε  and ),( ijσ=Σ , { }i j = 1, 2 .  (4.1)   
The variance sii = si2 of the random variable iε is a measure of both the difficulty that the 
agent has in controlling yield and quality of beef, and the difficulty that the principal has 
in measuring the output or implicitly observing the actions of the agent. The covariance 
                                                 
15 Additively linear production functions allow one to separately consider the effects of the cow-calf 
producer’s and the feedlot operator’s actions on beef yield and quality in successive production stages.  
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between iε and jε , sij is a measure of random complementarity (or substitutability) 
between the actions of the agent.  
When the cattle are ready for slaughter, the principal takes control of the animals 
upon making payments to the agent according to the contract. As compensation, the 
principal pays a fixed fee, a,  that covers feed cost and yardage charges for each hundred 
pounds of live weight gain, and incentives b1 and  b2 for incremental yield and quality per 
hundred pounds of added weight, respectively.16 Thus, the payment scheme is linear in 
the principal’s measures of beef yield and quality, 
).( εα +MaTβ+=w  (4.2) 
The power of the incentive scheme in equation (4.2) increases with b. Feed cost plus 
yardage fee and flat-rate-per-pound-of-gain are two special cases of this linear payment 
scheme. Equation (4.2) represents a feed cost plus yardage fee contract when b1 = 0 and b2 
= 0 and a flat-rate-per-pound-of-gain contract when a = 0 and b2 = 0. Actual cattle 
feeding contracts may also have a provision for cost sharing when cost is at least partly 
contractible. In this model, the principal is assumed to cover any intended share of the 
agent’s cost by transferring income through a. This assumption aids analytical simplicity 
without loss of generality.  
The agent’s average net income per hundred pounds of live weight gain, ,x is the 




T −++= εβα . (4.3)  
                                                 
16 Attention is restricted to limited payment schemes with a fixed fee and a linear incentive based on the 
full vector of contractible variables. A theoretical justification for the use of linear contracts can be found in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Bhattacharyya and Laffontain (1995).  
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Suppose the agent has constant absolute risk averse (CARA) preferences with absolute 
risk aversion j so that his utility follows a negative exponential utility function 
( ( )) exp( ( ))U X a X aϕ= − −  where 
1
( ) ( )k iiX a x a==∑ , xi(a) represents net income from 
the ith hundred pounds of live weight gain, and k is the number of hundred pound 
increments of meat (the scale of operation) the feedlot is able to produce. If the 
distribution of net income from each one hundred pounds of gain follows 
2( ) ~ ( ( ), ( ))i x xx a N a aμ σ  and each is an independent draw from the same distribution of 
errors in the measured yield and quality grades, then 2( ) ~ ( ( ), ( )).x xX a N k a k aμ σ
),x aσ
17 Thus, 
the assumptions of CARA and normality lead to the linear mean-variance certainty 
equivalent decision criterion, such that the agent’s objective is to 
 which is equivalent to 
 where X(a) = kx(a) and x(a) from 
(4.3) represents net return from the typical one hundred pounds of gain. With this 
background, the agent’s certainty equivalent income per hundred pounds of weight gain 
associated with (4.3),  
2( ) ( / 2) (xk a kϕ μ ϕ−
2( ) ( / 2) ( )x xa aϕ σ−
max ( ( )) ( / 2) (
a
E X a V X
max ( ( )) ( / 2) ( ( )
a
E x a V x a
( ))a− =
)ϕ μ− =
                                                 
17 In reality, the assumption of independence of random draws for each incremental one hundred pounds of 
gain is somewhat extreme. However, it is a useful simplifying assumption for this conceptual exercise for 
several reasons. First, the assumption that successive increments in weight gain are perfectly correlated is 
also not plausible. Rather, reality likely lies somewhere between no correlation and perfect correlation 
because of variation in weather and animal characteristics. Second, the model becomes excessively 
complicated while providing little additional conceptual understanding if imperfect correlation is 
introduced. The main point of this conceptual exercise is to demonstrate which factors play a role and the 
theoretical ambiguities that arise. A more general model would likely have only more ambiguities. Third, 
constant absolute risk aversion is also an extreme assumption. According to arguments by Arrow (1965), 
constant relative risk aversion likely better reflects reality. The assumption used here generates a model in 
which the risk premium scales up by firm size as under constant relative risk aversion when successive 
increments of weight gain are perfectly correlated. Thus, the assumptions used here seem to balance, in 






T a C aACE M a ϕ Tα β= + − − Σβ β  (4.4) 
is a meaningful and relevant behavioral criterion where the absolute risk aversion 
coefficient is the same as in maximization of the expected utility of total short-run profit. 
Thus, the agent’s certainty equivalent income is his expected compensation from the 
linear payment scheme, minus his private cost, minus the risk premium.  
For given values of a and b, the agent chooses a to maximize this certainty 














The first order condition of the agent’s maximization problem yields 
 . (4.5) βMCa 1−∗ =
Differentiating (4.5) with respect to b and assuming a is strictly positive in all 
components obtains )(/ 1 ijijiijjii mcmcCa −=∂∂
−β  and )(/ 1 jjijijjjji mcmcCa −=∂∂
−β  
for i, j œ {1, 2} and i ∫ j, where C  is the determinant of C. For positive values of mii and 
cii, the sign of iia β∂∂ /  is non-negative and the sign of jia β∂∂ /  is non-positive if mij ≤ 0 
and cij ≥ 0, i ≠ j (strict inequalities hold if strict inequality holds in the sufficient 
conditions). In other words, if the actions are substitutes in both the production function 
(i.e., mij ≤ 0, i ≠ j) and the agent’s cost function (i.e., cij ≥ 0, i ≠ j), then the agent chooses 
an action ai that increases with bi and decreases with bj. Similarly, the signs of iia β∂∂ /  
and jia β∂∂ /  for i, j œ {1, 2} and i ∫ j are non-negative (positive with strict inequality in 
the sufficient conditions) if the actions are complements in the production and cost 
function (i.e., if mij ≥ 0  and cij ≤ 0, i ≠ j).  
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The principal sells fed cattle to a beef packer and realizes revenue. The principal 
can sell fed cattle either through open outcry livestock actions on a live weight basis 
where the packers are bidders, or sell them to an individual packer using a dressed weight 
or a grid pricing method through some kind of marketing agreement. When fed cattle are 
priced on a grid, the packer pays a base price for the threshold yield and quality 
combination, plus premiums (or discounts) for higher (lower) yield and quality. Suppose 
B denotes the base payment for yield and quality combination y0 and q0 per hundred 
pounds of live weight, p1 denotes the price premium for the incremental yield Dy, and p2 
denotes the premium for the incremental quality Dq, Thus, the principal’s revenue per 
hundred pounds of live weight from the grid is ( )TB p Ma ε+ +  where p is a vector of 
incremental yield and quality grade premiums, p = (p1, p2). The grid revenue nests the 
revenues from live- and dressed-weight pricing methods. When there is no premium for 
beef quality (i.e., p2 = 0),  represents the revenue from dressed-weight 
pricing, and when there is no premium for incremental yield and quality grades (i.e., p1 = 
0 and p2 = 0) it represents the revenue from live-weight pricing.  
)( ε++ MapB T
The principal’s returns per hundred pounds of live weight gain, z, is her revenue 
from the grid minus the payment to the feeder. 
)()()( εβαε +−−++= MaMapBaz TT  (4.6) 
Suppose that the principal’s preference is also characterized by constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) with absolute risk aversion y. The risk preference of the principal can 
thus be represented by a negative exponential utility function ),exp()( zZU ψ−−=  where 
, zi represents net return’s from the ith hundred pounds of live weight 









scale of the cattle owner’s operation). If the distribution of net income from each one 
hundred pounds of gain follows and each is an independent 
draw from the same distribution, then  Thus, CARA and 
normality yields the linear mean-variance certainty equivalent criterion, 
 which is equivalent to 
 where z(a) from (4.6) represents net 
returns of the principal from the typical one hundred pounds of gain and Z(a) = k*z(a). 
Thus, the principal’s certainty equivalent income from each hundred pounds of live 
weight gain is  
))(),((~)( 2 aaNaz zzi σμ
),(()( * akNaZ zμ=
),()2/()( 2** akak zz σψμ −














ββψβα −−+= MaMapBPCE TT −Σ−− pp T  (4.7) 
The principal chooses a and b to maximize PCE in (4.7) subject to the agent’s 
incentive compatibility and individual rationality (participation) constraints. Let w denote 
the minimum acceptable monetary certainty equivalent of the agent’s compensation 
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The (IR) constraint is binding at the optimum, so that a and a* can be substituted into the 
principal’s objective function to obtain the unconstrained maximization problem  






max .  
Assuming a* > 0, the first-order necessary conditions for this unconstrained problem 
yield 
 . (4.8) ]ˆ[])ˆˆ([ 111 pCMMCMM Σ+Σ++= −−−∗ ψψϕβ
where b* represents the optimal incentive for yield and quality improving activities. This 
expression for b* provides useful insights about the optimal incentive structure in cattle 
feeding contracts under alternative scenarios.  
 
Risk Neutrality (or Certainty) 
If either there is no uncertainty (i.e., )0=Σ  or the agent is risk neutral (i.e., j = 0) 
then equation (4.8) reduces to  
.p=∗β  (4.9) 
This behavior reduces the principal’s risk premium to zero so that risk aversion on the 
part of the principal does not matter. This implies that the principal transfers the yield and 
quality premiums earned in the grid directly to the agent. If the fed cattle are sold 
according to dressed weight, the principal transfers only the yield premium, as under the 
dressed-weight pricing method, b2 = p2 = 0. Under the live weight pricing method, p1 = p2 
= 0, which implies that b1 = b2 = 0. However, the principal can extract a part (or all) of the 
transferred premiums from the agent through the use of a (if fed cattle are priced in a grid 
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or according to dressed weight). Thus, the special case with no uncertainty or risk 
neutrality is a standard transfer pricing problem.  
 
Unrelated Agent Activities (No Multitasking) 
When the agent’s actions are systematically and stochastically unrelated (i.e., m12 














=∗ . (4.10) 
Thus, when the agent’s activities are unrelated, the optimal incentive for the ith task is 
independent of the characteristics of the jth activity. Moreover, the principal offers a 
higher-powered incentive to the agent when the premium goes up (i.e., when pi is larger), 
when the production function is more elastic with respect to the agent’s action 
),0/( >∂∂ iii mβ  and when the principal is risk averse (i.e., ).0ˆ/ >∂∂ ψβ i
2
iσ
 On the other 
hand, the principal offers lower powered incentives for a particular task when the agent is 
more risk averse (i.e., j is larger), when uncertainty is higher (i.e., is larger), and 
when the cost function is more convex (i.e., cii is larger).  
 
Related Agent Activities and Unobservable Beef Quality before Slaughter 
In reality, agent’s actions to improve yield and quality of beef are not independent 
(m12 ∫ 0, c12 ∫ 0). For example, while the use of growth promoting implants increases 
yield, the rate of weight gain, and feed efficiency, it also has an apparent negative effect 
on beef quality (Field and Taylor, 2002; Duckett, et al., 1996). On the other hand, a 
common practice to increase beef quality is to feed high grain rations during the finishing 
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phase, which increases the percentage of fat in the carcass. As a result, marbling 
(intramuscular fat), and hence beef quality increases, but at the cost of yield (Fox and 
Black, 1984). This tradeoff is particularly important when fed cattle are priced on a grid 
according to actual yield and quality of beef. Another important issue for the principal is 
that actual quality of beef is almost unobservable and immeasurable until cattle are 
slaughtered. Therefore, in reality, cattle feeding contracts offering incentives for beef 
quality (b2 = 0) are not observed (although ex post grid pricing offers new possibilities). 
In the case where the agent performs multiple tasks (m12 ∫ 0, c12 ∫ 0), and the 
quality of beef is immeasurable by the principal upon delivery of the fed cattle, such 
that is large and22σ 12σ is zero (i.e., the agent’s actions are independently distributed), the 



















∗ , (4.11)  
where A1= c22m11 – c12m12,  A2 = c12m11 – c11m12, and q = j + y. 
The main comparative static result that follows from (4.11) is that if the agent’s 
activities are substitutes in the production and cost functions (i.e., when m12 < 0 and c12 > 
0) then a higher (lower) premium for actual yield (quality) leads to a higher (lower) 
powered incentive (i.e.,  and  With other things equal,  
reaches its highest value when there is no premium for quality at all (p2 = 0), as in the 
case of the dressed-weight pricing method. This implies that, if the principal intends to 
sell fed cattle on a dressed weight basis, she would offer a high powered incentive for the 
yield improving activity. Thus, a cost-of-gain contract (the highest powered practical 
0/ 11 >∂∂




incentive contract) for cattle feeding is more likely if the principal decides to sell fed 
cattle according to dressed weight.  
Under the grid pricing mechanism, actual yield and quality of beef are measured 
after slaughter and both are rewarded accordingly. Therefore, the incentive for a yield 
improving activity is likely to be lower than a cost-of-gain contract if the beef quality 
premium is positive (p2 > 0). This result is consistent with the argument of Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991) that, when inputs are substitutes and one of the activities cannot be 
measured, then the only way to provide the incentive for the immeasurable activity is to 
reduce the incentive for the other (measurable or observable) activity.    
Since the first term in the numerator of equation  (4.11) is positive and the second 
term is negative, it may be optimal for the principal to set b1 equal to zero (negative) 
provided these two terms offset each other (the second term is greater than the first in 
absolute value). Zero incentives can also arise in a limiting case when the agent’s 
activities are perfect substitutes in the production function such that m11 = m12 = m22 and 
yield and quality premiums are equal (p1 = p2). In that case, both b1 = 0 and b2 = 0. This 
result may explain why a majority of cattle are fed on the basis of a yardage fee plus feed 
cost.  























The sign of the right hand side of (4.12) is positive when m12 < 0 and c12 > 0, and 
ambiguous when m12 > 0 and c12 < 0. Thus, when the agent’s actions are net substitutes, 
the incentive for the yield improving activity increases with the level of the principal’s 
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risk aversion. When the actions are net complements, the effect of the principal’s risk 
aversion level on b1 depends on the sign of the second term in the numerator. In 
particular, if m12 > 0 and c12 < 0, then if the first term in the numerator is 
absolutely larger than the second term. However, the magnitude of the effect of the 
principal’s risk aversion on the incentive scheme also depends on p1 and p2. If the 
principal is risk averse but the agent is risk neutral, then 
0/1 >∂∂
∗ ψβ
1 / 0β ψ
∗∂ ∂ =  as Thus, 
when the agent is risk neutral but the principal is risk averse, a high-powered incentive 
contract is optimal. 
1 .pβ
∗ = 1
The effect of the agent’s risk aversion level on the optimal incentive scheme is 
negative when actions are net substitutes and ambiguous when the actions are net 

























   
 (4.13) 
For m12 < 0 and c12 > 0, the first term in the numerator of (4.13) is positive and m12A1 – 
m22A2 is negative. So  if 0/1 <∂∂
∗ ϕβ .0)()( 21
1
212111
1 >+−− −− CAmAm σψθϕψθ  When 
the agent is risk averse but the principal is risk neutral (i.e., when j > 0 and y = 0) and 
the agent’s actions are net substitutes, then  if 0/1 <∂∂
∗ ϕβ <− 1212111 )( pAmAm
ϕβ ∂∗ /1
 
 If this condition does not hold, then could be positive or 
zero. Thus, higher powered incentive contracts may be observed even when the agent is 
highly risk averse.  
.)( 2222112 pAmAm − ∂
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Finally, the effect of the degree of substitutability of the agent’s actions in the 
production and cost functions (i.e., the effects of m12 and c12) on the optimal incentive 















1211 θσ+>< .   
In other words, the effect of substitutability in the production function can be determined 
under certain conditions.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 The multitask principal-agent model presented in this chapter yields several 
testable hypotheses about the incentive structure of cattle feeding contracts. The main 
comparative static results of the model are that, given that carcass yield and quality 
improving activities of the cattle feeder are net substitutes, the power of the incentive 
scheme for cattle feeding is lower under the value-based grid pricing of fed cattle than 
under traditional pricing methods, and the power of the incentive increases with the level 
of the cattle owner’s risk aversion and decreases with the level of the feeder’s risk 
aversion. While other comparative static results are ambiguous, the main hypotheses are 
also conditional on the substitutability (or complementarity) between the cattle feeder’s 
actions. Therefore, even qualitative relationships cannot be resolved without estimation 
of the production, cost, and contract coefficients. 
Comparing the performance of alternative contract arrangements likely requires 
even more precise estimation than is necessary to determine many of these qualitative 
relationships. Such estimation requires ranch-to-rail data on cattle fed under various 





proprietary in nature and therefore not available publicly. Further, even where such data 
are compiled by direct survey methods, the data are typically lacking on specifics of the 
array of feeder actions that can affect yield and quality, which are essential in discovering 
the motivation and potential for contracting. Moreover, given the complicated nature of 
the beef production process, linear-quadratic functional forms of the production and cost 
functions appear to be too simplistic.  
 The unique approach adopted in this study to overcome these obstacles is to use a 
detailed dynamic biophysical model for beef cattle growth developed in the animal 
science literature. This model is employed to simulate the outcomes of alternative 
production technologies. The growth model implicitly includes the relationships that 
reflect production and cost relationships and allows evaluating cattle feeding outcomes 
with observed input and output price data to determine the optimal incentive schemes 
under alternative fed cattle pricing and risk aversion scenarios. The next chapter provides 
a detailed description of the biophysical growth model for beef cattle. 
CHAPTER 5 
A DYNAMIC BIOPHYSICAL MODEL FOR BEEF CATTLE GROWTH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Since the late 19th century, animal scientists have been exerting a great amount of 
effort to understand and model the beef cattle production process. The major goal has 
been either to predict animal performance given a fixed feed resource or to predict feed 
requirements that support a fixed level of production. However, biological growth and 
composition of gain also depend on other factors such as the animal’s biological type 
(e.g., genotype, sex, body type, condition, etc.), use of growth promoting implants, and 
environmental conditions. Therefore, where predictive accuracy is concerned, an 
integrated biophysical model must account for all the factors that influence an animal’s 
biological growth and its composition. With significant advances in understanding 
complex biophysical relationships and rapid progress in computational technology in 
recent years, several mathematical models have been developed to simulate beef cattle 
production. 
Alternative beef cattle growth simulation models mainly differ in the systems 
used to determine the energy content of the feedstuffs. The two most common methods 
used in measuring energy content of feed are total digestible nutrients (hereafter, TDN) 
and net energy (hereafter, NE) systems. While the TDN system works well in balancing 
rations for cows, the NE system has been widely adopted for simulating growth of feedlot 
cattle because it is more precise in measuring the energy value of feeds than the TDN 
system. The NE system partitions the energy content of feed into net energy for 
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maintenance (NEm) and net energy for growth (NEg). Lofgreen and Garrett (1968) first 
published a simple growth simulation model based on the NE system to compute feed 
requirements when performance is fixed. Fox and Black (1977a-c, 1984) altered the 
Lofgreen and Garrett model to predict performance when voluntary feed intake and 
energy content of feeds are known.  They also generalized the model to account for the 
differences in breed, mature size, growth promoting implants, and feed additives. 
Since introduction of the Fox and Black model, continuous evaluations and 
modifications have been made to improve its accuracy under alternative management 
practices and production situations (Fox et al., 1988, 1992; Tylutki et al., 1994; Perry and 
Fox, 1997; Fox and Tylutki, 1998). Successive Subcommittees on Beef Cattle Nutrition 
(hereafter, Subcommittee) of the National Research Council (NRC, 1981, 1984, 1996, 
2000) have fully adopted the revised model after further evaluation with experimental 
data. The latest version of the model is described and documented by Fox et al. (2003).   
Using the procedures and equations as described by the Subcommittee (NRC, 
1996, 2000) and Fox et al. (2003), researchers in the department of Animal Science at 
Cornell University have developed a dynamic and mechanistic growth model with daily 
time steps that can be applied in feedlots to predict growth rate, accumulated weight, days 
required to reach target body composition, and carcass weight and composition of 
individual animals (Tedeschi et al., 2004). The dynamic model is able to predict either 
average daily gain (ADG) when daily dry matter intake (DMI) is known or dry matter 
required (DMR) when ADG is known (Tedeschi et al., 2004). In either case, the model 
requires information about length of the feeding period, energy and protein content of the 
diet, animal characteristics (age, gender, breed, initial body weight, frame and body 
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condition scores, hair depth, and adjusted final body weight at a target empty body fat 
percentage), and environmental conditions (temperature, humidity, hours of sunlight, 
wind speed, mud, and hair coat). 
Tedeschi et al. (2004) evaluated their dynamic growth model with feed intake and 
performance data on 362 steers fed in individual pens. When dry matter intake was 
known, their model accounted for 89 percent of the variation with a bias of -2.6 percent 
in predicting individual animal ADG and explained 83 percent of the variation with a bias 
of -1 percent in estimating the observed body weights at the actual total days on feed. 
When ADG was known, their growth model predicted the dry matter required for that 
ADG with only 2 percent bias and an R2 of 74 percent. Thus, Tedeschi et al. claim that 
their dynamic growth model is able to predict animal performance and body composition 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy. This dynamic growth model is available for 
application in a computer program called the Cornell Value Discovery System (CVDS) 
developed to predict performance and costs of feeding individual animals in group pens.  
The CVDS model is useful in predicting cost of gain and carcass performance 
during and at the end of the feeding phase. However, a major drawback of the CVDS 
model is that it is applicable only when either ADG or DMI is observed, while both of 
these variables remain unknown to the cattle feeder and/or the cattle owner before 
feeding the cattle. At the time of placing the cattle in feedlots, feedlot operators and 
feeder cattle owners typically make agreements on either the length of the feeding period 
or the target harvest body weight. At this point, they predict either harvest body weight 
when the length of the feeding period is known or days to finish when harvest body 
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weight is known. For this purpose, a dynamic growth model is required that can predict 
voluntary DMI by each individual animal and the resulting gain and composition.  
Another limitation of the CVDS model is that it is unable to simultaneously 
predict cattle performance under alternative feeding strategies. While energy and protein 
contents of the rations significantly alter gain and its composition, a wide spectrum of 
rations can be formulated using various combinations of available feed ingredients (NRC, 
1996, 2000). Also, there are several growth promoting implants, the effect of which are 
significantly different (Duckett et al., 1997). Comparison of the outcomes of alternative 
feed-implant strategies is required in order to make important economic decisions. For 
example, cattle feeders may be interested in formulating a ration that is both biologically 
and economically efficient. Thus, there is a need for an integrated growth model that is 
capable of simultaneously predicting the outcomes of alternative feeding strategies.  
This chapter delineates a deterministic and dynamic biophysical growth model for 
beef cattle. The model is developed by adapting the CVDS model as described in 
Tedeschi et al. (2004) with complementary sub-models published in the reports of the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 1996, 2000) on beef cattle nutrition requirements and other 
relevant animal science research. For a wide range of alternative feed-implant strategies, 
the model can predict dry matter intake by each individual animal on each day on feed, 
resulting daily weight gain and composition, final weight and yield and quality grades of 
the carcass, and days required to reach a target harvest body weight or final body weight 
and composition for a given feeding period.  
The model is deterministic in the sense that it does not include any stochastic 
component and the parameters in the equations are fixed. Fixed parameter values are used 
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mainly for two reasons. First, statistical descriptors of most of the parameters are not 
available. The Subcommittee reports on beef cattle nutrition (NRC, 1984, 1996, 2000) 
and other published animal science research (Tedeschi et al, 2004; Lofgreen and Garrett, 
1968; Garrett et al., 1978; Fox and Black, 1984; and Fox et al., 1992), from which the 
parameter values are obtained, but do not report the underlying distributions. Second, 
Christian (1981) suggests that using variables other than weather to provide stochastic 
elements in models is unlikely to lead to marked improvements and that the use of 
stochastic variables increases the chance of confusion instead of clarification (Forbes and 
Oltjen, 1984). The basic growth model, however, does not account for the probability 
distributions of the independent variables including weather. Given fixed parameter 
values and data on independent variables, the model makes definite predictions about the 
values of the dependent variables without any associated probability distribution. The 
following sections of this chapter define the dependent and independent variables used in 
the model, and describe the equations for predicting cattle feeding outcomes.   
 
5.2 Variables in the Biophysical Growth Model  
Major dependent variables of the growth model are daily dry matter intake, 
weight gain, composition of gain, carcass weight, and yield and quality grades. 
Independent variables in the model include an animal’s biological characteristics (e.g., 
age, sex, initial shrunk body weight, breed, frame and body condition scores, and hair 
depth), metabolizable and net energy and protein content of the feed, and attributes of 
weather (temperature, humidity, hours of sunlight, wind speed, mud, and hair coat).18 
                                                 
18 Effects of growth promoting implants and feed additives on feed intake, gain, and fat content of gain are 
incorporated through published parameter values. 
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The model also requires either a user input value for expected final shrunk body weight a
a target body fat (when the goal is to feed the cattle until they reach a target harvest body
weight) or the length of the feeding period (when cattle are fed for a predetermined 
length of period). Definitions of the dependent and independent variables used in this 
growth model are presented in Table 5.1 in alphabetical order.  
t 
 
                                                                                                                                                
The growth model crucially depends on user input values for final shrunk body 
weight adjusted for the use of growth promoting implants (AFSBW), equivalent shrunk 
body weight at a target body fat percentage (EqSBW), and net energy and protein content 
of the ration. Accordingly, the first step in the cattle growth simulation model is to 
establish these values.  
 
5.3 Determining Adjusted Final Body Weight and Composition 
The critical first decision point in beef cattle feeding is to determine the harvest 
body weight at a target body fat percentage. Shrunk body weights of the fed cattle sold in 
the US markets range from 850 to 1450 lbs.19 However, making cattle as fat as possible 
may not be efficient from either biological and/or economic points of view. Like all other 
animals, growth of beef cattle is constrained by biochemical factors. Feed efficiency and 
average daily gain decline as an animal approaches maturity (NRC, 2000). Feed intake 
also declines as maturity is reached, further reducing average daily gain.20 Feeding cattle  
 
 
19 When calculating the actual body weight of beef cattle, a 4 percent shrink is typically assumed to account 
for gut fill and mud coat.  
 
20 Some feedlot operators use this reduction in ADG and intake as an indicator of "finish". 
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Table 5.1: Glossary of the variables used in the growth model
Variables Description Unit
a 1 Fasting heat production coefficient (0.072 for beef cattle) Mcal/kg-0.75/day
a 2 Maintenance adjustment for previous temperature Mcal/kg-0.75/day
AdjDMI DMI  adjusted for breed, body fat, and weather condition kg/day
AdjREM REM  adjusted for cold or heat stress Mcal/day
AFSBW Adjusted final shrunk body weight (at 28% bbody fat) kg
BCS Body condition score (1=emaciated, …, 9=obese)
BE Breed effect for maintenance
CETI Current month's effective etmperature index oC
CFP Carcass fat percentage %
CW Carcass weight kg
DMFM Dry matter available for maintenance kg/day
DMFG Dry matter available for gain kg/day
DMI Predicted dry matter intake kg/day
DMIB DMI  adjustment factor for breed
DMIBF DMI  adjustment factor for body fat content
DMIIMP DMI  adjustment factor for the use of implant
DMIM DMI  adjustment factor for mud depth in the feedlot
DMIT DMI  adjustment factor for temperature
DMITNC DMI  adjustment factor for temperature with night cooling
EBF Empty body fat kg
EBFP Empty body fat percentage %
EBW Empty body weight kg
EI External insulation oC/Mcal/m2/day
EqSBW Equivalent shrunk body weight kg
EWG Empty weight gain kg/day
FIG Fat in gain
HCCode Hair coat code (1=dry and clean, 2=some mud on lower
body, 3=wet and matted, 4=covered with wet snow or mud)
HD Hair depth cm
HE Heat production Mcal/day
HideCode Hide depth code (1=thin, 2=average, and 3=thick)
HideME Hide depth adjustment for external insulation
HRSc Hours of sunshine in the current month Hours
HRSp Hours of sunshine in previous month Hours
IF Ionophore adjustment factor
IN Total insulation oC/Mcal/m2/day






MCP Microbial crude protein
ME Dietary content of metabolizable energy Mcal/kg
MEcs Animal requirement for ME  adjusted for cold stress Mcal/day
MP Dietary content of metabolizable protein g/day
MPb Digestible microbial protein
MPf Digestible undegraded feed protein
MPg Metabolizable protein required for gain g/day
Mud Mud depth in the feedlot Cm
MudME Mud adjustment factor for external insulation
NEg Dietary content of net energy for growth Mcal/kg
NEm Dietary content of net energy for maintenance Mcal/kg
NEmcs Cold stress adjustment factor for REM
NEmhs Heat stress adjustment factor for REM
NEFG Net energy available for growth after maintenance Mcal/day
NPg Net protein required for gain g/day
PEg Protein efficiency for gain
PETI Previous month's effective temperature index
PIG Protein in gain
PN NEm  adjustment for previous nutrition
QG Numerical quality grade
RE Retained energy Mcal/day
REM Required energy for maintenance Mcal/day
RHc Current relative humidity %
RHp Previous relative humidity %
RMP Total metabolozable protein required for maintenance g/day
SA Surface area m2
SBW Shrunk body weight kg
SRW Shrunk reference weight (478 kg at 28% body fat) kg
SWG Shrunk weight gain kg/day
Tc Current average temperature oC
Tp Previous month's average temperature oC
TI Tissue (internal) insulation oC/Mcal/m2/day
UCT Upper critical temperature oC
UIP Undegraded feed protein
WSc Current wind speed km/hour
WSp Previous wind speed km/hour
YG Numerical yield grade  
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beyond the point of biochemical maturity may improve the quality grade and generate 
higher revenue given the price spread, but the cost of gain is likely be higher as feed 
efficiency goes down. On the other hand, it may not be profitable to feed cattle until they 
reach biochemical maturity because palatability of beef at full maturity may not be 
desirable to consumers. While body fat in finished cattle varies from 21 percent to 33 
percent in the world market, consumers in the US rather prefer beef with at the least 
USDA low Choice quality, which corresponds to approximately 28 percent empty body 
fat (Fox et al., 2002; NRC, 1996, 2000). Therefore, shrunk body weight at 28 percent 
empty body fat is typically considered to determine the target harvest body weight (Perry 
and Fox, 1997; NRC, 2000; Tedeschi et al., 2004).  
The weight at which cattle reach 28 percent empty body fat differs depending on 
genotype and sex (Fox and Black, 1984; NRC, 2000). For the same reason, chemical 
composition of the empty body is different among cattle types even when weight is the 
same. Based on steer composition and heifer mate mature weight, steers are assumed to 
have 28 percent empty body fat at the mature breeding female weight of a particular 
frame size (Smith et al., 1976; Cundiff et al., 1981; Jenkins and Ferrell, 1984; Harpster, 
1978). At the same degree of maturity, bulls are assumed to be 20 percent heavier and 
heifers 20 percent lighter than steers of the same frame score (Klosterman and Parker, 
1976; Harpster et al., 1978; Fortin et al., 1980). Fox et al. (1992) developed a relationship 
between frame size and shrunk body weight of beef and dairy cattle at 28 percent empty 
body fat, which has been adopted by the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996). Table 5.2 presents 
expected shrunk body weights of beef cattle of different frame sizes at 28 percent body 
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fat. Thus, if frame scores are known, shrunk body weight of beef cattle can be determined 
from Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Frame scores and expected shrunk body weights of feeder cattle 
                at 28% body fat.
Frame 
Score Bulls Steers Heifers
1 480 400 320
2 520 433 346
3 560 467 374
4 600 500 400
5 640 533 426
6 680 567 454
7 720 600 480
8 760 633 506
9 800 667 534
Source: Fox et al. (1992).
Weight of feeder cattle at 28% body fat
 
 
Expected final shrunk body weight (EFSBW) at 28 percent empty body fat, as 
predicted by the above method, can be used to estimate animal nutrient requirements for 
maintenance and growth and days required to finish. However, the expected finished 
weights for different frame sizes in Table 5.2 were estimated using data from cattle that 
received an estrogenic implant and were fed in a two-phase feeding program, first 
backgrounded on high quality forage based rations containing approximately 50 percent 
grain for approximately 90-120 days, and then finished on typical high-grain feedlot 
rations. Based on observed effects of growth promoting implants on feed intake, daily 
gain, feed efficiency, and weights at similar composition, Fox et al. (1992) suggest that 
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the EFSBW should be adjusted to one frame size smaller if no implant is used or one 
frame size larger for an estrogen and Trenbolone Acetate (TBA) combination implant. 
Evaluating the results of relevant studies, the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996) 
provides a guideline to adjust the EFSBW for alternative implant and ration strategies: 
No implant:    (25 to 45 kg.)AFSBW EFSBW= − ; 
Estrogen only:    EFSBWAFSBW = ; 
Estrogen plus TBA:   (25 to 45 kg.)AFSBW EFSBW= + ; 
Extended backgrounding:  (25 to 45 kg.)AFSBW EFSBW= + ; 
Typical ration:    EFSBWAFSBW = ; 
High energy ration from weaning: (25 to 45 kg.)AFSBW EFSBW= − . 
Tedeschi et al. (2004), however, suggest reducing EFSBW by 5 percent for calves fed 
high energy rations from weaning to harvest, and increasing it by 5 percent for calves 
placed in backgrounding programs at a slow rate of gain for an extended period of time 
before finishing on a high energy ration.   
 
5.4 Determining Equivalent Shrunk Body Weight  
Based on energy intake, rate of gain, and body composition data obtained from 72 
comparative slaughter experiments with 3,491 cattle, Garrett (1980) developed equations 
to predict energy and protein requirements for medium-frame-size steers, which were 
later adopted by the Subcommittee (NRC, 1984). These medium-frame steer equations 
can be used as the standard reference base to compute energy requirements for gain for 
any given rate of gain, and shrunk weight gain for any available energy for gain. 
However, adjustments in body weight are needed to predict energy requirements and 
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gains at various stages of growth for all cattle types. Tylutki et al. (1994) describes a 
procedure to adjust the body weights of cattle with various body sizes and sexes to a 
weight at which they are equivalent in body composition to the steers in the Garrett 
(1980) data base. The weight equivalent (EqSBW) to the medium-frame-size steer (NRC, 
1984) is calculated as 
 ) . (5.1) /( AFSBWSRWSBWEqSBW tt ×=
 Using the energy and protein retained validation data (Harpster, 1978; Danner et 
al. 1980; Lomas et al. 1982; Woody et al. 1983), the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996) 
estimated shrunk reference weights for three marbling categories: traces, slight, and 
small. The estimated empty body fat percentages within all cattle in each of the three 
marbling categories were 25.2 ( 91.2± ), 26.8 ( 0.3± ), and 27.8 ( 4.3± ), respectively, and 
the corresponding SBWs of the animals were found to be 435, 462, and 478 kg (NRC, 
1996). The Subcommittee (NRC, 1996) recommends using these values of SBW as the 
standard SRWs for the corresponding target empty body composition. Thus, in order to 
predict the energy requirement and gain, SBW in the Subcommittee’s (NRC, 1984) 
equations is replaced by EqSBW, which is calculated by multiplying the ratio of 478 to 
adjusted final shrunk body weight at 28 percent empty body fat (AFSBW) by the actual 
shrunk body weight of the animal.  
 
5.5 Ration Energy and Protein Values 
  Dry matter intake (DMI) and shrunk weight gain (SWG) crucially depends on net 
energy values of the ration. Moreover, energy allowable growth must be supported by 
protein allowable growth (Tedeschi et al., 2004; NRC, 2000). The National Research 
105 
 
Council (1996, 2000) provides a feed library comprising nutrient and chemical 
composition of available feedstuffs. Using the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) feed library, 
net energy and protein values of a ration containing several feed ingredients can be 
computed for each kilogram of feed and dry matter. The contents of metabolizable energy 
(ME), net energy for maintenance (NEm), and net energy for growth (NEg) of each feed 
ingredient are directly available from the feed library.  Metabolizable protein (MP) 
content of the feed can be calculated from other components in the list following the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 2000).  
 Metabolizable protein is defined as the actual protein absorbed by the intestine. 
The total amount of MP available from the consumed feed is the sum of digested 
undegraded feed protein and digested microbial protein (NRC, 2000). Available 
undegraded feed protein (UIP) is assumed to be 80 percent digestible. Therefore,  
  (5.2) .8.0 UIPMPf ×=
The contribution of microbial protein to the total supply of MP is estimated from the 
microbial crude protein (MCP) yield (NRC, 2000). For the feed ingredients with effective 
neutral detergent fiber (eNDF) higher than 20 percent,  
   .13.0 TDNMCP ×=
It is assumed that MCP contains 80 percent true protein, 80 percent of which is 
digestible. Hence, available microbial protein is  
 .  (5.3) 8.08.0 MCPMPb ××=
Finally, total MP supplied by the consumed feed is calculated as  
  (5.4) .bf MPFPMP +=
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 Once harvest body weight and composition, equivalent shrunk body weight, and 
energy and protein values are determined, the growth model can be employed to predict 
dry matter intake, weight gain, and composition of gain on a daily basis. The model also 
accounts for the effects of the environment and different implant strategies on the net 
energy requirement for maintenance and growth in each production situation.  
 
5.6 Prediction Equations for Dry Matter Intake by Individual Animal 
Although feed intake of ruminant animals is primarily driven by energy and 
protein requirements for maintenance and growth, factors that regulate feed intake are 
complex and not yet fully understood. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of empirical 
animal science research has established that dry matter intake (DMI) of an animal is 
determined by dietary energy concentration and physiological factors such as 
gastrointestinal fill, ruminal volatile fatty acid concentration and pH, percent of body fat, 
and age and frame size of the animal (NRC, 1996). In addition, numerous experiments on 
ruminant animals have shown that environmental management and dietary factors also 
influence feed intake. For example, feed intake increases (decreases) as the temperature 
falls below (above) (Kennedy et al., 1986; Minton, 1986; Young, 1986; Young et 
al., 1989). Other adverse environmental conditions such as level of precipitation and 
mud, and wind speed accentuate the effects of ambient temperature (NRC, 2000). Use of 
growth promoting implants increases feed intake, while ionophore feed additives 
decreases feed intake (Fox et al., 1988, 1992; Rumsey et al., 1992).  
Co20
 The Subcommittee (NRC, 1984) provided an equation to predict DMI for growing 
and finishing beef cattle that describes DMI as a function of dietary NEm concentration 
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and SBW. Later, the 1996 Subcommittee evaluated the parameters in the equations of the 
1984 Subcommittee using data obtained from experiments conducted with growing and 
finishing beef cattle that were published in the Journal of Animal Science from 1980 to 
1992. The base DMI equation, with revised parameter values adopted by the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 1996) is given by  
  (5.5)  0.75 21 0( (0.2435 0.0466 )) /t tDMI SBW NEm NEm a NEm−= × × − × −
where a0 = 0.1128 for ages less than 12 months and a0 = 0.0869 for ages greater than 12 
months. Subsequent research and field experiments suggested that equation (5.5) should 
be adjusted for the effects of empty body fat, genetic breed, feed additives, temperature, 
and mud depth on voluntary feed intake, which are recognized by the Subcommittee 
(NRC, 2000).  
 
Adjustment for Body Fat 
Using the relationship between equivalent shrunk body weight (EqSBW) and 
empty body fat percentage (EBFP) provided by Fox et al. (1992) and the Subcommittee 
(NRC, 2000), Tedeschi at al. (2003) allow a continuous adjustment for the effect of body 
fat on DMI. They recommend that the DMI equations be multiplied by a body fat 
adjustment factor (DMIBF) given by  
  (5.6)  
2
1 for 350 kg
                                            
0.7714 0.00196
for 350 kg.


















Adjustment for Breed 
Fox et al. (1992) and the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) also suggest that the DMI 
prediction equation be adjusted for genetic breed of the beef cattle with a factor defined 
by 
  (5.7) 
1.08 for Holstein cattle           
1.04 for British Holstein cattle







Adjustment for the Use of Growth Promoting Implants 
Accepting the results of the research by Fox et al. (1992), the Subcommittee 
(NRC, 2000) suggests that predicted DMI be decreased by 6 percent when implants are 
not in use and by 4 percent if an ionophore is fed at concentrations of 27.5 to 33 mg/kg 
dietary dry matter. Although the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) does not suggest different 
adjustment factors for different growth promoting implants, Duckett et al. (1996) found 
that use of continuous estrogenic implants increased feed intake by 6 percent over non-
implanted controls, while the effect was larger (7 percent to 10 percent) for the use of 
estrogen plus TBA. Therefore, the DMI adjustment factor for the use of growth 
promoting implants (DMIMP) adopted in this study is defined as 
  (5.8) 
0.94 for no anabolic implant                           
1.00 for any estrogenic implant                       











Adjustment for Environmental Conditions 
Fox and Tylutki (1998) examined the effects of temperature (Tc), relative 
humidity (RHc), wind speed (WS), and hours of sunlight (HRS) on feed intake of dairy 
cattle. They found that dairy cattle consume more feed to produce more heat to support a 
higher metabolic rate in cold weather and consume less feed in hot weather to reduce heat 
production. According to the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000), the DMI adjustment factors 
provided by Fox and Tylutki are equally applicable to beef cattle. The DMI adjustment 
factor (DMIT) for different levels of temperature is defined as  
  (5.9) 2
1.16                                                 for 20              
1.0433 0.0044 0.0001 for 20 20
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⎪






where CETI represents the current month’s effective temperature index, which is 
computed using the current month’s average temperature (Tc), relative humidity (RHc), 
wind speed (WSc), and hours of sunlight (HRSc) as (Baeta et al., 1987) 
)4905.0()010754.0()456.0(88.27 2 RHcTcTcCETI ×−×+×−=  
))3600/1000(1507.1()00088.0( 2 WScRHc ××+×+  
2(0.126447 ((1000 / 3600) ) ) (0.019876 )WSc Tc RHc− × × + × ×  
   (5.10) (0.046313 ((1000 / 3600) )) (0.4167 ).Tc WSc HRSc− × × × + ×
Fox and Tylutki (1998) also examined the effects of night cooling on feed intake 
as temperatures fall considerably during the night in some regions of the U.S. The DMI 
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Adjustment for Mud Depth in the Feedlot 
 Fox et al. (1992) found that voluntary feed intake by cattle decreases with the 
mud depth of the feedlot, which is also recognized by the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000).     
Tedeschi et al. (2004) provides the following equation for continuous adjustment for mud 
depth on feed intake. 
 . (5.12) tt MudDMIM ×−= 01.01
Thus, with the adjustments for body fat, genetic breed, feed additive, and weather 
condition, the prediction equation for feed intake by feedlot cattle is  
 tttttt DMIMDMITNCDMIMPDMIBDMIBFDMIAdjDMI ×××××= . (5.13) 
 
5.7 Required Energy for Maintenance 
 As defined by the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996), the maintenance requirement for 
energy is the amount of feed energy intake that results in no net loss or gain of energy 
from the tissues of the animal body. Processes or functions comprising maintenance 
energy requirements include essential metabolic processes, body temperature regulation, 
and physical activity (NRC, 2000). Typically, energy required for maintenance is 
computed by adjusting the basal metabolism energy requirement for physiological state, 
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breed, activity, environmental effects, and heat and cold stress. The Subcommittee (NRC, 
2000) defines the base maintenance energy requirement of beef cattle in a thermoneutral 
environment with minimal physical activity as21 
 , (5.14) ))(( 21
75.0 aPNBEaSBWREM tt +×××=
where a1 = 0.077, BE is the breed effect multiplier as provided by the Subcommittee 
(NRC, 2000), and PN and a2 are adjustment factors for previous plane of nutrition and 
previous temperature, respectively.22  
 According to the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996), the body condition score (BCS) of 
an animal, which follows a nine point scale where 1 is emaciated and 9 is obese, reflects 
the previous plane of nutrition that has an effect of the animal’s fasting metabolic energy 
requirement. In particular, for each one point change in BCS from the mid-point (BCS = 
5) a change of 5 percent in fasting metabolism is expected. This relationship is 
represented by  
 05.0)1(8.0 ×−+= BCSPN . (5.15) 
Reviewing the studies of Young (1975a, 1975b), the Subcommittee (NRC, 1981) 
recognized that the temperature to which an animal had been previously exposed had an 
effect on the animal’s current basal metabolic rate, and the current temperature to which 
an animal is exposed affects the energy required to cope with the current direct effects of 




21 A temperature of is described as being thermoneutral since this temperature has no effect on the 
base metabolic rate (Fox and Tylutki, 1998). 
 
22 The parameter value for  in the basal maintenance energy requirement equation is adopted from the 
study by Lofgreen and Garrett (1968) with cattle fed in individual stalls. Assuming that the animals in the 
study of Lofgreen and Garrett had on average 6 position changes and 8 standing hours, Tedeschi et al. 
(2004) suggest that the value of  would be 0.072 without any physical activity and no previous nutrition 
effect. Tedeschi et al. (2004) also provides a list of multipliers for alternative physical activities of the cattle 
while on feed.  
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cold stress or heat stress (Fox and Tylutki, 1998). The subsequent Subcommittees have 
adopted the following equation to take account of previous temperature on beef cattle’s 
maintenance requirement: 
 . (5.16) )20(0007.02 Tpa −×=
Analyzing the same data set used by Young (1975a), Fox and Tylutki (1998) 
found that a2 did not decrease above the thermoneutral temperature, and proposed an 
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where   
)4905.0()010754.0()456.0(88.27 2 RHpTpTpPETI ×−×+×−=  
2(0.00088 ) (1.1507 (1000 / 3600) )RHp WSp+ × + × ×  
2(0.126447 ((1000 / 3600) ) ) (0.019876 )WSp Tp RHp− × × + × ×  
 (0.046313 ((1000 / 3600) )) (0.4167 ).Tp WSp HRSp− × × × + ×  (5.18) 
 In addition to adjustment in the maintenance energy requirement for previous 
ambient temperature, the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) also recommends adjustment for 
the effects of current temperature. The energy requirement for maintenance increases 
when effective ambient temperature increases above the upper critical temperature (UCT) 
or decreases below the lower critical temperature (LCT). These effects are called heat and 
cold stresses, respectively. During cold stress, animals loose heat to the environment and 
increase metabolism to produce adequate heat to maintain body temperature. 
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Alternatively, during heat stress, an elevated body temperature results in increased 
tissue metabolic rate and animals need to exert extra effort to dissipate heat (NRC, 2000). 
Both UCT and LCT  are functions of how much heat an animal produces and how much 
heat is lost to the environment. Heat production by an animal is a function of 
metabolizable energy intake and retained energy. On the other hand, the amount of heat 
loss by an animal depends on the environmental condition as well as animal specific 
attributes. Thus, the effects of heat or cold stress depends both on environmental and 
animal factors.  
 
Adjustment for the Direct Effect of Cold Stress  
 Factors primarily contributing to differences in animal heat loss include surface 
area (SA), external insulation (EI), and internal or tissue insulation (TI). According to the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 2000), surface area is a function of shrunk body weight given by 
the equation  
 . (5.19) 67.009.0 tt SBWSA ×=
Heat production per unit of animal body surface area is given by   
 ttttt SAREAdjDMIMEHE /))(( −×= , (5.20) 
where   
 NEgIFNEmREMAdjDMIRE ttt ××−= − )))/((( 1 . (5.21) 
External insulation of an animal is provided by hair coat plus the layer of air 
surrounding the body. However, the effectiveness of hair as external insulation is 
influenced by wind, precipitation, mud, and hide thickness (NRC, 2000). The measure of 
external insulation adopted by the Subcommittee is  
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 ttttt HideMEMudMEHDWSEI ×××+×−= ))55.2()296.0(36.7(  (5.22) 
where 
  (5.23) 
1 ( 1) 0.2  for 2











 2.0)1(8.0 ×−+= HideCodeHideMEt . (5.24)  
Tissue insulation (TI) is measured as 
 . (5.25) BCSTI ×+= 75.025.5
Thus, total insulation of an animal can be expressed as  
 . (5.26) TIEIIN tt +=
 Using the amount of heat production by an animal and its insulation, the lower 
critical temperature is calculated as  
 )85.0(39 ××−= ttt HEINLCT . (5.27) 
The increase in energy required to maintain essential heat production in an environment 
colder than the animal’s  is computed as LCT
  (5.28) 
( ) /  for 
0 for
t t t t t
t
t t
SA LCT Tc IN LCT Tc
MEcs
LCT Tc
× − >⎧⎪= ⎨
≤⎪⎩  .
t
Finally, required energy for maintenance adjusted for cold stress is calculated as  
 tttt MEcsMENEmREMREMcsAdjREM ×+== )/( . (5.29) 
 
Adjustment for the Direct Effect of Heat Stress 
 Predicting the UCT of an animal is difficult because of the complex interaction of 
environmental and physiological factors. Fox and Tylutki (1998) suggest a method to 
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quantify the direct effect of heat stress that uses CETI instead of UCT. The heat stress 
factor for the required energy for maintenance developed by Fox and Tylutki (1998) is 




             (0.000457 )















Required energy for maintenance is thus computed by multiplying REM  by the heat 
stress adjustment factor, 
 tttt NEmhsREMREMhsAdjREM ×== . (5.31) 
  
5.8 Available Energy for Growth and Weight Gain 
 Weight gain that can be expected for the metabolizable energy and protein 
consumed by an animal on a given day is a function of the net energy available for 
growth (NEFG) after accounting for maintenance requirements, and the equivalent 
shrunk body weight (EqSBW) of the animal at the beginning of that day (Tedeschi et al. 
2004; Tylutki et al., 1994). Accurate prediction of weight gain depends on accurate 
estimation of net energy available for growth and the mature weight of the animal (Fox et 
al., 1992).  
As described by the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000), net energy available for growth 
can be estimated as dry matter available for growth multiplied by dietary content of NEg. 
Dry matter available for growth is equal to total dry matter intake minus dry matter 
required for maintenance, which is required energy for maintenance (adjusted for 
environmental and physiological factors) divided by the dietary content of NEm adjusted 
for the use of ionophores,   
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 )/( IFNEmAdjREMDMFM tt ×= ; (5.32) 
 ; (5.33) ttt DMFMAdjDMIDMFG −=
 . (5.34) NEgDMFGNEFG tt ×=
The Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) developed the following equation from the body 
composition data base of Garrett (1980), which predicts shrunk weight gain using 
estimated net energy for gain (NEFG) and equivalent shrunk body weight (EqSBW) of 
the animal:  
 . (5.35) 6837.01
9116.091.13 −−××= ttt EqSBWNEFGSWG
The predicted shrunk weight gain is added to the current shrunk body weight to obtain 
the shrunk body weight at the beginning of the next day. The process continues until a 
specified feeding period (in days) ends or a target final body weight is reached. 
 
5.9 Protein Requirements for Maintenance and Growth 
 Metabolizable protein required for maintenance (MPm) is determined by 
metabolic fecal, urinary, and scurf losses. Using nitrogen balance studies that account for 
such protein losses, the Institute National De la Recherche Agronomique (INRA, 1988) 
estimated that the maintenance requirement was 3.25 g MP/kg SBW0.75. Based on the 
growth of animals’ metabolic body weight, Wilkerson (1993) determined the 
maintenance requirements for growing cattle to be 3.8 g MP/kg SBW0.75. The 
Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) accepted Wilkerson’s measure because the estimate was 
based on animal growth rather than nitrogen balance. Wilkerson’s measure is also 
supported by recent research on nitrogen balance by Susmel et al. (1993).   
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 Given the relationship between energy available for gain ( ) and protein 
content of gain, net protein required for gain ( ) can be calculated following the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) as 
NEFG
NPg
 )))./(4.29(268( tttt SWGNEFGSWGNPg ×−×=  (5.36)  
However, protein conversion efficiency of MP  to  is not constant across body 
weights and rates of gain (NRC, 2000). Recent research on protein efficiency of growing 
cattle suggests that efficiency decreases as body weight increases (Ainslie et al. 1993; 
Wilkerson, 1993; INRA, 1988). Using INRA data, Ainslie et al. (1993) developed an 
equation with a lower bound to estimate protein conversion efficiency of MP to NP  
which was adopted by the Subcommittee (NRC, 1996, 2000), 
NP
 
0.834 (0.00114 )  for 300







− × ≤⎧⎪= ⎨
>⎪⎩
 (5.37) 
Metabolizable protein required for gain (MPg) is thus calculated by dividing NPg by PE. 
While MPm is calculated based on metabolic body weight (SBW0.75) of an animal, MPg is 
based on the SBW itself. Total protein required for maintenance and growth is the sum of 
MPm and MPg, 
  (5.38) ))./((8.3 75.0 ttttt SBWPEgNPgSBWRMP ×+×=
Following Tedeschi et al. (2004), the cattle growth simulation model assumes that 
ruminal requirements for nitrogen are met, and tissue amino acid requirements are met by 
the available metabolizable protein. The model also assumes that the requirements for 





5.10 Composition of Gain and the Amount of Body Fat 
 While gain is composed of protein, fat, water, nitrogen, and ash, the net energy 
available for gain is retained as either protein or fat (NRC, 2000). Garrett (1980, 1987) 
developed equations to estimate the energy content of gain as a function of observed 
empty body weight and gain, and then predicted the proportions of protein and fat in gain 
using the estimated energy content of weight gain. The Subcommittee (NRC, 1996) 
adopted the equations proposed by Garrett (1980, 1987). Tedeschi et al. (2004) provide 
similar equations that can be used to predict protein and fat content of gain when net 
energy available for gain (NEFG) and empty weight gain (EWG) are known:   
  (5.39) 0.956 ;tEWG SWG= × t
 );/(0271.0254.0 ttt EWGNEFGPIG ×−=  (5.40)  
 )./(123.0154.0 ttt EWGNEFGFIG ×+−=  (5.41) 
 Body fat accumulates over time and the amount of empty body fat (EBF) at the 
end of any day during the feeding phase can be estimated by adding the amount of fat in 
gain to the amount of EBF at the beginning of the day (Tedeschi et al., 2003; 2004),   
 tttt EWGFIGEBFEBF ××+= − 85.01 . (5.42) 
Accordingly, the percentage of empty body fat at the end of a day on feed can be 
obtained by dividing the amount of accumulated fat by the empty body weight (EBW), 
 ) . (5.43) /(100 ttt EBWEBFEBFP ×=
 This approach requires an estimate of empty body fat of the cattle at the beginning 
of the feeding phase. Simpfendorfer (1974) and Owens et al. (1995) presented the 
following quadratic equations, respectively, to predict initial empty body fat. 
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Tedeschi et al. (2003) evaluated the above equations using slaughter data from five 
studies (Crickenberger, 1977; Danner, 1978; Harpster, 1978; Lomas, 1979; Woody, 
1978). They found that, while both of the equations accounted for a similar proportion of 
variation, the Owens et al. (1995) equation predicts lower values for EBF when EBW was 
below 200 kg and the Simpfendorfer (1974) equation overpredicts EBF for higher EBW. 
Tedeschi et al. (2003) suggest that the systematic bias could be eliminated by multiplying 
the right hand side of the Simpfendorfer (1974) equation by 0.85. Thus, the initial empty 
body fat can be predicted following Tedeschi et al. (2004) as 
 . (5.46) 20 0 0(0.00054 0.037 0.61) 0.85EBF EBW EBW= × + × − ×
 
5.11 Prediction Equations for Carcass Weight 
 Based on animal science laboratory research, several equations have been 
published in the Journal of Animal Science establishing a positive relationship between 
empty body weight and carcass weight of beef cattle (Lofgreen et al., 1962; Garrett and 
Hinman, 1969; Holzer and Levy, 1969; Fox et al., 1972; Fox et al., 1976; Garrett et al., 
1978). The empty body weight of cattle can be predicted from shrunk body weight as 
(Garrett, 1980; NRC, 1996, 2000)  
 . (5.47) tt SBWEBW ×= 891.0
Carcass weight can then be calculated using any of the following equations: 
 Lofgreen et al. (1962): tt EBWCW ×+−= 69.086.21 ; 
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 Garrett and Hinman (1969): tt EBWCW ×+−= 73.022.22 ; 
Fox et al. (1976):  tt EBWCW ×+−= 71.071.28 ; 
Garrett et al. (1978): tt EBWCW ×+−= 76.054.24 . (5.48) 
Fox et al. (1976) suggest that the above equations are mutually consistent in 
predicting carcass and empty body weights given alternative conditions and types of 
cattle tested, and compatible with live sale weights adjusted for the rumen-reticulum 
contents. However, parameter values in the above equations differ because the 
procedures used to determine carcass and empty body weight of the cattle in the 
corresponding research were not similar. Fox et al. (1976) argue that if all the research 
had determined empty body weight as live weight minus all digestive tract content, 
parameter values in all the equations would likely be similar.  
Using actual empty body weight and carcass weight data, Tedeschi et al. (2004) 
evaluated the equations published by Garrett and Hinman (1969), Fox et al. (1976), and 
Garrett et al. (1978). They found that all three equations accounted for at least 89 percent 
of the variation, but for cattle with various frame sizes the Garrett and Hinman (1969) 
equation had the best combination of low mean bias, mean squared error (MSE), and root 
mean squared prediction error (RMSPE). 
 
5.12 Prediction Equations for Carcass Yield and Quality Grades 
 The primary factor in determining yield grade is the amount of carcass fat. On the 
other hand, quality grade is a function of marbling score, which is directly related to the 
amount of carcass fat, but is subject to variation in the distribution of fat within the 
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carcass. Fox and Black (1984) developed two equations that can be used to predict yield 
grade and quality grade from the percentage of carcass fat,  
 or tt CFPYG ×+−= 15.07.1  f ;4025 ≤≤ tCFP  (5.49) 
 or tt CFPQG ×+= 23.05.2  f .3815 ≤≤ tCFP  (5.50) 
Fox and Black (1984) argue that, although various other factors may influence yield and 
quality grades, their prediction equation works reasonably well under typical feedlot 
conditions.  
Percentage of carcass fat can be estimated from empty body fat percentage 
following the relationship provided by Garrett and Hinman (1969), 
 tt EBFPCFP ×+= 0815.170.0 . (5.51) 
Estimated carcass fat percentage can then be used in the above equations to predict yield 
and quality grades. The resulting yield grade value is equivalent to the numerical yield 
grade standards set by the USDA. However, the numerical quality grade obtained from 
the prediction equation needs to be converted to represent USDA standards. Fox and 
Black proposed the following rule to convert numerical quality grade to the categories 
recognized by the USDA:   
Standard = 8, Select = 9, Low Choice = 10, Mid Choice = 11, 
High Choice = 12, Low Prime = 13, and Mid Prime = 14. 
 Using independent data from six studies (Crickenberger, 1977; Danner, 1978; 
Harpster, 1978; Lomas, 1979; Perry et al., 1991; Woody, 1978), which included pen- and 
individually-fed steers and heifers of different breeds, Tedeschi et al. (2004) evaluated 
the yield grade prediction equation proposed by Fox and Black. They found that the 
equation provided satisfactory predictions of yield grade in the range of 2.5 and 3.5, but 
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tended to under- and over-predict yield grade below and above that range, respectively.23 
Tedeschi et al. (2004) also developed an equation to predict yield grade directly from 
empty body fat percentage, which gives very similar results to the one developed by Fox 
and Black, 
 tt EBFPYG ×+−= 127.0604.0 . (5.52) 
 Employing carcass data of 1,355 beef cattle, Guiroy et al. (2001) estimated the 
relationship between carcass and empty body fat percentage to each USDA quality grade. 
Results from their study show that mean empty body fat percentages that correspond to 
USDA standard, select, low choice, mid-choice, high choice, low prime, and mid-prime 
are 21.13, 26.15, 28.61, 29.88, 31.00, 31.94, and 32.45, respectively. Thus, the difference 
in empty body fat percentage units decreases as quality grade improves, while the 
incremental change is fixed (4 percentage points) in the measure proposed by Fox and 
Black (1984). In order to predict quality grade, this model uses mean empty body fat 
percentages with associated standard errors as reported by Guiroy et al, while equation 
(5.49) is adopted to predict yield grade of the carcass. 
 
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a dynamic biophysical growth model for beef cattle that can 
simultaneously predict the outcomes of alternative feeding strategies for given animal 
characteristics and the production environment. In particular, for a wide range of 
alternative feed-implant strategies, the model is able to predict dry matter intake by each 
individual animal for each day on feed, resulting daily weight gain and composition, final 
                                                 
23 Actual yield grade is determined from accurate measures of hot carcass weight, fat thickness at the 12th-





weight and yield and quality grades of the carcass, and days required to reach a target 
harvest body weight or final body weight and composition for a given feeding period.  
The model is developed by adapting the CVDS model as described in Tedeschi et 
al. (2004) with complementary sub-models published in NRC reports (1996, 2000) of the 
Subcommittee on beef cattle nutrition requirements and other relevant animal science 
research. All of the basic equations, i.e., equations (5.1)-(5.38), and associated parameter 
values for predicting feed intake and weight gain are well recognized and accepted by the 
Subcommittee (NRC, 1996, 2000) after many critical evaluations. The equations for 
predicting the composition of gain, carcass weight, and resulting yield and quality grades, 
i.e., equations (5.39)-(5.52), were also evaluated and recommended by a respected panel 
of animal scientists. Since this growth model can predict feed intake, growth 
performance, carcass yield, and beef quality with an acceptable degree of accuracy, the 
remainder of this dissertation considers its usefulness for examining economic decision 
making by cow-calf producers, cattle feeders, and beef packers including explanation of 
the predominance of various contract forms and the potential for new grid pricing 
possibilities. The next chapter employs the biophysical model to predict feedlot and 
carcass performance of a large set of feeder steers and evaluates the predictive efficiency 
of the model with actual data. 
CHAPTER 6 
APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF THE BIOPHYSICAL GROWTH 




The biophysical growth model for beef cattle presented in the previous chapter 
can be used to predict feedlot and carcass performance of individual cattle for a given 
input and production environment. The model may also be useful for economic decision 
making by cow-calf producers, cattle feeders, and beef packers. For example, given input 
and output price data, producers can determine the optimal time or final body weight for 
marketing fed cattle. This study employs the model in determining optimal actions of 
cattle feeders and cow-calf producers who work under alternative cattle feeding contracts. 
Before using the model beyond its primary purpose, it is important to test how it performs 
in predicting cattle feeding outcomes. This chapter presents an evaluation of the 
predictive efficiency of the growth model.  
The biophysical growth model for beef cattle is applied to simulate feedlot and 
carcass performance of a large sample of steers actually fed in feedlots located in 
southwestern Iowa through the Tri-County Steer Carcass Futurity Cooperative (TCSCF). 
Simulated outcomes are then compared with the actual outcomes. The following section 
provides a detailed description of the data used in the simulation. The step-by-step 
simulation procedure is presented next. Results from the simulation are then presented 
and analyzed. Finally, the biophysical growth model for beef cattle is evaluated by 
comparing predicted outcomes with actual observations.  
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6.2 Description of Input Data 
Data used in the cattle growth simulation process were obtained from three 
sources. First, feedlot and carcass performance data on 1147 steers actually fed in 
feedlots located in Red Oak, Iowa, under the TCSCF program during 1995-99, were 
obtained from the Iowa Beef Center (IBC) of Iowa State University. This data set 
contains individual cow and calf information provided by the cow-calf producers, feedlot 
performance data recorded by the feeders, and carcass data collected from the packers. 
Second, energy and protein values of typical feed ingredients were obtained from the 
report on beef cattle nutrition published by the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000). Finally, daily 
and weekly averages of major weather variables such as temperature, relative humidity, 
hours of sunshine, and wind speed in Red Oak, Iowa, were obtained from the 
WeatherBank Incorporation, a meteorological consulting company providing weather 
data and products. All of these three data sets are described in detail below.  
 
The TCSCF Data 
For more than 25 years the TCSCF has been helping beef producers better 
manage and market their products by providing ranch to rail information. Cow-calf 
producers who are interested in sharing cow-calf information in exchange for feedlot and 
carcass performance data can feed their cattle through the TCSCF by retaining ownership 
and providing detailed cow and calf information. The TCSCF places the cattle from the 
interested cow-calf producers in participating feedlots and records information on 
individual animal performance during the feeding phase, and carcass data after slaughter. 
By obtaining feedlot and carcass data, cow-calf owners are able to learn more about how 
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their cattle perform on the feedlot and on the rails. On the other hand, by obtaining cow-
calf information, cattle feeders and packers also learn more about the type of the cattle 
that are likely to perform better in the feedlot and on the rail. While this voluntary 
method of sample selection may self-select, say, cow-calf owners who are more 
interested in marketing efficiency, this selectivity should not bias the test of the 
biophysical growth model which is conditioned on the relevant factors (e.g., genetic stock 
and production practices) that could otherwise cause this bias.  
The TCSCF provided data on 1147 steers to IBC researchers. The steers were 
placed on feed in the feedlots of Red Oak, Iowa, during October-December of 1995-98 
and slaughtered during April-June of the following year. Upon receiving the cattle from 
the ranchers, the TCSCF obtained cow-calf information for each individual steer. Cow-
calf information include birth date and weight of the steer calves, cow and sire breed, 
cow age and weight, cow calving interval, and cow body condition score at weaning. 
Individual steer’s age, weight, and frame score were recorded immediately after the cattle 
were delivered to the participating feedlots. Upon completion of the feeding phase, 
TCSCF collected feedlot performance of the animals. Feedlot information include days 
on feed (DOF), total amount of feed consumed, and total weight gain. Finally, carcass 
data were recorded upon slaughter. Carcass data include hot carcass weight (HCW), 
dressing percentage (DP), fat cover (FC), rib-eye area (REA), percentage of kidney, 
pelvic, and heart fat (KPH), yield grade (YG), marbling score (MS), and quality grade 
(QG).  
These detailed TCSCF data were obtained from the IBC. After careful review of 
the data, 22 observations were omitted from the data set because the data were not 
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plausible.24 Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics of major variables in the retained 
data set of 1125 observations. The first section of Table 6.1 describes the common 
statistics of the sample. Some 78 percent of these feeder cattle were from Angus or 
Angus-crossbred cows, and 90 percent were British or British-crossbreds. More than 80 
percent of these cattle were medium frame steers. The mean and median age of these 
cattle at the time of feedlot placement were 217 and 216 days, respectively, with a 
minimum age of 122 days and a maximum age of 337 days (Table 6.1). Initial body 
weights of these feeder steers varied from 272 to 838 lbs, with a mean placement weight 
of 548.6 lbs (Table 6.1). On average, the cattle were fed for 201 days, with minimum and 
maximum numbers of days on feed of 148 and 239, respectively (Table 6.1). Final shrunk 
body weight of the cattle ranged from 896 to 1530 lbs, with a mean slaughter weight of 
1154.1 lbs. Dressing percentage upon slaughter varied from 57.14 percent to 61.31 
percent, while the mean was 60.94 percent. More than 87 percent of the carcasses were 
graded as USDA yield grade three or better and around 59 percent of the carcasses were 
graded as USDA Choice or better. 
Most of the steers in the data set were born in February, March, and April, and 
weaned at ages ranging from 5 to 10 months. The weaned calves were placed on feed in 
October, November, and December. Therefore, the data set is disaggregated according to 
the month of placement of the steers in the feedlots. Summary statistics of the feeder 
steers placed on feed in October, November, and December are presented in second, 
third, and fourth sections of Table 6.1, respectively. Of the 1125 steers, 521 were placed  
                                                 
24 Either average daily gain or feed efficiency (feed per pound of gain) of these cattle are out of the range of 
sensibility. Also, these cattle failed a preliminary run of the growth simulation model. Even with a high-
energy ration and an aggressive implant, all of these omitted cattle required more than 300 days to reach the 




Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
All cattle: 1125 observations
Age (days) 217 29 122 216 337
Initial body weight (lb.) 548.59 83.14 272 542 838
Frame score1 4.71 1.09 0.75 4.75 7.93
Days on Feed 201 21 148 202 239
Final body weight (lb.) 1154.15 87.48 896 1150 1530
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 703.37 59.06 512 701 938
Numerical yield grade2 2.61 0.58 0.64 2.62 4.51
Numerical quality grade3 3.41 0.66 1 3 5
October cattle: 521 observations
Age (days) 202 25 134 199 288
Initial body weight (lb.) 525.52 78.41 272 522 820
Frame score1 4.40 1.07 0.75 4.51 7.24
Days on Feed 209 21 148 223 239
Final body weight (lb.) 1144.16 82.34 896 1142 1530
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 696.60 55.28 527 696 938
Numerical yield grade2 2.76 0.55 1.10 2.76 4.22
Numerical quality grade3 3.32 0.63 1 3 5
November cattle: 257 observations
Age (days) 216 21 122 216 276
Initial body weight (lb.) 553.49 78.25 360 552 776
Frame score1 4.86 0.98 2.01 4.88 7.45
Days on Feed 202 16 169 204 232
Final body weight (lb.) 1151.03 86.81 956 1150 1400
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 689.97 55.48 535 689 865
Numerical yield grade2 2.37 0.53 0.98 2.33 4.00
Numerical quality grade3 3.37 0.69 1 3 5
December cattle: 347 observations
Age (days) 241 24 153 242 337
Initial body weight (lb.) 579.61 83.07 392 574 838
Frame score1 5.04 1.06 2.34 4.93 7.93
Days on Feed 188 17 160 199 203
Final body weight (lb.) 1171.45 92.95 920 1168 1460
Hot carcass weight (lb.) 723.48 62.08 512 724 902
Numerical yield grade2 2.57 0.58 0.64 2.59 4.51
Numerical quality grade3 3.57 0.64 1 4 5
Source: Tri-County Steer Carcass Futurity Cooperative (TCSCF).
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of the TCSCF cattle.
1 Frame score: 1 to 3 = small, 4 to 6 = medium, and 7 to 9 = large.
2 Numerical yield grade: 1 = high, …, 5 = low.





on feed during October, 257 in November, and 347 in December. From Table 6.1, the 
cattle placed on feed later had higher mean ages and initial and final body weights. 
The relatively wide variation in most observed factors suggests this is a useful 
dataset for testing performance of the biophysical growth model. In order to determine 
whether any particular characteristic of the feeder cattle placed on feed in different 
months represent some underlying distribution, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
tests were performed. For each of the variables listed in Table 6.1, statistical distributions 
of each pair of observations categorized by feedlot placement months are compared 
against each other (e.g., October vs. November, November vs. December, and October 
vs. December). The K-S test statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of the same 
underlying distribution can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level for most of the 
variables except for final body weight, carcass weight, and quality grade of the October 
and November cattle. 
 The TCSCF data, however, do not provide any information about the production 
technology, inputs, and management practices adopted by the feedlots for feeding the 
cattle. In particular, information about the composition and energy and protein values of 
feed, daily dry matter intake by the animals, and the use of implants and/or feed additives 
were not reported. However, some information about the feed is available in the TCSCF 
Rules and Regulations, which states that cattle are fed a warm-up ration for 28 days 
before placing them on approximately an 80 percent concentrate ration.25 The TCSCF 
Rules and Regulations also suggest that the cattle are weighed individually at the time of 
re-implant, which implies that a continuous implant strategy was adopted for these steers. 
                                                 
25 The TCSCF Rules and Regulations are listed at http://www.ag.iastate.edu/centers/tcscf/rules.htm.  
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Therefore, a set of typical feedlot rations with implants are assumed following the reports 
of several Southwestern Iowa feedlots and guidelines published in various beef cattle 
research reports and bulletins.   
 
Net Energy and Protein Values of Feedlot Rations 
Feedlot rations are typically formulated using concentrate, silage, hay, and 
protein, vitamin, and mineral supplements. Concentrates are high energy feeds (mostly 
feed grains and their by-products) that contain less than 20 percent protein and less than 
18 percent fiber. Corn and sorghum are the most common feed grains in cattle rations, 
with barley, oats, wheat, and other grains used to a lesser extent. Silage is produced from 
green forage crops that are compressed and stored under anaerobic conditions. The most 
common crops used for silage are corn, sorghum, grasses, legumes, and some small 
grains. In general, grain and silage account for a large part (approximately 60 to 80 
percent) of feedlot rations. Sometimes grass or alfalfa hay are substituted for a small 
portion of silage. While grass hays are lower in energy content than silage, they add extra 
fiber in the diet. On the other hand, alfalfa hay is richer in protein content than silage. 
Protein supplements are dry or liquid feedstuffs that contain 20 percent or more protein. 
Soybean meal, cottonseed meal, and corn gluten meal are the most common protein 
supplements used in feedlot rations. The only vitamin supplement of general practical 
importance to beef cattle is vitamin A. Vitamin A is usually included in all commercial 
protein supplements for feedlot cattle. For maintenance and growth, cattle also require 
minerals such as calcium, magnesium, and phosphorus. Requirements for such minerals 
are usually met by the mineral content of the other ingredients of the ration.   
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  Feeding programs utilized by cattle feeders can be categorized into two major 
groups: simple and complex. Simple feeding programs involve feeding a relatively 
constant proportion of concentrate (e.g., grain) and roughage (e.g., silage) with an added 
protein supplement for the entire feeding period. In complex feeding programs, the grain-
silage ratio is altered with every fifty or hundred pounds of weight gain. While numerous 
combinations are possible as the grain-silage ratio can vary from all grain to all silage, the 
range varies from 60 percent grain-40 percent silage to 90 percent grain-10 percent silage 
in typical feedlot rations (Field and Taylor, 2002). A recent survey on the feeding and 
marketing practices of cow-calf producers and feedlot operators in Nebraska by Feuz and 
Umberger (2001) found that corn grain and silage together accounted for 57 to 80 percent 
of feedlot rations, and that this percentage was increasing with placement weight. Feuz 
and Umberger also reported that the corn-silage ratio increased with placement weights, 
ranging from 55 percent corn-45 percent silage to 92 percent corn-8 percent silage.  
Based on this survey and information obtained from three commercial feedlots in 
Iowa, 9 warm-up rations and 9 finishing rations are formulated for model validation 
purpose.26 A separate set of 6 strategic rations are also formulated to take account of 
simple feeding programs. Beef cattle requirements for minerals, nitrogen, and amino 
acids are met by each of these rations (NRC, 2000).27 Composition of the rations (per kg 
dry matter) and corresponding net energy and protein values are presented in Table 6.2. 
Each of the rations is comprised of four ingredients: corn grain, corn silage, alfalfa hay,  
                                                 
26 The three commercial feedlots are Cody Feedlot (www.codyfeedlot.com), CRI Feeders Inc. (www.cri-
feeders.com), and Silver Creek Feeders  (www.silvercreekfeeders.com). 
 
27 Although numerous rations could be formulated by changing the grain-silage ratio in smaller increments, 
only a few combinations are selected following typical feeding practices of feedlots. In most cases, feedlot 




Table 6.2: Energy and protein values of the rations (per kg dry matter).
Composition NEm NEg ME MP
C:Si:A:So1 Mcal. Mcal. Mcal. gm.
Warm-up Ration 1 30:50:05:15 1.804 1.171 2.732 99.52
Warm-up Ration 2 30:50:10:10 1.841 1.204 2.775 105.42
Warm-up Ration 3 30:50:15:05 1.879 1.237 2.819 111.32
Warm-up Ration 4 40:40:05:15 1.852 1.213 2.790 103.11
Warm-up Ration 5 40:40:10:10 1.889 1.246 2.833 109.01
Warm-up Ration 6 40:40:15:05 1.927 1.279 2.877 114.91
Warm-up Ration 7 50:30:05:15 1.900 1.255 2.848 106.70
Warm-up Ration 8 50:30:10:10 1.937 1.288 2.891 112.60
Warm-up Ration 9 50:30:15:30 1.975 1.321 2.935 118.51
Finishing Ration 1 60:20:05:15 1.948 1.297 2.906 110.29
Finishing Ration 2 60:20:10:10 1.985 1.330 2.949 116.19
Finishing Ration 3 60:20:15:05 2.023 1.363 2.993 122.10
Finishing Ration 4 70:10:05:15 1.996 1.339 2.964 113.88
Finishing Ration 5 70:10:10:10 2.033 1.372 3.007 119.79
Finishing Ration 6 70:10:15:05 2.071 1.405 3.051 125.69
Finishing Ration 7 80:0:05:15 2.044 1.381 3.022 117.47
Finishing Ration 8 80:0:10:10 2.081 1.414 3.065 123.38
Finishing Ration 9 80:0:15:05 2.119 1.447 3.109 129.28
Strategic Ration 1 30:40:10:10 1.841 1.204 2.775 105.42
Strategic Ration 2 40:40:10:10 1.889 1.246 2.833 109.01
Strategic Ration 3 50:30:10:10 1.937 1.288 2.891 112.60
Strategic Ration 4 60:20:10:10 1.985 1.330 2.949 116.19
Strategic Ration 5 70:10:10:10 2.033 1.372 3.007 119.79
Strategic Ration 6 80:0:10:10 2.081 1.414 3.065 123.38
1 Denotes ration percentages ordered as corn:silage:soybean meal:alfalfa hay
Note: NEm  = net energy for maintenance; NEg  = net energy for gain; ME  = metabolizable energy; 
MP  = metabolizable protein.
Source: National Research Council (2000).  
 
and soybean meal. The second column of Table 6.2 shows the proportion of these 
ingredients in the rations. Alfalfa hay and soybean meal each account for 20 percent of 
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the rations. The other 80 percent of the rations are corn grain and silage. Columns 3,4,5, 
and 6 of Table 6.2 depict net energy for maintenance (NEm) and growth (NEg), 
metabolizable energy (ME), and metabolizable protein (MP) available from the rations. 
As the table shows, energy and protein values of the rations increase with the proportions 
of grain and protein supplement. Dry matter, energy, and protein contents of the feed 
ingredients are listed in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3: Nutrient values of feed ingredients used to formulate the rations.
Ration DM NEm NEg ME TDN CP UIP
Ingredients % Mcal/kg Mcal/kg Mcal/kg % DM % DM %CP
Corn 88 2.18 1.50 3.18 88.00 9.80 55.30
Corn silage (45%) 34 1.70 1.08 2.60 72.00 8.65 30.00
Alfalfa hay 91 1.31 0.74 2.17 60.00 18.60 28.00
Soybean Meal 89 2.06 1.40 3.04 84.00 49.90 35.00
Note: DM  = dry matter content; NEm  = net energy for maintenance; NEg = net energy for gain; 
ME  = metabolizable energy; TDN = total dry matter nutrient; CP  = crude protein; and 
UIP  = undegraded feed protein.
Source: NRC (2000).  
 
Along with the rations listed in Table 6.2, three alternative implant strategies are 
considered: no implant, moderate implant (estrogen only), and aggressive implant 
(estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate).28 This yields 243 (9x9x3) complex ration-implant 
strategies and 18 (6x3) simple strategies. Following Tedeschi et al. (2004), it is assumed 
that requirements for minerals, nitrogen, and amino acids are met by the supplied diet.   
                                                 
28 Following implant use guidelines suggested by Field and Taylor (2002) and Duckett et al. (1996), a 
continuous implant strategy is adopted throughout the finishing phase, i.e., implanting at the time of 





Empirical studies have shown that feedlot performance of cattle depends crucially 
on particular environmental attributes, especially temperature, humidity, sunshine, and 
mud depth. Accordingly, all of the major beef cattle growth models account for the 
effects of such variables. The growth model presented in the previous chapter calculates 
dry matter intake and weight gain by the animals in a day-step fashion using average 
daily weather information.29 However, the TCSCF dataset does not include any 
information about the weather conditions under which the cattle were fed. In order to 
simulate the production situation, daily and weekly averages of major weather variables 
such as temperature, relative humidity, hours of sunshine, and wind speed in Red Oak, 
Iowa, over the period of 1995-1999, are obtained from the WeatherBank Incorporation, a 
meteorological consulting company providing weather data and products.  
The TCSCF cattle were placed in the feedlots during the months of October-
December of 1995-1998, and slaughtered no later than June the following year. Table 6.4 
presents average monthly temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, and hours of 
sunshine during September-June of 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, and 1998-1999. 
 
                                                 
29 Since temperatures move slowly from one season to the next but can fluctuate widely from day to day, 
Fox and Tylutki (1998) recommend using the average mean daily temperature over the previous month to 
represent previous exposure (Tp), and the average mean daily temperature during the current week to 




Table 6.4: Average monthly weather information, 1995-1999.
Temperature Rel. Humidity Wind Speed Sunshine
(oC) (%) (kmph) (hours)
1995-96
    September 13.17 63.10 14.12 4.74
    October 1.98 71.50 14.27 3.86
    November -1.90 76.81 12.30 1.94
    December -7.06 74.10 15.42 3.40
    January -2.91 62.55 14.54 5.07
    February 1.85 58.45 17.44 2.09
    March 10.69 58.53 17.81 3.62
    April 16.24 77.61 15.16 1.81
    May 22.89 73.70 11.69 4.79
    June 17.13 74.70 9.55 7.09
1996-97
    September 12.83 65.10 15.67 5.85
    October 1.28 74.67 15.02 2.91
    November -4.07 75.35 14.33 3.69
    December -6.52 70.06 16.71 4.27
    January -0.99 76.46 12.70 3.64
    February 6.18 64.10 17.23 7.00
    March 8.76 60.33 14.70 5.22
    April 15.23 54.61 16.56 7.89
    May 23.94 59.60 11.16 9.68
    June 17.61 70.00 9.92 7.61
1997-98
    September 11.54 65.26 13.60 5.92
    October 5.59 65.90 13.03 4.04
    November -1.76 72.26 12.20 2.52
    December -2.83 70.35 10.90 2.82
    January 3.12 69.57 13.22 2.80
    February 1.00 67.87 17.49 3.40
    March 11.87 65.73 17.97 6.29
    April 20.68 78.00 14.01 8.41
    May 22.06 79.67 15.39 7.89
    June 23.89 77.50 9.92 7.57
1998-99
    September 14.84 84.19 11.89 5.39
    October 7.70 85.73 14.86 4.43
    November 0.43 79.90 11.63 5.47
    December -3.67 86.42 14.27 3.57
    January 4.11 84.29 15.52 4.87
    February 5.82 71.65 15.47 6.83
    March 13.06 78.50 19.63 4.19
    April 17.76 64.52 16.14 6.51
    May 22.81 67.87 13.35 6.88
    June 18.17 63.33 8.74 8.20
Source: Weatherbank Inc.  
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6.3 Simulation Procedures and Results 
Employing the dynamic and deterministic biological growth model and using the 
cattle, nutrient, and weather data as described above, outcomes of feeding the TCSCF 
steers are simulated. Two separate simulations are performed for two alternative terminal 
conditions: one feeds the cattle until a target finish weight is reached and the other feeds 
the cattle for a predetermined length of feeding period. In the first simulation model, final 
shrunk body weight is an exogenous variable, while in the second total days on feed is 
given. Other common independent variables in the growth simulation models are age, 
initial shrunk body weight, breed, frame score, body condition score, hair depth, hide 
thickness, hair coat of the cattle, net and metabolizable energy and protein content of the 
ration, implant factors, and environmental attributes. However, TCSCF did not provide 
information about the body condition score, hair depth, hide thickness, and hair coat of 
the cattle. Therefore, typical values are assumed for these variables. Specifically, 
following the approach of the Subcommittee on Beef Cattle Nutrition (NRC, 2000), all 
feeder steers are assumed to have a moderate body condition score of 5, hair depth of 0.5 
inches, average hide thickness with hide code 2, and a hair coat code of 2 (some mud on 
the lower body).  
The primary objective of both of the simulations is to predict the outcomes of 
alternative ration-implant strategies as accurately as possible. Therefore, biological 
growth of each individual animal is simulated for the use of each of the ration-implant 
strategies under each of the terminal conditions. Daily dry matter intake, energy required 
for maintenance, energy available for growth, weight gain, and composition (protein and 
fat) of the gain are computed step by step for each individual animal for each of the 18 
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strategic ration-implant strategies. In the first model, daily feed intake, growth, and body 
composition of each of the steers are computed until they reach final weights as reported 
by the TCSCF. In the second simulation model, daily outcomes are calculated up to the 
corresponding feedlot days as reported by the TCSCF. Steps of the simulation procedure 
are described in Appendix 6.1.  
At the end of feeding, total dry matter intake (TDMI), days on feed (DOF) for 
simulation model 1, total shrunk weight gain (TSWG) for simulation model 2, final 
carcass weight (FCW) or yield, final empty body fat percentage (EBFP), and the resulting 
yield and quality grades (YG and QG) are computed. Average daily gain (ADG), feed 
efficiency (FE) in terms of pounds of feed consumed per pound of gain, and dressing 
percentages (DP) measured by carcass yield as a percentage of live body weight are also 
calculated from the simulation outcomes. A brief summary of the simulation outcomes is 
presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Only the means (across all cattle) of the major dependent 
variables are presented in the tables. Table 6.5 displays the results of simulation model 1 
with a fixed terminal weight while Table 6.6 shows the results of simulation model 2 with 
a fixed terminal time.  
According to the biophysical growth model, daily dry matter intake increases with 
the body weights of the cattle and potency of the growth promoting implants, but 
decreases with the net maintenance energy content of feed. Thus, for a given target 
weight gain, total dry matter intake should decrease with the maintenance energy of feed 
and potency of implants. Feed efficiency (pounds of feed consumed per pound of gain) 
and average daily gain should improve (as a result, required days on feed declines) with 
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the energy content of feed and potency of the implant. These predictions are confirmed 
by the values in columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Results from simulation model 1 (fixed terminal state) - means across all cattle.
FSBW DOF TSWG TDMI ADG FE CW DP EBFP YG QG
(lbs.) (days) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) % (%)
No Implant
  Ration 1 1155.5 272 607.6 4822.4 2.27 7.93 706.7 61.14 28.57 3.04 3.19
  Ration 2 1155.5 263 607.6 4618.2 2.34 7.60 706.7 61.14 28.66 3.05 3.16
  Ration 3 1155.6 255 607.7 4433.6 2.41 7.29 706.7 61.14 28.74 3.07 3.12
  Ration 4 1155.6 248 607.7 4265.1 2.48 7.02 706.7 61.14 28.82 3.08 3.08
  Ration 5 1155.6 242 607.8 4110.6 2.54 6.76 706.8 61.14 28.88 3.09 3.06
  Ration 6 1155.6 236 607.7 3967.8 2.60 6.53 706.8 61.14 28.95 3.10 3.02
Estrogen Only
  Ration 1 1155.9 221 608.0 4248.5 2.77 6.99 706.9 61.14 27.18 2.81 3.80
  Ration 2 1155.8 214 608.0 4079.1 2.85 6.71 706.9 61.14 27.26 2.83 3.78
  Ration 3 1155.9 208 608.1 3923.7 2.94 6.45 707.0 61.14 27.33 2.84 3.74
  Ration 4 1156.0 203 608.1 3780.2 3.01 6.22 707.0 61.14 27.40 2.85 3.70
  Ration 5 1155.9 198 608.1 3646.9 3.09 6.00 707.0 61.14 27.47 2.86 3.69
  Ration 6 1156.0 193 608.1 3523.7 3.16 5.79 707.0 61.14 27.53 2.87 3.67
Estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate
  Ration 1 1156.1 195 608.2 3911.9 3.12 6.43 707.1 61.14 25.79 2.59 4.32
  Ration 2 1156.2 190 608.3 3755.7 3.22 6.17 707.1 61.14 25.87 2.60 4.29
  Ration 3 1156.2 184 608.3 3611.3 3.31 5.94 707.1 61.14 25.94 2.61 4.28
  Ration 4 1156.2 179 608.4 3478.1 3.40 5.72 707.2 61.14 26.01 2.62 4.26
  Ration 5 1156.2 175 608.4 3354.4 3.49 5.51 707.2 61.14 26.07 2.63 4.24
  Ration 6 1156.2 171 608.4 3240.1 3.57 5.32 707.2 61.14 26.13 2.64 4.23
Note: FSBW  = final shrunk body weight, DOF  = days on feed, TSWG  = total shrunk weight gain, TDMI  = 
total dry matter intake, ADG  = average daily gain, FE  = feed efficiency, CW  = carcass weight,  DP  = 
dressing percentage, EBFP  = empty body fat percentage, YG  = yield grade, and QG  = quality grade.  
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Table 6.6: Results from simulation model 2 (fixed terminal time) - means across all cattle.
FSBW DOF TSWG TDMI ADG FE CW DP EBFP YG QG
(lbs.) (days) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) (lbs.) % (%)
No Implant
  Ration 1 1018.7 203 470.8 3443.6 2.32 7.34 617.2 60.56 25.16 2.49 4.57
  Ration 2 1034.0 203 486.2 3431.9 2.40 7.08 627.2 60.63 25.62 2.56 4.41
  Ration 3 1048.2 203 500.4 3415.6 2.47 6.85 636.5 60.70 26.05 2.63 4.26
  Ration 4 1061.3 203 513.5 3395.0 2.54 6.63 645.1 60.76 26.45 2.70 4.12
  Ration 5 1073.4 203 525.6 3370.6 2.60 6.43 653.0 60.81 26.82 2.76 3.98
  Ration 6 1084.5 203 536.7 3342.6 2.65 6.25 660.3 60.86 27.16 2.81 3.83
Estrogen Only
  Ration 1 1109.8 203 562.0 3836.8 2.77 6.84 676.8 60.96 26.09 2.64 4.23
  Ration 2 1127.2 203 579.4 3826.3 2.86 6.62 688.2 61.03 26.57 2.72 4.07
  Ration 3 1143.4 203 595.5 3810.3 2.94 6.41 698.8 61.09 27.02 2.79 3.89
  Ration 4 1158.3 203 610.5 3789.4 3.02 6.22 708.5 61.15 27.43 2.86 3.73
  Ration 5 1172.1 203 624.2 3763.9 3.08 6.04 717.6 61.20 27.82 2.92 3.57
  Ration 6 1184.8 203 636.9 3734.2 3.15 5.87 725.8 61.24 28.17 2.97 3.41
Estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate
  Ration 1 1179.3 203 631.4 4097.2 3.12 6.50 722.3 61.22 26.27 2.67 4.17
  Ration 2 1198.8 203 650.9 4089.7 3.21 6.29 735.0 61.29 26.77 2.75 3.99
  Ration 3 1216.9 203 669.0 4076.1 3.30 6.10 746.8 61.35 27.24 2.82 3.80
  Ration 4 1233.6 203 685.8 4056.9 3.39 5.92 757.8 61.41 27.67 2.89 3.62
  Ration 5 1249.1 203 701.2 4032.5 3.46 5.76 767.9 61.46 28.06 2.96 3.46
  Ration 6 1263.4 203 715.5 4003.3 3.53 5.60 777.2 61.50 28.43 3.02 3.29
Note: FSBW  = final shrunk body weight, DOF  = days on feed, TSWG  = total shrunk weight gain, TDMI  = 
total dry matter intake, ADG  = average daily gain, FE  = feed efficiency, CW  = carcass weight,  DP  = 
dressing percentage, EBFP  = empty body fat percentage, YG  = yield grade, and QG  = quality grade.  
 
The growth model also implies that empty body and carcass fat percentages 
increase with the net energy content of feed and decreases as more aggressive implant 
strategies are adopted. Column 10 of Table 6.5 shows that a 10 percent increase 
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(decrease) in the grain-silage ratio results in only about a 0.10 percent increase (decrease) 
in mean body and carcass fat, while the change is quite substantial (at least 1.31 
percentage points) for a change in implant strategy. Nevertheless, in order to determine 
the value of the carcass, changes in body and carcass fat percentages are translated into 
numerical yield and quality grades. Since yield and quality grades are directly calculated 
from empty body fat (Tedeschi et al., 2004) or carcass fat percentages (Fox and Black, 
1984), they follow the same patterns as body fat. Recall that higher numerical yield and 
quality grades imply lower beef quality. In particular, carcasses with yield grade higher 
than 3 and quality grades higher than or equal to 4 receive discounts in the grid.30 Thus, 
aggressive implants (e.g., estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate) and low-grain rations are 
undesirable as long as carcass value is the concern. As column 8 of Table 6.5 shows, 
carcass weight remains nearly unchanged for alternative feeding strategies. This is 
because the final body weights are fixed for all the strategies while the growth model 
predicts carcass weight from final body weight using a linear equation with fixed 
parameter values developed by Garrett and Hinman (1969).   
In order to test whether the outcomes of alternative ration-implant strategies are 
different, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests are performed. Total dry matter 
intake, weight gain, and the composition of gain by each individual animal under any two 
ration formulae (for a given implant strategy) are paired and tested to see if the difference 
between the matched pairs are from a distribution whose median is zero. Similarly, 
outcomes under alternative implant strategies are paired (keeping the ration formula 
                                                 
30 The practical measures of yield and quality grades are discrete in nature. According to Guiroy et al. 
(2001), carcasses with EBFP lower than 27 should be assigned numerical quality grade 4 (Select).The 




fixed) and tested for a zero median difference. All of the test statistics indicate rejection 
of the hypothesis of a zero median difference at a 5.0 percent significance level. Thus, the 
biological growth simulation model produces a clear shift in cattle feeding outcomes 
associated with cattle feeding practices. More precisely, the model shows that the energy 
content of the feed and implant strategy systematically alters the distribution of yield and 
quality of beef for a typical lot of cattle.  
 
6.4 Evaluation of the Results of the Cattle Growth Simulation Model 
 The equations and parameters of the biological growth simulation model adopted 
in this study are well recognized and accepted by the Subcommittee (NRC, 2000) after 
many critical evaluations. Therefore, this study does not make any attempt to evaluate 
functional forms or the values of the parameters used in different equations. The 
objective is rather to proceed with economic analyses assuming functional forms and 
parameter values of the biological model as proposed by this respected panel of animal 
scientists. Nonetheless, it is important to know how well the model performs in 
predicting actual cattle feeding outcomes, especially when the results of economic 
analyses crucially depend on the predictive efficiency of such a model.  
The predictive efficiency of a biological model is typically evaluated by 
comparing the simulated values of the endogenous variables with empirical data. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Tedeschi et al. (2004) have previously evaluated their dynamic 
growth model with feed intake and performance data on 362 steers fed in individual pens. 
When dry matter intake was known, their model accounted for 89 percent of the variation 
with a bias of -2.6 percent in predicting individual animal ADG and explained 83 percent 
of the variation with a bias of -1 percent in estimating the observed body weights at the 
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actual days on feed. When ADG was known, the growth model predicted the dry matter 
required for that ADG with only 2 percent bias and an R2 of 74 percent. Tedeschi et al. 
found that all of the equations used to predict CW from EBW accounted for at least 89 
percent of the variation, but the Garrett and Hinman (1969) equation had the best 
prediction when no size scaling was done. Estimating equations (5.49) and (5.52) they 
found that both equations had similar and satisfactory predictions of YG in the range of 
2.5 and 3.5. Thus, the dynamic growth model presented by Tedeschi et al. is able to 
predict animal performance and body composition with an acceptable degree of accuracy. 
As mentioned earlier, the TCSCF did not record the composition and amount of 
feed provided to the cattle.31 Therefore, it is not possible to match the feeding strategies 
and compare the simulated and actual outcomes as precisely as did the study by Tedeschi 
et al. (2004). Thus, for the purposes of this study, further verification is needed for the 
case where feeding and implant strategies must be approximated with available 
information. In the absence of information about the nutrient contents of feed and 
implants actually provided to the cattle in TCSCF feedlots, a plausible range of ration-
implant strategies that reflect TCSCF guideline are considered for model verification 
purpose. In particular, feedlot and carcass performance of each individual steer are 
simulated using the warm-up and finishing rations listed in Table 6.2 along with three 
alternative implant strategies.32 The simulated outcomes are then compared with the 
TCSCF data following three standard statistical procedures: first, by examining the 
                                                 
31 The TCSCF data reports total amount of feed consumed by the cattle, but not the proportions of the feed 
ingredients or the energy content. Upon contacting the responsible personnel in the IBC, I learned that the 
amount of feed consumption by individual animals was calculated following the Cornell Net Carbohydrate 
and Protein Systems (CNCPS).   
 
32 Following TCSCF guidelines, no implant is considered during the warm-up ration phase and a 
continuous implant strategy is adopted throughout the finishing ration phase.  
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frequency distribution of the actual observations with respect to the plausible range of 
simulated outcomes; second, by testing whether the simulated and actual samples come 
from the same distribution; and finally, by comparing the estimated probability densities 
of the simulated and actual observations.   
The first step in evaluating the predictive efficiency of the biophysical growth 
simulation model involved determining whether the actual feedlot days, final carcass 
weights, and yield and quality grades are within the plausible ranges constructed by the 
simulation of 243 (9μ9μ3) warm-up and finishing ration-implant strategies. The lower 
bounds of the range for each relevant variable is determined by warm-up ration 1 and 
finishing ration 1 with no implant, while the upper bound of the range is determined by 
warm-up ration 9 and finishing ration 9 with an aggressive implant strategy.  
The two-way contingency tables reflected in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show how many 
of the actual observations of days on feed, carcass weight, yield grade, and quality grade 
are within the plausible range simulated by model 1 (fixed terminal weight) and model 2 
(fixed terminal time), respectively. From Table 6.7, approximately 92 and 69 percent of 
the actual days on feed and quality grades, respectively, are in the ranges of simulated 
outcomes by model 1. However, actual yield grades of 77 percent of the carcasses are out 
of the predicted range. Since no carcass weight variation occurs under model 1, two-way 
contingency tables for carcass weight are not presented in Table 6.7.33 
                                                 
33 According to the growth model, dressing percentage remains the same for alternative ration-implant 
strategies with a fixed terminal weight (Table 6.5). Thus, for alternative strategies, final carcass weight 
simulated by model 1 is the same although yield and quality grades vary. A very narrow range of carcass 
weights can be result from alternative ration-implant strategies because of the discrete day-step nature of 
the simulation model (e.g., Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.7: Two-way contingency tables showing how many of the actual outcomes are within the 
                   constructed ranges simulated by growth model 1 (fixed terminal weight).
Days on Feed
Within Out of Within Out of 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 241 26 267
1996 182 5 187 October 486 35 521
1997 219 12 231 November 238 19 257
1998 389 51 440 December 307 40 347
Total 1031 94 1125 Total 1031 94 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 17.57 p -value 0.001 χ 2-Statistic1 6.69 p -value 0.035
Yield Grade
Within Out of Within Out of 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 50 217 267
1996 53 134 187 October 142 379 521
1997 44 187 231 November 48 209 257
1998 111 329 440 December 68 279 347
Total 258 867 1125 Total 258 867 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 9.05 p -value 0.029 χ 2-Statistic1 10.32 p -value 0.006
Quality Grade
Within Out of Within the Out of the 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 173 94 267
1996 133 54 187 October 351 170 521
1997 151 80 231 November 173 84 257
1998 316 124 440 December 249 98 347
Total 773 352 1125 Total 773 352 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 5.59 p -value 0.13 χ 2-Statistic1 2.16 p -value 0.338
1 The χ2-Statistic tests whether the classification between within range and out of range is random.




Table 6.8: Contingency tables showing how many of the of the actual outcomes are within the
                   constructed ranges simulated by growth model 2 (fixed terminal time).
Final Body Weight
Within the Out of the Within the Out of the 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 240 27 267
1996 181 6 187 October 482 39 521
1997 218 13 231 November 235 22 257
1998 380 60 440 December 302 45 347
Total 1019 106 1125 Total 1019 106 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 21.66 p -value < 0.001 χ 2-Statistic1 6.89 p -value 0.032
Final Carcass Weight
Within the Out of the Within the Out of the 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 229 38 267
1996 172 15 187 October 454 67 521
1997 206 25 231 November 224 33 257
1998 323 117 440 December 252 95 347
Total 930 195 1125 Total 930 195 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 46.25 p -value < 0.001 χ 2-Statistic1 35.32 p -value < 0.001
Yield Grade
Within the Out of the Within the Out of the 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 50 217 267
1996 45 142 187 October 123 398 521
1997 40 191 231 November 40 217 257
1998 80 360 440 December 52 295 347
Total 215 910 1125 Total 215 910 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 3.72 p -value 0.29 χ 2-Statistic1 12.72 p -value 0.002
Quality Grade
Within the Out of the Within the Out of the 
Range Range Total Range Range Total
1995 191 76 267
1996 110 77 187 October 342 179 521
1997 156 75 231 November 163 94 257
1998 284 156 440 December 236 111 347
Total 741 384 1125 Total 741 384 1125
χ 2-Statistic1 8.57 p -value 0.036 χ 2-Statistic1 1.4 p -value 0.496
1 The χ2-Statistic tests whether the classification between within range and out of range is random.




For model 2 (fixed terminal time), approximately 91, 82, and 66 percent of actual 
body weights, carcass weights, and quality grades are within the constructed ranges, 
respectively (Table 6.8). Actual yield grades of only 19 percent of the carcasses are 
within the predicted range. Thus, a simple count of the actual observations within the 
constructed range indicates that, with a plausible set of ration-implant strategies, the 
growth model is able to reasonably well approximate the actual live weight, dressed 
weight, and carcass quality grade. For yield grade, either the outcomes are less accurate 
or yield grade is sensitive to the feed-implant strategy. 
A second step is to determine whether the predictive efficiency of the growth 
model varies systematically with respect to the initial physical condition of an animal  
(e.g., feedlot placement weight, age, and frame score) or weather conditions. Table 6.1 
indicates that average age and weight of the animals were significantly different across 
feedlot placement months. Table 6.4 shows that overall weather condition varied across 
the years cattle were placed on feed. The frequencies of actual observations that fall 
within and outside the plausible range are therefore categorized according to the feedlot 
placement years (1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998) and months (October, November, and 
December). The left panel of Tables 6.7 and 6.8 display the two-way contingency tables 
of frequencies for the cattle categorized according to placement years, while the two-way 
tables in the right panel are for the cattle categorized by placement months.  
The significance of plausible classifications in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 can be tested 
using Pearson’s chi-squared test. In the context of these tables, the null hypothesis of 
statistical independence of rows and columns for Pearson’s chi-squared test corresponds 
to random classification of simulated outcomes to within- and out-of-range categories. 
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The chi-squared tests and their p-values are reported for each of the contingency tables in 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8.34 For data grouped by year in Table 6.7, each of the statistics except 
for quality grade implies rejection of random classification at the 5 percent significance 
level with very small p-values in the cases of days on feed and final yield grade. 
However, the significance for yield grade is not meaningful because a majority of 
simulated results fall outside of observed outcomes. 
For the data grouped by month placed on feed, the results are similar with 
significance for all simulated outcomes other than quality grade (with the same 
qualification on the results for yield grade), although the extent of significance is 
somewhat less for days on feed. For data categorized by year in Table 6.8, each of the 
statistics except for yield grade implies rejection of random classification at the 5 percent 
significance level with very small p-values (again with the same qualification on the 
results for yield grade). For the data grouped by month, the results are similar for 
simulated outcomes other than quality grade. These results verify that the relative 
frequencies of actual days on feed, final carcass weight, and yield grade differ with 
respect to feedlot placement year and month, while the relative frequency of predicted 
quality grades within the observed range does not depend on such categories.35  
These results show that the biophysical growth model does not have systematic 
bias towards feedlot placement year or month for predicting animal performance, or 
towards initial physical conditions of animals and weather conditions that differ by 
                                                 
34 A p-value less than 0.05 suggests that the null hypothesis of no difference should be rejected at the 5 
percent significance level.  
 
35 To test for systematic variation by year or month, each cell’s contribution to the chi-squared value was 
also examined. The test statistics indicated no systematic variation for feedlot placement year or month. 
Each cell’s individual contribution to the chi-squared value and associated tests are not reported to 
economize on space.  
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placement year and month. Notably, however, these types of chi-squared tests require 
selecting categories in a suitable and unbiased fashion. Information is clearly lost by 
combining data into categories. Thus, more precise measures for testing the goodness of 
fit of simulated outcomes to actual observations can further validate performance of the 
growth model.  
A common way to test the goodness of fit of simulated observations to actual 
observations is to treat the two samples as independent and compare the statistical 
properties of their underlying distributions. The usual parametric technique is to apply a 
t-test of equal means conditioned on equal variances and then apply an F-test of equal 
variances, assuming that the simulated and actual observations are from normally 
distributed populations. These tests treat individual observations separately and, unlike 
the chi-squared tests above, do not lose information through combining data into discrete 
categories. However, both t- and F-tests assume that the samples in consideration are 
normally distributed. In order to avoid such a rigid assumption and provide conclusions 
with greater generality, several nonparametric tests are also used. The most widely used 
nonparametric techniques are the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum (hereafter R-S) and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (hereafter K-S) tests. The R-S and K-S tests are both designed to 
test for the equality of two distributions. To test the goodness of fit of simulated data to 
actual data the nonparametric R-S and K-S tests are also performed in addition to the 
parametric t- and F-tests.   
For alternative ration-implant strategies, simulation model 1 generates different 
days on feed required to reach a target final body weight, while model 2 generates 
different final shrunk body weights for a given feeding period. For each individual 
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animal, the ration-implant strategy that corresponds to the nearest neighbor of the actual 
days on feed for model 1, or the final body weight for model 2, is sorted from the 
plausible alternatives employing a simple search algorithm. Other relevant outcomes 
(e.g., final carcass weights, yield grades, and quality grades) from that particular feeding 
strategy are then separated and saved as the elements of a row vector of a two-
dimensional matrix. This procedure is repeated for all cattle in the sample, thus 
generating a matrix with vectors containing simulated feedlot and carcass data. Simulated 
days on feed (model 1), final body weights (model 2), carcass weights, and yield grades 
are then compared with the actual data using the parametric t- and F-tests and the 
nonparametric R-S and K-S tests.36 The tests are performed with full samples as well as 
with subsamples categorized by the months of placement of animals in feedlots. Results 
of the tests for model 1 and model 2 are presented in Tables 6.9 and 6.10, respectively.  
For the full and grouped samples of days on feed (model 1) and final body 
weights (model 2), the reported p-values of t-tests in Table 6.9 and 6.10 indicate that, 
assuming normality and identical variances, the null hypothesis of identical means of 
actual and simulated outcomes cannot be rejected at the 5.0 percent significance level. 
The p-values of F-tests for the full and grouped samples yield no evidence of 
dissimilarity of variances of actual and simulated days on feed (model 1) or final body 
weights (model 2). The reported p-values of the nonparametric tests (R-S and K-S tests) 
indicate that, for the full sample as well as for each of the subsamples of days on feed   
                                                 
36 The parametric t- and F-test and nonparametric R-S and K-S tests assume that the comparable 
distributions are both continuous distributions. Since quality grade data are ordinal in nature, these tests are 




Table 6.9: Results of statistical tests to compare actual observations and simulated observations 
           from model 1 (fixed terminal weight).
t-t est1 F- test2 R-S test3 K-S test3
All cattle (1125 observations)
    Days on Feed Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.74 p  = 0.11 p  = 0.78 p  = 0.09
    Carcass Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.16 p  = 0.29 p  = 0.27 p  = 0.44
    Yield Grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
October cattle (521 observations)
    Days on Feed Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.88 p  = 0.20 p  = 0.89 p  = 0.08
    Carcass weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.29 p  = 0.54 p  = 0.37 p  = 0.68
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
November cattle (257 observations)
    Days on Feed Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 1.00 p  = 0.34 p  = 0.93 p  = 0.12
    Carcass weight Reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  = 0.003 p  = 0.70 p  = 0.004 p  = 0.04
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
December cattle (347 observations)
    Days on Feed Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 1.00 p  = 0.11 p  = 0.34 p  = 0.06
    Carcass weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.26 p  = 0.70 p = 0.14 p = 0.14
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
1 The two-sample t-test verifies whether the actual and simulated observations are independent random 
samples from normal distributions with equal means given equal but unknown variances
2 The two-sample F-test verifies whether the actual and simulated observations come from normal 
distributions with the same variance regardless of equality of means. 
3 Both the R-S test and K-S nonparametric tests verify whether the distributions of actual and 
simulated observations are the same. 
Note: H 0 represent the null hypothesis of equality of distributions and corresponding p -values are the
probabilities of a more extreme result. Rejection corresponds to 5.0 percent significance.  
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Table 6.10: Results of the statistical tests to compare actual observations and simulated 
           observations from model 2 (fixed terminal time).
t-t est1 F- test2 R-S test3 K-S test3
All cattle (1125 observations)
    Body Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.81 p  = 0.69 p  = 0.83 p  = 0.97
    Carcass Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.45 p  = 0.14 p  = 0.61 p  = 0.57
    Yield Grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
October cattle (521 observations)
    Body Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.93 p  = 0.80 p  = 0.99 p  = 0.96
    Carcass weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.47 p  = 0.39 p  = 0.54 p  = 0.58
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
November cattle (257 observations)
    Body Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.96 p  = 0.84 p  = 0.999 p  = 0.99
    Carcass weight Reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  = 0.005 p  = 0.57 p  = 0.009 p  = 0.03
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
December cattle (347 observations)
    Body Weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.71 p  = 0.65 p  = 0.71 p  = 0.94
    Carcass weight Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 Cannot reject H 0 
p  = 0.08 p  = 0.40 p = 0.10 p = 0.09
    Yield grade Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001 p  < 0.001
1 The two-sample t-test verifies whether the actual and simulated observations are independent random 
samples from normal distributions with equal means given equal but unknown variances
2 The two-sample F-test verifies whether the actual and simulated observations come from normal 
distributions with the same variance regardless of equality of means. 
3 Both the R-S test and K-S nonparametric tests verify whether the distributions of actual and 
simulated observations are the same. 
Note: H 0 represent the null hypothesis of equality of distributions and corresponding p -values are the
probabilities of a more extreme result. Rejection corresponds to 5.0 percent significance.  
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(model 1) or final body weights (model 2), the null hypothesis that actual and simulated 
distributions are identical cannot be rejected at the 5.0 percent significance level (Tables 
6.9 and 6.10).  
The test results for the actual and simulated carcass weights and yield grades 
obtained under both models are similar because, with matched body weight and feedlot 
days for each animal in the sample, the ranking of carcass performance turns out to be the 
same by the two methods even though the quantitative outcomes are slightly different. As 
implied by the reported p-values of t-tests in Table 6.9 and 6.10, assuming normality, the 
null hypothesis of identical means and variances of actual and simulated carcass weights 
cannot be rejected at the 5.0 percent significance level for the full sample nor for the 
October and December subsamples. The p-value of the t-test for carcass weights of cattle 
placed in feedlots in November implies rejection of the hypothesis of identical means at 
the 5.0 percent significance level. On the other hand, the p-values of F-tests for the 
November subsample yield no more evidence of dissimilarity of variances of carcass 
weights than for the full sample or the other subsamples. However, for the full and 
grouped samples of actual and simulated yield grades, the p-values of t- and F-tests imply 
rejection of the null hypotheses at any acceptable level of significance.  
The reported p-values of the nonparametric tests (R-S and K-S tests) indicate that, 
for the full sample as well as for the October and December subsamples of actual and 
simulated carcass weights, the null hypothesis that actual and simulated distributions are 
identical cannot be rejected at the 5.0 percent significance level (Tables 6.9 and 6.10). 
However, for the November subsample of carcass weights, the hypothesis of identical 





                                                
not rejected at 1.0 percent level. The R-S and K-S test results further indicate that the null 
hypotheses that actual and simulated yield grade distributions are identical can be 
rejected for all cases at reasonable significance levels.  
In summary, the parametric and nonparametric tests confirm that the biophysical 
growth simulation model is able to approximate actual days on feed (for given final body 
weight), final body weights (for given days on feed), and carcass weights well with a 
plausible set of ration-implant strategies. But, the model fails to predict yield grade at a 
reasonable level of acceptance.  
While the above tests involve cumulative frequency distributions of the simulated 
and actual data, the probability densities can be estimated for further comparison. Several 
parametric, semiparametric, and nonparametric techniques are available for probability 
density estimation. Kernel density estimation is the most popular technique among the 
nonparametric methods. Probability densities of the actual and simulated days on feed 
(model 1), carcass weight, yield grade, and quality grade data are estimated using a 
Gaussian kernel function. Actual and estimated densities for each of these are graphically 
presented in Figure 6.1.  
The solid and dashed lines in Figure 6.1A represent the probability density curves 
for actual and simulated days on feed, respectively. Figure 6.1B presents the 
corresponding quantile-quantile (q-q) plot, showing whether the actual and simulated 
days on feed come from the same distribution.37 The probability density and q-q plots  
 
37 The quantile-quantile (q-q) plot is a graphical technique for determining if two data sets come from 
populations with a common distribution (i.e., a graphical alternative for the various two-sample tests). A q-
q plot is a plot of the quantiles of the first data set against the quantiles of the second data set. If the data 
falls near the 450 line, then the evidence suggests the two samples come from the same distribution. The 
method is robust with respect to changes in the location and scale of either distribution.  
 

































        
    Figure 6.1A: Estimated kernel densities of actual      Figure 6.1B: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
     and simulated days on feed (all cattle).        and simulated days on feed (all cattle). 
  









































   
       Figure 6.1C: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure 6.1D: Quantile-quantile plot of actual      
        and simulated carcass weights (all cattle).         and simulated carcass weights (all cattle).  
 










































        Figure 6.1E: Estimated kernel densities of actual         Figure 6.1F: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated yield grades (all cattle).          and simulated yield grades (all cattle). 
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indicate that the actual and simulated days on feed have similar distributions. In a similar 
fashion, probability density curves of actual and simulated carcass weights and 
corresponding q-q plot are represented by Figures 6.1C and 6.1D, respectively. These 
figures show that the actual and simulated carcass weights have virtually the same 
distribution.  
Figures 6.1E and 6.1F show the probability density curves and the corresponding 
q-q plots for actual and simulated yield grade observations. While estimated densities 
appear to be quite different for simulated and actual yield grades, the q-q plot shows that 
the predictions are ranked quite accurately. In accordance with the findings of Tedeschi et 
al. (2004), the probability density curves and the q-q plot indicate that the growth model 
tends to over-predict (under-predict) numerical yield grade when actual yield grade is 
below 2.5 (above 3.5). While the simulation model over-predicts numerical yield grades 
of 66.1 percent of the observations, the means of actual and simulated yield grades are 
2.61 and 2.85, respectively. Compared to the actual discrete variation in qualitative yield  
grades (which are whole numbers), this quantitative bias at the mean level seems of 
limited consequence. More importantly, the relatively accurate qualitative ranking 
suggested by Figure 6.1F suggests that the simulated qualitative yield grades appear to be 
useful for examining the implications of alternative fed cattle pricing, although the under-
representation of quantitative yield grade variability must be considered in evaluating 
variability of grid pricing with respect to yield grade.  
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Figure 6.1G represents the probability density curves for the actual and simulated 
quality grades.38 The estimated density of simulated quality grades is similar to that of 
actual quality grades except for a slight location shift to the right, thus slightly over-
predicting actual numerical quality grade. This bias in the prediction of quality grades is 
much smaller than the actual discrete variation in quality grades, which are whole-
numbered grades. This persistent but small discrepancy is viewed as minimal and is thus 
ignored.  



















Figure 6.1G: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (all cattle). 
 
Finally, probability densities of actual and simulated observations categorized by 
the feedlot placement months (October, November, and December) are also estimated 
following the same procedure. Estimated densities and q-q plots of actual and simulated 
days on feed, carcass weight, yield grade, and quality grade data for the cattle placed in 
the feedlot in October, November, and December are shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, 
respectively. From these figures it is evident that, while the corresponding densities of the 
                                                 
38 Each observation of a numerical quality grade assumes an integer value in the range of 1 and 5. Quantile-
quantile plots for actual and simulated quality grade data thus display only five discrete points, and 
therefore are not reported.   
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        Figure 6.2A: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure 6.2B: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
        and simulated days on feed (October cattle).         and simulated days on feed (October Cattle).  
 










































        Figure 6.2C: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure 6.2D: Quantile-quantile plot of actual           
        and simulated carcass weights (October cattle).         simulated carcass weights (October Cattle).  
 









































        Figure 6.2E: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure 6.2F: Quantile-quantile plot of actual    
        and simulated yield grades (October cattle).       and simulated yield grades (October Cattle). 
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               Figure 6.2G: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (October cattle). 
 

































      Figure 6.3A: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure 6.3B: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
      and simulated days on feed (November cattle).       and simulated days on feed (November Cattle). 
 











































        Figure 6.3C: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure 6.3D: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
        and simulated carcass weights (November cattle).      and  simulated carcass weights (Nov. Cattle). 
159 
 












































        Figure 6.3E: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure 6.3F: Quantile-quantile plot of actual     
        and simulated yield grades (November cattle).        and simulated yield grades (November Cattle). 
 



















        Figure 6.3G: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (November cattle). 
 





































     Figure 6.4A: Estimated kernel densities of actual         Figure 6.4B: Quantile-quantile plot of actual    
     and simulated days on feed (December cattle).       and simulated days on feed (December Cattle). 
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      Figure 6.4C: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure 6.4D: Quantile-quantile plot of actual          
      and simulated carcass weights (December cattle).       and simulated carcass weights (December Cattle).  
 







































      Figure 6.4E: Estimated kernel densities of actual         Figure 6.4F: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
      and simulated yield grades (December cattle).         and simulated yield grades (December Cattle). 
 






















Figure 6.4G: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (December cattle). 
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disaggregated sample follow patterns similar to the densities of the full sample, the 
predictive efficiency of the biophysical growth model is higher for the cattle placed on 
feed in October than for those placed on feed in November and December. However, no 
particular pattern is observed for the progression of the feedlot placement months. 
Furthermore, the high degree of similarity between actual and simulated distributions in 
these plots reveals that the nonparametric tests reject identical distributions only because 
of quantitatively inconsequential differences. Estimated densities of feedlot and carcass 
performance data simulated by model 2 are almost identical to those of model 1 and, 
therefore, are presented graphically in Appendix 6.2.  
Both the statistical and graphical results provide considerable justification for 
using the simulated carcass weights of the growth model. The statistical and graphical 
results also indicate that the biophysical growth simulation model provides useful 
predictions of other actual feedlot and carcass performance outcomes except for yield 
grade. While the model tends to predict qualitative variation in yield grade correctly, it 
understates the quantitative variation. Animal science research (e.g., Tedeschi et al., 
2004) also recognizes this inadequacy of the model. Thus, in terms of comparing the 
benefits of a given grid pricing system to the traditional fed cattle pricing methods, this 
result suggests that the estimated benefits of grid pricing would be biased downward 
because the effective incentive for yield grade would be understated by the growth 
model. However, as long as the growth model provides satisfactory predictions about 
carcass weight and quality grade outcomes and ranks yield grade predictions with an 
acceptable degree of accuracy, the model appears to permit determination of the structure 
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of optimal contracts for cattle feeding with grid pricing possibilities aside from biasing 
the optimal premium incentive for yield grade.  
For example, Figure 6.1C suggests that the average quantitative yield grade 
predicted by the growth model is higher than the actual average. If this bias in 
quantitative yield grade prediction shifts qualitative yield grade predictions upward (e.g., 
predicted qualitative yield grade is 3 while the actual yield grade is 2), the predicted yield 
grade premium from a given grid pricing system would be lower implying less incentive 
for overall beef quality improvement than the actual incentive in effect. In this case, the 
effective incentive in an optimal contract with grid pricing would be understated if based 
on analysis with the growth model. Thus, with appropriate interpretation of the results, 
the growth model appears to be useful for the purpose of determining optimal cattle 
feeding contracts with alternative fed cattle pricing systems.  
   
6.5 Conclusion 
The biophysical growth simulation model for beef cattle presented in Chaper 5 is 
employed in this chapter to predict feedlot and carcass performance of a large set of 
feeder steers that were actually fed in different feedlots located in Red Oak, Iowa. The 
simulated outcomes under alternative ration-implant strategies are then compared with 
actual feedlot and carcass performance data. Statistical analyses suggest that the growth 
model is able to predict required days on feed to reach a target final body weight, 
accumulated weight for a given feeding period, carcass weight, and quality grade with an 
acceptable degree of accuracy. In particular, the model is able to predict carcass weight 





carcasses. The bias in quality grade prediction appears to be minimal. While the model 
also provides satisfactory predictions of quantitative yield grade within a certain range 
and predicted yield grades are accurately ranked, it tends to understate the variation in 
quantitative yield grade. Since the ability of the model to predict all other aspects of beef 
cattle feeding performance with quite satisfactory results, further use of the model for the 
purpose of investigating optimal contracts with grid pricing appears acceptable with 
appropriate qualifications regarding yield grade predictions.   
Employing this biophysical growth model for beef cattle, the next chapter 
determines the optimal incentive structures for cattle feeding contracts under alternative 
fed cattle pricing schemes. In particular, feedlot and carcass performance under 
alternative feeding strategies are combined with historical price data to evaluate the 
predictions of the multitask principal-agent model presented in Chapter 4. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURE FOR CATTLE FEEDING CONTRACTS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The dynamic biophysical model for beef cattle growth presented in Chapter 5, 
which is validated in Chapter 6, provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the theoretical 
predictions of the multitask model presented in Chapter 4. That is, using the biophysical 
model to represent the technology of feedlots, the economic model of Chapter 4 can be 
used to examine feeder behavior under alternative contract provisions, and the 
implications for contract choice by cattle owners. As indicated by the results of the 
growth simulation model, with a target harvest body weight as the terminal condition for 
feeding, average daily gain (ADG) increases and days required to reach the target body 
weight (DOF) and pounds of feed required per pound of gain (FE) decrease with the 
nutrient content of the ration and the potency of the growth promoting implant. On the 
other hand, the quality of beef increases with the energy content of feed and decreases 
with the potency of the implant. Energy content of feed and the potency of the growth 
promoting implant are thus substitutes in affecting the quality of beef. As in the multitask 
model, the substitution effect of these two inputs in determining beef quality has similar 
implications for the incentive structure of cattle feeding contracts, especially when beef 
quality is not measurable or verifiable before slaughter.  
Defining the profit equations and utility functions of a contract cattle feeder and 
an owner who retains ownership of the cattle until slaughter, the next section discusses 
the implications of the beef cattle growth simulation results for the incentive structure of 
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cattle feeding contracts. The cattle performance data generated by the biophysical growth 
simulation model with expected shrunk body weight as the terminal condition are then 
combined with historical price data to determine the optimal incentive schemes for cattle 
feeding under alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk aversion scenarios. Section 
7.3 provides a description of the historical price series and plausible ranges of constant 
absolute risk aversion coefficients for the feeder and owner. Section 7.4 presents a 
generalized search method, which is used to determine the optimal (expected profit/utility 
maximizing) incentive schemes for cattle feeding. Optimal incentive schemes for cattle 
feeding and corresponding production technologies under alternative fed cattle pricing 
methods and risk aversion scenarios obtained from the search are presented and 
implications of the results are analyzed in Section 7.5. The last section summarizes and 
concludes the chapter.  
 
7.2 Profit and Utility Functions of the Cattle Feeder and Owner  
Following conventional wisdom and the model in Chapter 4, both cattle owners 
and feeders are assumed to maximize profits or the expected utility of profits. For an 
owner, the number of animals is predetermined by prior breeding decisions.  For a feedlot 
operator, the number of animals in a feeding season is determined by prior investment in 
feedlot facilities. Feeding seasons are determined by the breeding practices and biological 
cycle of bovine animals. Traditionally, cow-calf producers in the U.S. breed their cows in 
late winter and early spring. Thus, the majority of calves are born in February, March, 
and April, and placed in feedlots during the following October, November, or December. 
Calves placed in the feedlots during the fall gain market weight in the following April, 
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May, or June. Some producers breed their cows in late summer or early fall, primarily to 
reduce losses from calf scours and to complement their forage production program (Field 
and Taylor, 2002). The fall born calves are placed in the feedlots in the following 
summer, which become ready for slaughter in the following fall and winter. 
Commercial feedlots acquire feeder cattle from cow-calf producers or stocker 
operators by direct purchase or custom-feeding arrangements. When a feedlot operator 
supplies custom feeding services on a contractual basis, his decisions depend on the 
incentive structure of the payment scheme. When feeding the cattle on the basis of a 
typical yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contract, his short-run profit is maximized by 
maximizing the number of days required to reach a target harvest weight. In this case, the 
feedlot operator has an incentive to keep the animals in the facility for a longer period. 
This incentive is higher as the fixed fee per animal per day is higher (i.e., for higher 
yardage charges). On the other hand, the cost-of-gain contract provides incentives for the 
reduction of feed cost and the number of days required to reach a target harvest weight. 
Thus, the objective of a commercial feeder differs with the incentive scheme of cattle 
feeding contracts. 
The criteria of cattle feeders’ alternative objectives with existing cattle feeding 
contracts can be combined in a general profit equation. Suppose a commercial feedlot has 
a one-time capacity to feed n cattle. The feeder’s net profit from feeding each individual 
animal under any of the existing contract forms can be described by the following 
equation, which nests the incomes under alternative payment schemes 
 [ ( 1) ]Fi i i i R nf iADG ADG FE P C DOFπ α β γ= + × + − × × × − ×  for ; ni ...,1=
 subject to ,0 αα ≤≤ ,0 ββ ≤≤ and 0 γ γ≤ ≤  (7.1) 
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where represents the feeder’s profit from feeding animal i, a is the yardage charge per 
animal per day, b is the payment per pound of gain, g is the owner’s share of feed cost, PR 
denotes price per pound of feed, Cnf represents non-feed cost per animal per day, and 
ADGi, FEi, and DOFi denote average daily gain, feed efficiency, and days on feed, 
respectively. Given that the yardage charge, payment per pound of gain, and the owner’s 
share of feed cost never take negative values in reality, the lower limits of individual 
contract parameters are set to zero. The upper limits of the contract parameters given by 
F
iπ
,,βα  andγ represent the maximum feasible yardage fee per day, payment per pound of 
gain, and the owner’s share of feed cost. These are determined by the maximum 
attainable profit from the fed cattle and the participation constraints of the feeder and 
owner.  When a = 0 and g = 0, equation (7.1) represents the feeder’s profit from feeding 
animal i under the typical cost-of-gain contract. Alternatively, when  b = 0 and g = 1, the 
above equation represents the feeder’s profit under the yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost 
contract. The payment scheme takes the form of a yardage-fee-plus-feed-markup (on feed 
cost) contract when b = 0 and g > 1. 
 The cattle feeder’s revenue per pound of added weight, i.e., the payment scheme, 










××−++=××−++× )1()1( γβαγβα  for 1,...i n=  
where TSWGi is total shrunk weight gain by animal i. For a target weight gain (i.e., fixed 
TSWGi),  DOFi increases (i.e., ADGi decreases) with a and FEi increases with g. Since 
DOFi and FEi decrease with the energy content of feed and the potency of the implant, 
the feeder’s cost saving incentive is lower for higher a and g. The incentive for cost 
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saving is the highest when a = 0 and g = 0, and the lowest when αα = and .γγ =  The 
payment per pound of gain is the highest )( ββ = when a = 0 and g = 0 and the lowest 
when αα = and .γγ =  Thus, the power of the incentive scheme (i.e., the incentive for 
using a high energy ration and an aggressive implant) increases with b and decreases with 
a and g. In some cases, a feeder might find beneficial cost savings by using an aggressive 
(moderate) implant strategy with a low (high) energy ration. However, the feeder’s 
substitution between the energy content of the ration and the potency of the implant 
depends on the marginal rate of substitution and relative marginal costs of these inputs. 
 The feeder’s total profit from feeding n cattle is the sum of over i = 1,…,n. 
Thus, the feeder’s average profit per head can be represented by  
F
iπ
 (∑ == ni FiF n 1
1 ππ )   
[ ( 1) ]R nfADG ADG FE P C DOFα β γ= + × + − × × × − ×  (7.2) 
where the variables without subscripts represent averages over the n cattle in the lot. The 








1 ππ& )  
].)1([ nfR CPFEADGADG −×××−+×+= γβα  (7.3) 
Total shrunk weight gain by an animal can be expressed as a product of average daily 
gain and the number of days on feed. Therefore, the feeder’s average profit per hundred 
pounds of weight gain can be represented by  

















1100ˆ πππ     (7.4) 
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where k is the total number of one hundred pound increments in weight added to n cattle. 
Thus, k represents the size of the feedlot operation in terms of weight gain, while n 
represents the feedlot’s size in terms of number of cattle.  
 Beef cattle production is usually one of many on-farm activities of cow-calf 
producers.39 Cow-calf producers who retain the ownership of their cattle through 
slaughter while having them fed in commercial feedlots can reasonably be assumed to 
maximize profit per animal unless risk aversion is a concern. Suppose a cow-calf 
producer intends to retain the ownership of n* feeder cattle. The cattle owner’s profit 
from feeding the cattle in a commercial feedlot on a contractual basis and selling each 
individual fed animal on a grid that uses cash live-weight prices for establishing the base 














γβα  for  ∗= nj ...,1 ;
  subject to ,0 αα ≤≤ ,0 ββ ≤≤ and ,0 γγ ≤≤  (7.5) 
where ISBW stands for initial shrunk body weight of the feeder cattle, PL and PF  denote 
prices of fed and feeder cattle per hundred pounds of live weight, respectively, DPj and 
DPE are actual and expected dressing percentages, respectively, PY and PQ represent yield 
and quality grade premiums, respectively, and DY and DQ are incremental yield and 
quality grades, respectively. Equation (7.5) nests the owner’s profits from live- and 
                                                 
39 A large number of cow-calf producers do not depend primarily or substantially on beef cattle for their 
annual income. A 1997 NAHMS survey showed that only 380 out of 2,713 cow-calf operations have their 
primary source of income from the beef herd. Producers with 100 or fewer cattle have other, more 




dressed-weight pricing of the cattle. In particular, when there are no yield and quality 
grade premiums (i.e., PY = 0 and PQ = 0), equation (7.5) represents the owner’s profit 
from dressed-weight pricing. Yield premium is just the difference between the actual and 
expected dressing percentages multiplied by the live price. When there is no premium for 
yield (i.e., DPj - DPE = 0), then the equation represents profit under live-weight pricing.  
For a target weight gain (i.e., fixed TSWGi), the cattle owner’s revenue increases 
with PL, PY, PQ, DPj, DY and DQ, and decreases with DPE.40 According to the growth 
model, DQ decreases with the potency of the growth promoting implant. Therefore, as 
long as PQ is positive (i.e., the owner sells fed cattle through the grid pricing method), the 
cattle owner offers a low powered incentive for cost saving by choosing a payment 
scheme with a low b. On the other hand, if PQ  = 0 (i.e., the owner sells fed cattle through 
the live- or dressed-weight pricing methods), the owner offers a high incentive for cost 
saving by choosing a payment scheme with high b.  The cattle owner’s tradeoff between 
a and g for a given b depends on their relative net marginal benefits for the owner. The 
cattle owner’s average profit per head, per head per day, and per hundred pounds of 
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1100ˆ πππ    (7.8) 
                                                 
40 According to the growth model DPj is a linear function of body weight and therefore remains the same 
for a target weight gain. Yield grade outcomes of the model should be ignored as the predictive efficiency 
of the sub-model is low. 
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where k* and n* are the cattle owner’s size of operation in terms of weight gain and 
number of cattle, respectively.  
The cattle owner’s choice of a particular payment scheme and the feeder’s choice 
of a production technology under that scheme also depend on their respective risk 
preferences. Following expected utility theory, preferences of the risk-averse cattle feeder 
and the risk-averse owner are represented by expected utility functions with constant 
absolute risk aversion. As suggested by the derivation in Chapter 4, the choices of both 
the cattle owner and feeder are modeled with constant absolute risk aversion for the 
typical per animal problem. While normality may not hold in the simulation as under 
assumptions in the theoretical model of Chapter 4, the absolute risk aversion from the 
aggregate model is applied to the choice model for the per animal problem. That is, 
suppose the feeder’s short-run profit Fiπ  for ni ,...,1=  on each animal represents a 
random draw from the same (unknown) distribution. Then, under the conditions of the 
Central Limit Theorem and assuming the size n of the feeders operation is limited by 
fixed investments, the average incremental gain can be treated as approximate normally 
distributed. If  denotes the total net profits of the feeder from feeding n 
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− − = − −∏  
where Fπ  represents the feeder’s average profit per animal. Thus, the problem can be 
modeled as constant absolute risk aversion with respect to the typical per animal problem 
using the same absolute risk aversion coefficient as in the total profit problem. 
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A similar derivation also implies constant absolute risk aversion on the part of the 
cattle owner following  where denotes the total net 
profits of the owner from retaining ownership of n* cattle where n* fixed by prior 
breeding decisions. The owner’s expected utility is given by  
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= − − = − −∏ , 
where Oπ  denotes the owner’s average profit per animal. Thus, maximization of the 
expected utility of total profit is equivalent to maximizing the expected utility of the 
average profit per animal using the same absolute risk coefficient.  
The cattle feeder’s and owner’s stochastic costs and returns under alternative 
production technologies and fed cattle pricing methods can be calculated according to the 
profit equations (7.2) and (7.6) using cattle performance and random price data. For 
various constant absolute risk aversion coefficients of the owner and feeder, 
corresponding expected utilities can then be obtained according to the exponential utility 
functions. Feedlot and carcass performances of the TCSCF cattle for each of the 18 
strategic ration-implant strategies are generated employing the biophysical growth 
simulation model presented in Chapter 5. Following the procedure described in Chapter 
6, daily feed intake, weight gain, and composition (protein and fat) of the gain are 
computed until each individual animal reaches the expected (estimated) final shrunk body 
weight (EFSBW) for the USDA “Choice” grade. The use of EFSBW as the terminal 
condition in the growth model is consistent with the objectives of beef industry 
participants.41 The required data on total shrunk weight gain (TSWG), days on feed 
                                                 
41 Beef producers and packers strive to consistently produce “Choice” quality beef, which is desired most 
by the customers (Field and Taylor, 2002). In order to ensure “Choice” quality grade, feedlot operators 
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(DOF), average daily gain (ADG), feed efficiency (FE), dressing percentage (DP), and 
yield and quality grades (YG and QG) are thus obtained from the growth simulation 
model. The next section describes price data and plausible risk aversion coefficients for 
the cattle feeder and owner.  
 
7.3 Price Data and Risk Aversion Coefficients 
 Historical weekly average prices for fed cattle, feeder cattle, feed ingredients, and 
grid premiums and discounts data were obtained from the Livestock and Grain Market 
News (LGMN) of the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). These included Iowa weekly weighted average live- 
and dressed-weight prices for fed cattle, prices for feeder cattle of different weight groups 
and frame sizes, and weekly average prices for corn during January 1996 through 
December 1999. Iowa prices for soybean meal and alfalfa hay are not available through 
the USDA. Therefore, weekly average prices for soybean meal in Decatur, Central 
Illinois, and weekly average prices for alfalfa hay in Kansas were obtained for the same 
period. Weekly average yield and quality grade premiums and discounts paid in the grid 
under voluntary price reporting during 1996-99 and under mandatory price reporting 
during 1999 to 2005 were also collected. Summary statistics of the fed cattle and feed 
ingredient prices and quality and yield grade premiums/discounts are presented in Table 
7.1.  
                                                                                                                                                 
strive to harvest the cattle when they reach 0.3-0.4 inches of back fat (Chambers, 2005). Most beef cattle 
are likely to gain 0.3-0.4 inches of back fat at the corresponding EFSBW (Guiroy et al., 2001; Fox et al., 
1992). Also, feed efficiency and average daily gain declines beyond this point. Feuz (1999) reports that the 
average back fat thickness of 85 pens of cattle (5,520 head) priced on three different grids in 1997 was 0.41 
inches with a standard deviation of 0.11 inches. Packers also prefer live cattle between 1,000-1,400 lbs, 




Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Prices for Fed Cattle ($/lb)
    Live Weight Price 0.65 0.034 0.56 0.65 0.73
    Dressed Weight Price 1.03 0.057 0.89 1.04 1.19
Quality Grade Premiums/Discounts ($/lb)
    Prime 0.07 0.016 0.04 0.06 0.10
    Certified Angus Beef (CAB) 0.02 0.009 0.01 0.02 0.05
    Select -0.09 0.046 -0.25 -0.08 -0.03
    Standard -0.18 0.039 -0.31 -0.16 -0.12
Yield Grade Premiums/Discounts ($/lb)
    YG 1 (YG < 1) 0.03 0.002 0.02 0.03 0.03
    YG 2 (1 = <YG < 2) 0.02 0.002 0.01 0.02 0.02
    YG 3 (2 =< YG < 3) 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.02
    YG 4 (3.5 =< YG < 4) 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00
    YG 5 (4 =< YG < 5) -0.13 0.010 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11
    YG 6 (YG > 5) -0.18 0.004 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17
Prices for Feed Ingredients ($/lb)
    Corn 0.05 0.016 0.03 0.04 0.09
    Soybean Meal 0.10 0.028 0.06 0.10 0.15
    Alfalfa Hay 0.05 0.005 0.04 0.05 0.06
Note: Live and dressed weight prices for fed cattle and corn are Iowa weekly average prices during 
1996-1999. Prices for soybean meal and alfalfa hay are weekly averages prices during 1996-1999 in 
Decatur, Central Illinois, and Kansas, respectively. Yield and quality grade premiuns are weekly 
averages of voluntarily reported prices to the USDA during 1996-1999 and mandatorily reported 
prices during 1999 to 2005. 
Source: Direct communication with personnel in Livestock and Grain Market News (LGMN) of the
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Table 7.1: Summary statistics of the historical price series.
 
 
There is no widely quoted market price for corn silage because market for silage 
is very limited. Therefore, corn silage prices are calculated from corn prices following the 
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guidelines of the Iowa State University Extension Service. A value of 9 times the price of 
corn per bushel for each ton of usable (harvested and stored) silage is commonly used 
(Edwards, 2005). This value is adjusted for dry matter (34 percent) content of the corn 
silage used in rations formulated for the growth model. 
Grid base prices are not available because beef packers are not obligated to report 
those even under the mandatory price reporting rules of the AMS. While a variety of 
methods have been used to establish base prices in carcass grids, the most popular 
technique has been to use a formula that uses a local cash market price reported by an 
independent third party (e.g., the USDA) or an adjusted packing plant average price 
(Schroeder et al., 2003; Ward et al., 2002). The price is usually adjusted to a standard 
dressing percentage (Schroeder et al., 2003). Following Schroeder et al. (2003), grid base 
prices for this study are calculated from USDA live-weight prices with adjustment to an 
estimated dressing percentage (62.30 percent) plus $1.00 per hundred pounds of carcass. 
For example, using average live-weight price as the reference, the calculated grid base 
price according to this formula is (($0.65/0.623) + 0.01 =) $1.04/lb. The estimate of the 
dressing percentage is obtained by regressing the live-weight prices on dressed-weight 
prices without an intercept term.  
 The nonparametric Lilliefors test is performed on each of the historical price 
series to test whether they are drawn from populations with a normal distribution.42 The 
test results indicate that the null hypothesis of normality should be rejected at the 5.0 
percent significance level for all of the price series. Normal probability plots of the price 
data also confirm that approximation with a multivariate normal distribution could be 
                                                 
42 The Lilliefors test is a two-sided goodness-of-fit test suitable when a fully-specified null distribution is 
unknown and its parameters must be estimated (Lilliefors, 1967).  
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inappropriate. The correlation coefficient matrix of the multivariate data shows that cattle 
and feed ingredient prices are highly correlated. Therefore, multivariate densities of the 
prices are estimated using a Gaussian kernel function. Then random price vectors are 
drawn from the estimated multivariate distribution of the data until 10,000 observations 
are obtained.  
Cost of each individual feeder animal is calculated from the USDA reported Iowa 
prices for different weight groups and frame sizes. Prices on the particular week of 
delivery of each feeder animal to the feedlot are used to determine the cost. Non-feed cost 
per animal per day during 1995-99 is obtained from historical profitability reports of 
three Iowa feedlots (Cody Feedlot, CRI Feeders, and Silver Creek Feeders). Labor, 
utility, and interest on feed (9.0 percent per annum) are reported to be 20 cents per animal 
per day during 1995-2000. Prices of a moderate implant ($0.95 for Synovex S) and a high 
potency implant ($3.25 for Synovex Plus) were obtained from Duckett et al. (1996), and 
were found to remain current according to prices at CattleStore in August 2006. 
Accordingly, the costs of implanting at the beginning of the feed regime plus 
reimplanting after approximately 90 days of feeding are calculated to be $1.90 and $6.50 
per animal for the moderate and high potency implants, respectively. Thus, the costs of 
feeder cattle and implants, and non-feed cost per animal per day are not random in the 
model.  
Because estimates of relative risk aversion generally vary relatively less than do 
estimates of absolute risk aversion, the coefficients of constant absolute risk aversion are 
chosen to match plausible values of relative risk aversion. Saha et al. (1994) report a brief 
survey of estimates of relative risk aversion coefficients that range from 0 to 18.8. The 
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feeder’s and owner’s constant absolute risk aversion coefficients are calibrated from 
these estimates according to  and FΠ⋅= ϕϕ̂ OΠ⋅=ψψ̂ , where ϕ̂  and ψ̂  are the 
feeder’s and owner’s relative risk aversion coefficients at mean profit levels. A survey of 
cattle feeders and cow-calf producers showed that the capacity of feedlot operations 
ranges from 55 to 89,000 animals with an average of 5,000, and the size of cow-calf 
operations varies from 10 to 4,500 cattle with an average of 500 animals (Feuz and 
Umberger, 2001). Mark et al. (2000) reported that cattle feeders’ average profit per 
animal was $15 during 1980-1997, while Marsh and Feuz (2002) reported that the 
average return to cow-calf producers was $93 per slaughtered animal during 1980-96. 
Substituting these values in  and FΠ⋅= ϕϕ̂ OΠ⋅=ψψ̂ , the upper bounds of feeder’s and 
owner’s absolute risk aversion coefficients (corresponding to relative risk aversion of 
18.8) are calibrated to be 0.025 and 0.019, respectively. Accordingly, the full range of 
risk aversion possibilities up to these limits is investigated in model simulations. 
 
7.4 The Feasible Contract Parameter Space and the Generalized Search Procedure  
The optimal incentive schemes and corresponding production technologies under 
alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk preferences of the cattle feeder and owner 
are determined by employing a parameter search procedure developed specifically for 
this study. The basic idea is to search the feasible parameter space for the combinations 
of the contract coefficients (a, b, and g) that induce the feeder to adopt the production 
technology that gives maximum expected utility to the cattle owner. The search is 
performed in a Stackelberg fashion. First, a parameter space for all feasible combinations 
of a, b, and g is determined. Second, the technology space is searched for the feeder’s 
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expected utility maximizing production technology (e.g., his expected utility maximizing 
ration-implant strategy) for every feasible combination of a, b, and g. Finally, the 
contract parameter space is searched for the cattle owner’s expected utility maximizing 
incentive scheme given the feeder’s optimal production technology choice associated 
with each. The search is performed separately for each of the alternative fed cattle pricing 
methods: live-weight pricing, dressed-weight pricing, and grid pricing.  
In order to construct the parameter space for a, b, and g, first the lower and upper 
bounds of each of these contract coefficients are determined from the minimum and 
maximum attainable net revenues from sale of a fed animal (i.e., the revenue from sale of 
the fed animal minus the cost of the feeder animal). Because a negative yardage charge, 
negative payment per pound of gain, or negative share of feed cost for the owner are 
nonsensical and unrealistic, the lower limits of individual contract parameters are set to 
zero. On the other extreme, for the case when the cattle are fed and the owner transfers 
the entire net revenue to the cattle feeder, the maximum possible values of a, b, and g 
(upper bounds) are found to be 0.49, 0.47, and 1.45, respectively. In other words, if the 
net revenue is transferred completely and exclusively through a yardage fee (i.e., b = 0 
and g = 0), then a = $0.49 per animal per day. Similarly, if the net revenue is transferred 
completely and exclusively through a payment per pound of gain, then b = $0.47 per 
pound while a = 0 and g = 0. If the transfer is made completely and exclusively through a 
reimbursement for feed cost, then g = 1.45, i.e., a 45 percent markup on feed cost is given 
to the feeder) while a = 0 and b = 0. From any of these extremes, the owner would never 
pay more to induce the cattle feeder to enter the contract because that would cause a 
negative net benefit for the owner.  
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Because the simulation model has discontinuities in some of the defining 
equations, the first step in optimization was to test for concavity of profits. The concavity 
of the cattle feeder’s and owner’s profit functions was also tested considering all feasible 
combinations of a, b, and g. In particular, the feeder’s and owner’s profits are calculated 
by combining biophysical growth simulation outcomes for various random draws from 
the historical price series. For each draw, the feeder’s and owner’s profits for each 
feasible combination of a, b, and g were compared with various convex combinations of 
the profits for the nearest neighbors of the coefficients with the same average 
coefficients. The tests for both strong and weak concavity of the feeder’s and owner’s 
profits failed for the overall feasible parameter space. Although the failures were minor, 
this conclusion motivated comparison of all combinations of a, b, and g with 0.01 
accuracy to determine optimal choices.   
With an increment of 0.01 within the corresponding intervals (0 ≤ a ≤ 0.49, 0 ≤ b 
≤ 0.47, and 0 ≤ g ≤ 1.45), there are 350,400 plausible combinations of a, b, and g. 
Because the number of combinations of a, b, and g is so large, further possibilities for 
limiting the sample space without loss of generality were considered. The feasible region 
for a, b, and g is determined by the participation constraints of the feeder and owner and 
their maximum attainable net profits (i.e., net revenue minus cost of feeding). Setting the 
feeder’s and owner’s reservation net incomes equal to zero, the feasible parameter space 
can thus be further confined by  
DOFCRPFEADGADGCPFEADG FRnfR /)( −≤×××+×+≤+×× γβα  (7.9) 
where R is the cattle owner’s average revenue from selling a fed animal, CF is the cost of 
a feeder animal, and .0;0;0 ≥≥≥ γβα  The left hand side of the above expression 
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represents average feed and non-feed cost per head per day and the right hand side 
represents the cattle owner’s average net revenue per head per day from retaining 
ownership of the feeder animal until slaughter. The values of the cattle performance 
variables and ration price in (7.9) are set to match the feeding strategy with maximum 
cost of gain per pound of live weight. The value of R is set to the minimum of the average 
revenues under alternative production technologies and fed cattle pricing methods. 
Setting the boundaries of the feasible parameter space in this fashion allows one to 
consider all ration-implant strategies and fed cattle pricing methods available to the cattle 
feeder and owner. Only the combinations of a, b, and g that satisfy (7.9) are considered 
further. With this innocuous reduction of the parameter space, 39,829 combinations of a, 
b, and g are found to be feasible. This parameter space is called the unrestricted 
parameter space because it contains all values not eliminated by trivial considerations. 
While this parameter space considers all feasible choices for a, b, and g, only two 
major types of contracts are observed in reality: a yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contract 
with or without a markup (a > 0, b = 0, and g ≥ 1) and a cost-of-gain contract (a = 0, b > 
0, and g = 0). Therefore, to examine whether the form of typical contracts in current 
practice can be explained by the model, a further restricted feasible parameter space was 
also considered to allow only typical linear incentive contracts (a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and g = 0) 
and cost-plus contracts (a ≥ 0, b = 0, and g ≥ 1). These two sub-spaces are combined to 
represent a restricted parameter space corresponding to contract forms in current use. In 
this restricted parameter space, there are 1,085 combinations of a, b, and g to consider. 
For both the restricted and unrestricted parameter spaces, the cattle feeder’s 





combination of a, b, and g under each of the alternative ration-implant strategies for 
various values of constant absolute risk aversion coefficient in the interval 0 ≤ j ≤ 0.025. 
The feeder’s expected profit and utility maximizing feeding strategies are thus 
determined for each combination of a, b, g, and j. The cattle owner’s expected profit and 
utility per animal under a particular fed cattle pricing method given the feeder’s optimal 
strategies for all feasible combinations of a, b, and g are computed in the same way (for 
various constant absolute risk aversion coefficients in the interval 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.019). The 
owner’s profit and utility maximizing a, b, and g are then determined for each pair of 
values for the feeder’s and owner’s risk aversion parameters. The expected utility 
maximizing combination of a, b, and g  is the optimal incentive scheme for the cattle 
owner and the corresponding feeding strategy is the optimal production technology for 
the cattle feeder for a particular combination of j and y. This procedure is repeated for 
live-weight, dressed-weight, and grid pricing methods for fed cattle and also for all 
plausible combinations of j and y in the relevant range. A description of the search 
procedure is given in Appendix 7.1 in algorithmic form.  
 
7.5 Optimization Results 
The optimal contract coefficients, cattle feeding strategies, and corresponding 
certainty equivalents under alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk aversion 
scenarios are presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Table 7.2 displays the results of the 
generalized search performed over the unrestricted parameter space (a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, g ≥ 0) 
for the TCSCF cattle evaluated with year-round weekly average prices. Table 7.3 shows  
Table 7.2: Optimal contracts, cattle feeding strategies, and certainty equivalents (CE) of the cattle owner and feeder (a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, g ≥ 0).
Strat- Strat- Strat-
O wner Feeder a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total
0 0 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0* 10.9* 140.9* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.4* 10.9* 127.3* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.3* 10.4* 129.7*
0 0.000025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0* 10.9* 140.9* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.4* 10.9* 127.3* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.3* 10.4* 129.7*
0 0.00025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0* 10.9* 140.9* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.4* 10.9* 127.3* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.3* 10.4* 129.7*
0 0.0025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0* 10.8* 140.8* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.4* 10.8* 127.2* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.3* 10.4* 129.7*
0 0.025 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 129.7* 9.7* 139.5* 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 116.2* 9.7* 125.9* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.3* 10.4* 129.6*
0.000025 0 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9* 10.9* 140.8* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.3* 10.9* 127.3* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.2* 10.4* 129.6*
0.00025 0 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2* 10.9* 140.1* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 115.9* 10.9* 126.8* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 118.3* 10.4* 128.8*
0.0025 0 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 122.4* 10.9 133.3* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 111.4* 10.9 122.3* 0.13 0.08 0.87 12 110.3* 10.5 120.8*
0.019 0 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 73.3* 11.9 85.2* 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 79.5* 11.9 91.4* 0.23 0.08 0.78 10 57.0* 11.7* 68.8*
0.000025 0.000025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9* 10.9* 140.8* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.3* 10.9* 127.3* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.2* 10.4* 129.6
0.000025 0.00025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9* 10.9* 140.8* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.3* 10.9* 127.2* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.2* 10.4* 129.6*
0.000025 0.0025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9* 10.8* 140.7* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 116.3* 10.8* 127.1* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.2* 10.4* 129.6*
0.000025 0.025 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 129.7* 9.7 139.4* 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 116.1* 9.7 125.9* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 119.2* 10.4* 129.5*
0.00025 0.000025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2* 10.9* 140.1* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 115.9* 10.9* 126.8* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 118.3* 10.4* 128.8*
0.00025 0.00025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2* 10.9* 140.1* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 115.9* 10.9* 126.8* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 118.3* 10.4* 128.8*
0.00025 0.0025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2* 10.8* 140.0* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 115.9* 10.8* 126.7* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 118.3* 10.4* 128.8*
0.00025 0.025 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 129.0* 9.7 138.7* 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 115.7* 9.7 125.4* 0.19 0.03 0.97 11 118.3* 10.4* 128.7*
0.0025 0.000025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 122.4* 10.9 133.3 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 111.4* 10.9 122.3 0.13 0.08 0.87 12 110.3* 10.5 120.8*
0.0025 0.00025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 122.4* 10.9 133.3 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 111.4* 10.9 122.3 0.13 0.08 0.87 12 110.3* 10.5 120.8*
0.0025 0.0025 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 122.4* 10.8 133.2* 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 111.4* 10.8 122.2* 0.13 0.08 0.87 12 110.3* 10.5 120.7*
0.0025 0.025 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 122.3* 9.7* 132.1* 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 111.4* 9.7* 121.1* 0.13 0.08 0.87 12 110.3* 9.9 120.1
0.019 0.000025 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 73.3* 11.9 85.2 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 79.5* 11.9 91.4 0.23 0.08 0.78 10 57.0* 11.7* 68.8*
0.019 0.00025 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 73.3* 11.9 85.2 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 79.5* 11.9 91.4 0.23 0.08 0.78 10 57.0* 11.7* 68.7*
0.019 0.0025 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 73.3* 11.7 85.0 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 79.5* 11.7 91.3 0.23 0.08 0.78 10 57.0* 11.6* 68.6*
0.019 0.025 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 73.4* 9.7* 83.2* 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 79.7* 9.7* 89.4* 0.21 0.08 0.80 10 56.3* 10.5 66.8*
1 Shaded cells highlight the highest of the cattle owner's and feeder's certainty equivalents (CE) among live weight, dressed weight, and grid pricing methods;  Cells
with asterisks indicate cases in which the CE with the unrestricted parameter space dominates the CE with the restricted parameter space.
2 Strategy 10 is 60% corn and a moderate implant; 11 is 70% corn and a moderate implant; 12 is 80% corn and a moderate implant; 13 is 30% corn and an agressive 
implant; 15 is 50% corn and an aggressive implant.
Certainty Equivalent
Absolute Risk Live Weight Pricing Dressed Weight Pricing Grid Pricing




Table 7.3: Optimal contracts, feeding strategies, and certainty equivalents (CE) of the owner and feeder (a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, g = 0; a ≥ 0, b = 0, g ≥ 1).  
Strat- Strat- Strat-
O wner Feeder a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total a b g egy2 Owner Feeder Total
0 0 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 111.5 10.4 121.9 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 98.0 10.4 108.3 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 119.1 10.4* 129.4
0 0.000025 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 111.5 10.3 121.9 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 98.0 10.3 108.3 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 119.1 10.3 129.4
0 0.00025 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 111.5 10.3 121.9 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 98.0 10.3 108.3 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 119.1 10.3 129.4
0 0.0025 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 111.5 10.2 121.8 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 98.0 10.2 108.2 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 119.1 10.2 129.3
0 0.025 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 111.5 9.1 120.6 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 98.0 9.1 107.1 0.05 0.00 1.19 12 119.1 9.1 128.2
0.000025 0 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 111.4 10.4 121.8 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.9 10.4 108.2 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 119.0 10.4* 129.3
0.00025 0 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 109.4 10.4 119.8 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 96.1 10.4 106.5 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 116.9 10.4* 127.3
0.0025 0 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 99.6 30.6* 130.2 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 88.6 30.6* 119.2 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 107.0 11.1* 118.2
0.019 0 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 27.6 30.6* 58.2 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 33.7 30.6* 64.3 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 34.5 11.1 45.6
0.000025 0.000025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 111.4 10.4 121.8 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.9 10.4 108.2 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 119.0 10.4* 129.3
0.000025 0.00025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 111.4 10.4 121.8 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.9 10.4 108.2 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 119.0 10.4* 129.3
0.000025 0.0025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 111.4 10.3 121.8 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.9 10.3 108.2 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 119.0 10.3 129.3
0.000025 0.025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 111.4 10.1* 121.5 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.9 10.1* 108.0 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 119.0 10.1 129.0
0.00025 0.000025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 110.5 10.4 120.9 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.2 10.4 107.6 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 118.1 10.4* 128.4
0.00025 0.00025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 110.5 10.4 120.9 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.2 10.4 107.6 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 118.1 10.4* 128.4
0.00025 0.0025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 110.5 10.3 120.9 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.2 10.3 107.6 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 118.1 10.3 128.4
0.00025 0.025 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 110.5 10.1* 120.6 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 97.2 10.1* 107.3 0.16 0.00 1.09 12 118.1 10.1 128.1
0.0025 0.000025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 103.5 30.6* 134.0* 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 92.5 30.6* 123.1* 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 109.4 11.1* 120.6
0.0025 0.00025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 103.5 30.3* 133.8* 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 92.5 30.3* 122.9* 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 109.4 11.1* 120.6
0.0025 0.0025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 103.5 28.0* 131.5 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 92.5 28.0* 120.6 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 109.4 11.1* 120.6
0.0025 0.025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 103.5 5.1 108.5 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 92.5 5.1 97.6 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 109.4 11.1* 120.5*
0.019 0.000025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 60.4 30.6* 90.9* 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 66.9 30.6* 97.5* 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 49.2 11.1 60.3
0.019 0.00025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 60.4 30.3* 90.7* 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 66.9 30.3* 97.2* 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 49.2 11.1 60.3
0.019 0.0025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 60.4 28.0* 88.4* 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 66.9 28.0* 94.9* 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 49.2 11.1 60.3
0.019 0.025 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 60.4 5.1 65.4 0.00 0.40 0.00 13 66.9 5.1 71.9 0.26 0.00 1.00 10 49.2 11.1* 60.3
1 Shaded cells highlight the highest of the cattle owner's and feeder's certainty equivalents (CE) from live weight, dressed weight, and grid pricing methods;  Cells
with asterisks indicate cases in which the CE with the restricted parameter space dominates the CE with the unrestricted parameter space.
2 Strategy 10 is 50% corn with a moderate implant; 12 is 80% corn with a moderate implant; 13 is 30% corn with an agressive implant.
Certainty Equivalent
Absolute Risk Live Weight Pricing Dressed Weight Pricing Grid Pricing
Aversion Coeff. Optimal Parameters Certainty Equivalent1 Optimal Parameters Certainty Equivalent Optimal Parameters
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the results of the search over the parameter space restricted by typical contract forms (a ≥ 
0, b ≥ 0, g = 0; and a ≥ 0, b = 0, g ≥ 1). 43 In general, the results indicate that the optimal 
choices of cattle feeding contracts vary mainly with the incentive structure of alternative 
fed cattle pricing methods. In particular, the power of the optimal incentive scheme for 
cattle feeding (i.e., the degree of incentive for cost saving) is lower under value-based 
grid pricing than under traditional live- and dressed-weight pricing methods.  
The value-based grid pricing of fed cattle offers premiums (discounts) for higher 
(lower) yield, as well as for superior (inferior) quality of the carcass. Traditional live and 
dressed-weight pricing mechanisms do not provide any systematic incentives for carcass 
quality. Live-weight pricing provides an incentive for live weight gain, while dressed-
weight pricing offers a premium (discount) for higher (lower) yield. For a given target 
harvest weight, the traditional pricing methods simply provide a cost saving incentive. 
The cattle owner with any of these fed cattle pricing objectives transmits the embedded 
incentive structure of the chosen pricing method to the feeder through a payment scheme 
that induces the feeder to adopt a particular ration-implant strategy that produces desired 
outcomes at minimum cost. 
As explained in Section 7.2, the cattle feeder’s incentive for cost saving (carcass 
quality improvement) increases (decreases) with the payment per pound of gain (b) and 
decreases (increases) with the yardage fee per animal head per day (a) and the owner’s 
share of feed cost (g). Since feed cost accounts for a major share (70-80 percent) of the 
total cost of feeding, the cattle feeder’s choice for a particular feeding strategy crucially 
                                                 
43 The optimal contract coefficients and corresponding cattle feeding strategies remain the same when the 
cattle performance data are evaluated with January-June seasonal prices. The structure of the optimal 
incentive scheme is similar for the TCSCF cattle placed in October and December evaluated with January-
April and March-June seasonal prices, respectively.   
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depends on his share of feed cost. The cost of feed required for a target weight gain 
increases with the grain content of the ration and decreases with the potency of the 
growth promoting implant. Thus, for a given harvest weight, total feed cost is the highest 
with ration-implant Strategy 12 (80 percent corn with a moderate implant) and the lowest 
with Strategy 13 (30 percent corn with an aggressive implant strategy).44 On the other 
hand, for a given harvest weight, carcass quality is the highest with Strategy 12 and the 
lowest with Strategy 13. The results in Table 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that, the feeder chooses 
a relatively less costly strategy when fed cattle are to be marketed using any of the 
traditional pricing methods, and a relatively costly strategy yielding higher carcass 
quality when fed cattle are sold through the grid pricing system.45  Obviously, the power 
of the optimal incentive scheme (i.e., the incentive for cost saving) under value-based 
grid pricing is lower than the power of the schemes that are optimal under traditional 
live- and dressed-weight pricing methods.  
The optimal choice of contract and production technology also depends on the 
risk aversion levels of the contracting parties. In particular, the results indicate that the 
power of the incentive for cost saving (carcass quality improvement) increases 
(decreases) with the cattle owner’s risk aversion level, but the effect of the feeder’s risk 
                                                 
44 Although 30 percent corn may seem very low, a 1999 survey of feedlots in Nebraska (Feuz and 
Umberger, 2001) reported that grain percentage varied considerably in typical feedlot rations. While corn 
grain accounted for 60 percent-80 percent of feedlot rations in general, some feedlots used as low as 30 
percent corn in the ration for 500-699 pound cattle. Furthermore, 30 percent corn rations are optimal in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 only when risk aversion for the feeder or owner is high.   
 
45 The results show that the feeder has a strong tendency to choose an aggressive implant strategy and/or a 
lower grain ration whenever his share of the feed cost is significant. However, cattle feeding without an 




aversion on the incentive scheme is minimal.46 While these results confirm the 
predictions of the multitask model presented in Chapter 4 and are consistent with reality, 
other major findings and their implications are discussed in detail below. 
 
Optimal Contracts in the Unrestricted Parameter Space 
The upper panel of Table 7.2 shows the results for cases when the cattle owner is 
risk neutral (y = 0). Comparing the values of  a, b, and g under alternative fed cattle 
pricing methods, the power of the optimal incentive scheme with grid pricing (a = 0.19, b 
= 0.03, g = 0.97) is lower than what is optimal with live- and dressed-weight pricing (a = 
0.14, b = 0.10, g = 0.80). This is also evident from the relatively costly ration-implant 
strategy adopted by the feeder under grid pricing (Strategy 11: 70 percent corn with a 
moderate implant), while a less costly strategy (Strategy 15: 50 percent corn with an 
aggressive implant) is optimal under traditional pricing methods. Incentive compatibility 
implies that the particular compensation scheme under grid pricing provides a lower 
incentive for cost saving than the one under live- or dressed-weight pricing methods. 
With a risk-neutral cattle owner, the values of the optimal contract coefficients do not 
change with the risk preference of the feeder. However, for a very highly risk-averse 
cattle feeder (j = 0.025), a relatively less costly feeding strategy (Strategy 13: 30 percent 
corn with an aggressive implant) is optimal under traditional pricing methods.  
The middle panel of Table 7.2 shows the results for cases when the feeder is risk 
neutral (j = 0) but the owner is risk averse (y > 0). In these cases, the feeder’s optimal 
strategies (Strategies 13 and 15) for the compensation schemes with traditional pricing 
                                                 
46 In the remainder of this section, the power of the incentive scheme refers to the power of the cattle 
feeder’s incentive for cost saving.  
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methods are less costly than the strategies (Strategies 10, 11, and 12) that are optimal for 
the payment schemes with grid pricing. The feeder’s choice for costly feeding strategies 
under grid pricing implies that these cattle feeding contracts provide less incentive for 
cost saving in order to provide incentives for improving carcass quality.  
The lower panel of Table 7.2 shows the optimal contract coefficients and corresponding 
cattle feeding strategies when both the feeder and owner are risk averse (j > 0, y > 0). 
The values of a, b, and g along with the corresponding feeding strategies imply that the 
incentive for cost saving is lower with the contracts under grid pricing than the contracts 
under live and dressed pricing. For each of the risk aversion scenarios, relatively lower 
grain rations with an aggressive implant (Strategies 13 and 15) are found to be optimal 
under traditional fed cattle pricing methods, while higher grain rations with a moderate 
implant (Strategies 10, 11, and 12) are optimal under grid pricing.  
 In general, the incentive for cost saving increases with the cattle owner’s and 
feeder’s risk aversion levels. This effect, however, is not continuous and obvious only 
when the contracting parties are highly risk averse.47 The incentive structure of the 
optimal cattle feeding contract is apparently insensitive to the level of the feeder’s risk 
aversion (Table 7.2). For traditional pricing methods, a very high level of risk aversion on 
the cattle feeder’s part (e.g., j = 0.025) alters the optimal ration-implant strategy without 
changing the values of the contract coefficients. On the other hand, a high level of risk 
aversion on the cattle owner’s part (0.0025 ≤ y) alters the optimal incentive scheme as 
well as the feeding strategy. With live- and dressed-weight pricing of fed cattle, Strategy 
13 (30 percent corn with an aggressive implant) appears to be optimal if either the owner 
                                                 
47 Only five risk aversion levels of the feeder and owner are reported in Tables 7.2 and 7.3: no risk aversion 
(φ = 0, ψ =0), low risk aversion (φ = 0.000025, ψ =0.000025), moderate risk aversion (φ = 0.00025, ψ 
=0.00025), high risk aversion (φ = 0.0025, ψ =0.0025), and very high risk aversion (φ = 0.025, ψ =0.019).  
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or the feeder is highly risk averse, while Strategy 15 (50 percent corn with an aggressive 
implant) is optimal in all other risk aversion scenarios.  
For the value-based grid pricing method, the incentive structure of optimal cattle 
feeding contracts does not change with the level of the feeder’s risk aversion (Table 7.2). 
On the other hand, the effect of the cattle owner’s risk aversion on the optimal incentive 
scheme with grid pricing is ambiguous depending on the level of the owner’s risk 
aversion. The value of b increases and a and g decrease with the cattle owner’s risk 
aversion level within a moderate to high range (0.00025 ≤ y ≤ 0.0025), thus providing a 
higher incentive for cost saving. But a relatively more costly strategy (Strategy 12 instead 
of Strategy 11) becomes optimal for the feeder although the incentive for cost saving is 
higher. However, the value of a increases and g decreases, with b remaining the same, as 
the cattle owner becomes more risk averse (0.0025 < y ≤ 0.019). The corresponding 
feeding strategy (Strategy 10: 60 percent corn with a moderate implant) implies that the 
power of the incentive scheme is higher when the level of the owner’s risk aversion is 
very high. Thus, with the value-based grid pricing system and the unrestricted contract 
parameter space, the power of the optimal incentive scheme decreases first for a certain 
range of the owner’s risk aversion level (0.00025 ≤ y ≤ 0.0025), and then increases 
(0.0025 ≤ y ≤ 0.019). Non-concavity of the profit functions at the optimum is a plausible 
explanation for this inconsistency, which is not apparent with the restricted contract 






Optimal Contracts in the Restricted Parameter Space 
The search over the restricted parameter space [(a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, g = 0) and (a ≥ 0, b 
= 0, g ≥ 1)] corresponds to typical contracts observed in commercial cattle feeding. The 
optimal contract coefficients presented in Table 7.3 show that, for each combination of 
risk preferences of the feeder and owner, the power of the optimal incentive scheme with 
grid pricing is either the same or lower than those that are optimal with traditional fed 
cattle pricing methods. The power of the optimal incentive scheme increases with the 
cattle owner’s risk aversion level, while risk aversion on the feeder’s part does not have 
any effect on the optimal choice of contracts or ration-implant strategies. In particular, as 
long as the cattle owner is not highly risk averse, the value of the optimal contract 
coefficients and corresponding cattle feeding strategies are the same under each of the fed 
cattle pricing methods. For a highly risk-averse cattle owner, a very high powered 
incentive contract (e.g., a cost-of-gain contract) is optimal under live- and dressed-weight 
pricing methods, while a typical yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contract with a zero incentive 
for cost saving is optimal under grid pricing. 
The upper panel of Table 7.3 shows optimal values of the contract coefficients, 
corresponding ration-implant strategies, and resulting certainty equivalents when the 
cattle owner is risk neutral. Irrespective of the feeder’s risk preference, the optimal 
contracts and ration-implant strategies are found to be the same under all three fed cattle 
pricing methods. The optimal strategy for a risk-neutral owner is to pay a yardage fee of 
$0.05 per animal per day plus the total feed cost with a 19 percent markup, which induces 
the feeder to produce the highest quality carcass, which incurs the most costly feeding 
strategy (Strategy 12: 80 percent corn with a moderate implant).  The middle and lower 
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panels of Table 7.3 show that the yardage fee (a) increases and payment for feed cost (g) 
decreases with the level of the cattle owner’s risk aversion. A yardage fee of $0.16 per 
animal per day with a 9 percent markup on the feed cost is optimal for a low to 
moderately risk-averse cattle owner (0.000025 ≤ y ≤ 0.00025) under each of the fed 
cattle pricing methods. For a high level of risk aversion on the owner’s part, the cost-of-
gain contract (a = 0, b = 0.40, g = 0) is optimal under traditional live and dressed pricing, 
while a contract with a higher yardage fee and full reimbursement for feed cost without a 
markup (a = 0.26, b = 0, g = 1.00) is optimal under grid pricing. These payment schemes 
resemble the ones typically observed in reality, which implies that the model helps to 
explain contract variation observed in reality. Although the restricted parameter space 
allows for linear incentive contracts (a > 0, b > 0), such contracts are never found to be 
optimal by the model and are hardly observed in reality. 
The use of an aggressive implant is optimal only when cattle are fed under a cost-
of-gain contract. A moderate implant strategy is always optimal under yardage-fee-plus-
feed-cost contracts. The choice of yardage fee and the markup on feed cost vary with risk 
preferences of the cattle owner and the fed cattle pricing methods. Only restricted 
contracts are observed in practice and the level of the feeder’s risk aversion does not alter 
the optimal payment scheme or the feeding strategy. Adoption of a particular payment 
scheme with a particular fed cattle pricing objective reflects the level of risk aversion of 






Comparison of the Restricted and Unrestricted Contracts 
In both the restricted and unrestricted parameter spaces, the optimal contract 
coefficients and corresponding production technologies (i.e., ration-implant strategies) 
with live- and dressed-weight pricing methods are identical for each of the risk aversion 
scenarios (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). This is due to the similar incentive structures of live- and 
dressed-weight pricing of fed cattle. As mentioned earlier, live-weight pricing provides 
an incentive for live weight gain and dressed-weight pricing offers an incentive for 
carcass weight gain. According to the biophysical growth model, carcass weight is a 
linear function of the live body weight of an animal. Thus, when live weight is an 
exogenous specification of the contract, the incentive structures of these pricing methods 
are similar. Although the revenues under live- and dressed-weight pricing methods vary 
with the difference between the actual and estimated dressing percentages, the difference 
in revenues under these traditional pricing systems does not alter the values of the 
contract coefficients at the optimum. 
Comparing the values of unrestricted contract coefficients (a, b, and g) and 
corresponding feeding strategies under traditional and modern fed cattle pricing methods, 
the optimal compensation schemes and production technologies under grid pricing are 
different than those that are optimal under traditional pricing methods (Table 7.2). This is 
because the incentive structure of grid pricing is fundamentally different than the 
incentive structure of traditional pricing methods. In addition to the premium (discount) 
for higher (lower) yield, grid pricing also offers premiums (discounts) for higher (lower) 
carcass quality. This result validates the primary hypothesis of this study that the optimal 
incentive structure for cattle feeding contracts varies with the incentive structure of 
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alternative fed cattle pricing methods. With the restricted parameter space, however, 
optimal contracts and corresponding production technologies are the same unless the 
cattle owner is highly risk averse (i.e., y ¥ 0.0025).  
 
Comparison of the Cattle Owner’s and Feeder’s Welfare with Unrestricted and 
Restricted Contracts  
 
Certainty equivalents of the feeder (hereafter FCE ), the owner (hereafter OCE), 
and the total certainty equivalents (sum of the feeder’s and owner’s certainty equivalents, 
hereafter TCE) for each of the fed cattle pricing methods and risk preference scenarios 
are also reported in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. The TCEs with asterisks indicate preferable 
contracts for each of the pricing methods. Comparing the TCEs between restricted and 
unrestricted parameter spaces, the restriction on the parameter space (i.e., limiting the 
choice of compensation schemes) reduces TCE with each of the marketing environments 
under most of the risk preference scenarios. While the deadweight loss is a natural 
consequence of constrained optimization, the direction and magnitude of the change in 
TCE depend mainly on the risk preferences of the contracting parties and fed cattle 
pricing methods. 
Under traditional fed cattle pricing methods, unrestricted contracts strictly 
dominate restricted ones (in terms of TCE) as long as either the owner or the feeder is 
risk neutral. Restricted contracts strictly dominate unrestricted ones when the cattle 
owner is highly risk averse (i.e., y = 0.0025) and the feeder has low to moderate level of  
risk aversion (e.g.., 0.000025 ≤ j ≤ 0.00025), and also when the owner is very highly 
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risk-averse but the feeder is not very highly risk-averse (i.e., 0.000025 ≤ j ≤ 0.0025).48 In 
such cases, TCEs under the traditional pricing methods are slightly higher with the 
restricted contracts than the TCEs with the unrestricted ones. Under grid pricing, 
unrestricted contracts strictly dominate restricted ones except for one risk aversion 
scenario (j = 0.025 and y = 0.0025). Such a high level of risk aversion, however, is 
unlikely on the part of a typical custom cattle feeder. Thus, restricted contracts achieve 
higher total welfare than unrestricted contracts with traditional fed cattle pricing methods 
only if cattle owners tend to have high risk aversion while cattle feeders have moderate 
risk aversion. 
Also from Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the loss (gain) of TCE due to the restriction on the 
contract parameter space is large (small) with traditional pricing methods, while the 
magnitude of loss is very small with grid pricing except when the owner is very highly 
risk averse (y = 0.019). The magnitude of the loss (gain) in TCE increases (decreases) 
with the risk aversion levels of the contracting parties. However, the effect of the owner’s 
risk aversion on TCE is much larger than that of the feeder’s risk aversion. 
The deadweight loss due to the restriction on the contract parameter space 
corresponds to the change in optimal feeding strategies. The loss is higher for a change in 
the optimal implant strategy than the loss due to a change in the proportion of feed 
ingredients in the ration. For grid pricing, optimal implant strategies under alternative risk 
aversion scenarios remain the same with the restricted and unrestricted contracts. The 
restriction on the contract parameter space alters the optimal grain content of ration only 
slightly. On the other hand, for traditional fed cattle pricing methods, optimal implant 
                                                 
48 In most optimization problems restricted maximization yields a smaller optimum than unrestricted 
maximization. In this case, however, the maximization is not over TCE. Rather, the owner chooses the 
contract parameters to maximize OCE, which is why TCE can be higher in the restricted case. 
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strategies remain the same under the restricted and unrestricted contracts only if the cattle 
owner is highly risk averse (i.e., y ¥ 0.0025). If the owner has low to moderate risk 
aversion (i.e., 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.00025), then an aggressive implant strategy with a relatively low-
grain ration (Strategy 15) is optimal with unrestricted contracts, while a moderate implant 
strategy with a high-grain ration (Strategy 12) is optimal with restricted contracts. While 
the optimal feeding strategy with unrestricted contracts changes with a very high level of 
risk aversion by the feeder, the risk preference of the feeder does not alter the choice of 
optimal feeding strategy among restricted contracts. 
The changes in FCE and OCE due to the restriction on the contract parameter 
space, however, do not follow the same pattern as of the change in TCE. In tables 7.2 and 
7.3, the FCEs with asterisks indicate the feeder’s preference and the OCEs with asterisks 
indicate the cattle owner’s preference between the restricted and unrestricted contracts for 
each of the fed cattle pricing methods. For each of the risk aversion scenarios, the OCEs 
with the unrestricted contracts are higher than the OCEs with the restricted contracts 
under each of the fed cattle pricing methods. Thus, the owner always prefers the 
unrestricted contracts. This result is as expected because the owner chooses the contract 
parameters where every choice in the restricted parameter space is also available to the 
owner in the unrestricted case.49 
The feeder’s preference between the restricted and unrestricted contracts varies 
with the risk preferences of the contracting parties, especially the cattle owner. With 
traditional fed cattle pricing methods, a risk-neutral cattle feeder (i.e., j = 0) prefers the 
unrestricted contracts unless the owner is highly risk averse (i.e., y < 0.0025) and a risk-
                                                 




averse feeder (i.e., j > 0) prefers unrestricted contracts unless either the feeder is very 
highly risk averse (i.e., j = 0.025) or the owner is highly (i.e., y ¥ 0.0025) risk averse. A 
high level of risk aversion on the cattle owner’s part improves FCE significantly in the 
restricted case relative to the unrestricted case unless the feeder is very highly risk averse. 
In such cases, cost-of-gain contracts are optimal and transfer a large amount of surplus 
from the owner to the feeder. For a risk-neutral cattle feeder (i.e., j = 0) and a moderately 
risk-averse owner (i.e., y = 0.00025), FCEs under the unrestricted and restricted contracts 
are similar, $10.9 and $10.4, respectively. In contrast, if the owner is highly risk averse 
(i.e., y ¥ 0.0025), then the risk-neutral feeder’s FCE under the unrestricted and restricted 
contracts are $10.9 and $30.6, respectively. Comparing the corresponding OCEs under 
these scenarios, a highly risk-averse owner pays a high risk premium, a major part of 
which is recouped by the feeder unless he is also very highly risk averse. 
Under grid pricing, restricted and unrestricted FCEs are almost the same for low 
to moderate levels of risk aversion by the cattle feeder and owner (i.e., j, y ≤ 0.00025). 
Restricted FCEs are higher with grid pricing when the owner is highly risk averse (i.e.,  y 
= 0.0025). With the restricted parameter space, the yardage fee (a) increases and the 
owner’s share of feed cost (g) decreases with the owner’s risk aversion level. For a high 
level of risk aversion by the owner (i.e., y = 0.0025), a reaches its feasible maximum 
with g = 1. While a very high level of risk aversion by the owner tends to increase a and 
decrease g further, such cases fall outside the restrictions of sensibility on the contract 
parameter space. The feeder also prefers restricted contracts when both of the contracting 
parties are very highly risk averse (i.e., j = 0.025 and y = 0.019). 
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In the case of OCE, the restriction on the contract parameter space substantially 
reduces owner benefits under live and dressed-weight pricing for each of the risk 
preference combinations. However, the magnitude of the loss with grid pricing is much 
smaller. In particular, the loss of OCE due to the restriction on the contract parameter 
space is minor under grid pricing unless the owner is highly risk averse (i.e., y ¥ 0.0025). 
For low to moderate levels of risk aversion by the cattle owner (e.g.., 0.000025 ≤ j ≤ 
0.00025), the loss of OCE due to the restriction is about $18.4 under traditional pricing, 
while the loss under grid pricing is only $0.02. On the other hand, for a very highly risk-
averse cattle owner, the losses of OCE under traditional and grid pricing mechanisms are 
$12.9 and $7.8, respectively. 
Thus, for low to moderate levels of risk aversion, the cattle owner remains nearly 
indifferent between the restricted and unrestricted contracts with grid pricing, while the 
owner strictly prefers unrestricted contracts with the traditional pricing of fed cattle. This 
rough equivalence for the owner is remarkable given that the unrestricted contract choice 
must dominate the restricted choice for the owner by construction. For the same range of 
risk aversion levels, the feeder also remains indifferent between the restricted and 
unrestricted contracts with grid pricing. For traditional pricing methods, however, the 
feeder slightly prefers unrestricted contracts, while he strongly prefers restricted contracts 
at higher levels of risk aversion. Thus, compared to traditional pricing methods, grid 






The Cattle Owner’s Preference between Traditional and Grid Pricing Systems 
The highlighted OCEs in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate the fed cattle pricing method 
preferred by the cattle owner with unrestricted and restricted contract forms, respectively. 
With unrestricted contracts, the cattle owner prefers live-weight pricing of fed cattle as 
long as she is not very highly risk averse (i.e., y < 0.019).  The cattle owner prefers 
dressed-weight pricing with unrestricted contracts only when she is very highly risk 
averse (e.g., y = 0.019). Interestingly, grid pricing with unrestricted contracts is not 
preferable by the owner in any of the risk preference scenarios. This is contrary to the 
principle that greater information should improve market efficiency under grid pricing. 
But this outcome is plausible because the owner does not attempt to maximize TCE. 
Average revenues, costs, and total profit per animal under alternative fed cattle 
pricing methods and ration-implant strategies are reported in Table 7.4. The average 
revenue per animal from dressed-weight pricing ($798.14) is lower than the average 
revenue from live-weight pricing ($811.71) because the actual yield (dressing 
percentage) of the carcass is lower than the estimated yield (implied by the live and 
dressed-weight price series). While the estimated yield is 62.30 percent, the simulated 
average yield of the TCSCF cattle is found to be 61.49 percent.50 Consequently, the 
revenue from dressed-weight pricing is lower than the revenue under live-weight pricing 
on average. This is reflected in the certainty equivalents of the risk-neutral feeder and 
owner as reported in Table 7.2. Average total profits represented by bold fonts in Table 
7.4 correspond to TCEs of the risk-neutral owner and feeder in Table 7.2.  
                                                 
50 The actual average yield reported by TCSCF was 61.29 percent. The simulated average dressing 
percentage is slightly higher because, in the growth simulation for optimization purposes, expected final 





Table 7.4: Average revenues, costs, and profits per animal under alternative fed
                cattle pricing methods and cattle feeding strategies.  
Feeding
Strategies1 Live2 Dressed3 Grid4 Feed
Feeder 
Cattle Live Dressed Grid 
Strategy 10 811.71 798.14 819.15 271.64 417.82 122.25 108.68 129.69
Strategy 11 811.71 798.14 819.15 272.18 417.32 122.21 108.64 129.65
Strategy 12 811.71 798.14 819.15 272.92 416.88 121.92 108.35 129.36
Strategy 13 811.71 798.14 746.75 253.81 417.26 140.64 127.07 75.68
Strategy 14 811.71 798.14 746.75 254.37 416.64 140.70 127.13 75.74
Strategy 15 811.71 798.14 746.75 254.74 416.08 140.89 127.32 75.93
Strategy 16 811.71 798.14 746.75 255.40 415.57 140.74 127.17 75.78
Strategy 17 811.71 798.14 746.75 255.83 415.12 140.77 127.20 75.81
Strategy 18 811.71 798.14 746.75 256.50 414.71 140.50 126.93 75.54
1 Strategy 10: 60% corn, moderate implant; Strategy 11: 70% corn, moderate implant; Strategy 12: 80%
corn, moderate implant;  Strategy 13: 30% corn, agressive implant; Strategy 14: 40% corn, aggressive
implant; Strategy 15: 50% corn, agressive implant; Strategy 16: 60% corn, agressive implant; Strategy
17: 70% corn, agressive implant; Strategy 18: 80% corn, agressive implant.
2 Average revenue from live-weight pricing is the same for each of the ration-implant strategies 
because of the lot-average nature of the pricing method. 
3 Average revenue under dressed-weight pricing is lower than the average revenue under live-weight 
pricing because of the difference between actual dressing percentage (61.49 percent) and estimated 
dressing percentage (62.30 percent). 
4 Grid revenue for ration-implant strategies 10-12 (moderate implant) is higher than the revenue for 
strategies 13-18 (aggressive implant) because average quality of the carcasses is "Choice" with a 
moderate implant while it is "Select" with an aggressive implant.  
5 Feed and feeder cattle costs include 9.0 percent interest over the feeding period. 
Average Revenue (US$) Average Cost5 (US$) Average Profit (US$)
 
Although the formula for establishing the base price of the grid also uses the 
estimated dressing percentage to calculate the value of each carcass, the average revenue 
from the grid ($819.15, when the average quality of the carcasses is “Choice”) is higher 
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than the average revenue from dressed pricing.51 This is mainly because of the additional 
dollar for each 100 pounds of carcass in the grid base formula and the beef quality 
premium earned on average. While the average revenue from grid pricing is higher than 
the average revenue earned with live-weight pricing of fed cattle, grid pricing is still not 
preferred by the cattle owner. 
A sensible explanation for the poor overall performance of grid pricing among 
unrestricted contracts appears to be some combination of asymmetry of discounts versus 
premiums and the additional risk for owners associated with ex post pricing under risk 
aversion. Discounts in a typical grid are much larger than premiums. Quality grade 
premiums per 100 pounds of carcass range from $1 to $6, but discounts are usually $15 
to $25 and more. Thus, one discounted animal can easily offset the premiums earned on 
several premium animals. With this system of premiums and discounts in grid pricing, ex 
post information about carcass yield and quality adds to price risk, which leads to lower 
expected prices and lower certainty equivalents of the risk-averse owner and feeder. 
The results in Table 7.2 show that the OCEs with grid pricing are lower than with 
live-weight pricing even in the risk-neutral case. This is because the additional cost of 
ensuring beef quality is higher than the expected additional revenue earned from the 
grid.52 On average, carcasses failed to earn a positive premium in the grid. With given 
harvest body weights, “Choice” is the highest average carcass quality attained using 
ration-implant Strategies 10-12, while Strategies 13-18 produced “Select” carcasses on 
                                                 
51 The estimated dressing percentage used in the formula to establish the grid base price is obtained by 
regressing historical live weight prices on dressed-weight pricing without the intercept term. Some packing 
plants instead use plant average dressing percentage.   
 
52 Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that, when fed animals are to be priced on the grid, the cattle owner induces the 
feeder to adopt a moderate implant strategy with a high grain ration (Strategies 10-12), which produces 
“Choice” carcasses on average.  
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average. Average revenue per animal from grid pricing is $819.15 when the average 
quality of carcasses is “Choice” and $746.75 when the average quality is “Select”. Thus, 
the average discount per animal for a lower quality grade is substantial. In order to avoid 
this discount in the grid, the cattle owner not only pays extra rents to the feeder for 
inducing a quality-ensuring feeding strategy but also pays an extra premium to avoid 
increased price risk. Thus, the owner is worse off with grid pricing under risk neutrality. 
With restricted contracts, the cattle owner prefers grid pricing to traditional live- 
and dressed-weight pricing unless she is very highly risk averse (y < 0.019). With low to 
moderate levels of risk aversion by the cattle owner, OCEs under grid pricing with 
restricted contracts are significantly higher than those under traditional pricing methods. 
This is because the deadweight loss due to the restriction on the contract parameter space 
is attributed mostly to the cattle owner, while the loss is substantial under the traditional 
pricing methods but trivial under grid pricing. A very highly risk-averse cattle owner 
(i.e., y = 0.019) prefers dressed-weight pricing to live-weight and grid pricing with 
restricted contracts only if the feeder is not risk neutral. 
Given the structure of premiums and discounts for various carcass traits, 
profitability under grid pricing crucially depends on the difference between the actual and 
estimated dressing percentage used in establishing the base price in the grid. With further 
investigation I have found that, even under restricted contracts, the cattle owner prefers 
live-weight to grid pricing if the actual yield is slightly lower (e.g., 61.00 percent) or if 
the estimated yield is slightly higher (e.g., 62.80 percent). On the other hand, even with 
unrestricted contracts, the cattle owner remains indifferent between traditional and grid 
pricing systems with unrestricted contracts if actual and estimated yields are 
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approximately the same. The owner prefers grid pricing with unrestricted contracts if the 
actual yield exceeds the estimated yield.    
Between the two traditional pricing methods, the cattle owner prefers live-weight 
pricing to dressed-weight pricing with restricted contracts. This is because the average 
revenue from live-weight pricing is higher than the average revenue from dressed-weight 
pricing as actual carcass yield (61.49 percent) is lower than the estimated yield (62.30 
percent). Cattle owners are likely to prefer live-weight pricing as long as their expected 
yield is lower than the estimated yield (implied by the historical live- and dressed-weight 
price series). Thus, uncertainty about carcass yield and quality might be a reason for the 
predominance of live-weight pricing in fed cattle marketing. 
 
The Cattle Feeder’s Preference between Unrestricted and Restricted Contract Forms 
The highlighted FCEs in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate the cattle feeder’s preference 
between unrestricted and restricted parameter spaces (contract forms) given that the cattle 
owner then chooses her most preferred fed cattle pricing method and contract parameters 
given one of these forms.53 If the cattle feeder chooses the contract form (can restrict the 
parameter space), even though the owner chooses the contract parameters, these would 
reflect the chosen contract forms and pricing methods for each of the risk preference 
scenarios. As indicated by the highlighted OCEs in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the cattle owner 
prefers live-weight pricing with unrestricted contracts and grid pricing with restricted 
contracts as long as she is less than very highly risk averse (i.e., y < 0.019). If the cattle 
                                                 
53 This choice sequence seems to fit reality while reversing these choices or allowing the cattle owner to 
make both choices does not. 
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owner is very highly risk-averse (i.e., y = 0.019), she prefers dressed-weight pricing 
under both restricted and unrestricted contract forms unless the feeder is risk neutral.  
The highlighted FCEs in the upper panel of Table 7.2 indicate that, if the cattle 
owner is risk-neutral (i.e., y = 0), then the feeder prefers the unrestricted form of 
contracts. A risk-neutral cattle owner prefers live-weight pricing with unrestricted 
contracts, while she prefers grid pricing with the restricted contracts. At any level of the 
feeder’s risk aversion, the unrestricted FCEs under live-weight pricing (Table 7.2) are 
higher than the restricted FCEs under grid pricing (Table 7.3).   
A risk-neutral cattle feeder’s preference over contract forms varies with the 
owner’s risk aversion levels (see middle panels of Tables 7.2 and 7.3). For low to 
moderate levels of risk aversion by the cattle owner (i.e., 0.000025 ≤ y ≤ 0.00025), the 
risk-neutral feeder (j = 0) prefers the unrestricted contract form. In these cases, the 
owner prefers live-weight pricing with unrestricted contracts and grid pricing with 
restricted contracts. Again, the unrestricted FCEs under live-weight pricing are higher 
than the restricted FCEs under grid pricing. If the cattle owner is highly risk-averse (i.e., 
y = 0.0025), then the risk-neutral feeder prefers the restricted contract form. In this case, 
restricted FCEs are higher than unrestricted FCEs under each of the pricing methods. 
Although the feeder’s potential gain from traditional pricing with restricted contracts are 
substantially higher, he is not able to realize that as the owner prefers grid pricing with 
restricted contracts. However, if the owner is very highly risk-averse (i.e., y = 0.019), the 
feeder prefers the unrestricted contract forms while the owner prefers dressed-weight 
pricing.    
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A risk-averse feeder’s preferences between alternative contract forms depend on 
both the owner’s and the feeder’s risk aversion levels (see the lower panels of Tables 7.2 
and 7.3). For low to moderate levels of risk aversion by the owner (i.e., 0.000025 ≤ y ≤ 
0.00025), the feeder prefers the unrestricted form as long as he is not very highly risk 
averse (i.e., 0.000025 ≤ j ≤ 0.0025). In these cases, the owner prefers live-weight pricing 
with unrestricted contracts and grid pricing with restricted contracts, and the feeder 
prefers unrestricted FCEs under live-weight pricing to restricted FCEs under grid pricing. 
However, if the feeder is very highly risk averse ((i.e., j = 0.025) while the owner has 
low to moderate levels of risk aversion, then the restricted FCEs under grid pricing are 
higher than the unrestricted FCEs under live-weight pricing. If the cattle owner is highly 
risk averse (i.e., y = 0.0025), the feeder prefers the restricted contract form as the owner 
chooses grid pricing. For a very high level of risk aversion (i.e., y = 0.019), the owner 
chooses dressed-weight pricing and the feeder prefers the restricted form as long as he is 
less than very highly risk averse (i.e., 0 < j < 0.025). If the feeder is also very highly risk 
averse (e. g., j = 0.025), then he prefers the unrestricted contract form because the 
unrestricted FCE is higher than the restricted FCE. Thus, if the feeder controls the choice 
to restrict the parameter space, he chooses the unrestricted space if the cattle owner has a 
low to moderate level of risk aversion but chooses the restricted parameter space if he is 
not very highly risk averse and the owner is highly (or very highly) risk averse.  
For alternative risk preference combinations of the cattle owner and feeder, Table 
7.5 shows the preferred fed cattle pricing methods, contract parameters, corresponding 
cattle feeding strategies, and resulting certainty equivalents and average carcass quality 
when the cattle owner chooses the pricing method and the feeder chooses the contract  
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Table 7.5: Preferred pricing methods, contract parameters, feeding strategies, and resulting 
          certainty equivalents, and average carcass quality when the cattle owner chooses pricing 
          methods and the feeder chooses contract forms (not the contract parameters). 
Pricing Contract Coefficients2 Strat- Carcass
Owner Feeder Method1 a b g egy3 Owner Feeder Total  Quality
0 0 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0 10.9 140.9 Select
0 0.000025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0 10.9 140.9 Select
0 0.00025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0 10.9 140.9 Select
0 0.0025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 130.0 10.8 140.8 Select
0 0.025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 129.7 9.7 139.5 Select
0.000025 0 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9 10.9 140.8 Select
0.00025 0 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2 10.9 140.1 Select
0.0025 0 GP 0.26 0 1.00 10 107.0 11.1 118.2 Choice
0.019 0 DWP 0.15 0.11 0.76 13 79.5 11.9 91.4 Select
0.000025 0.000025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9 10.9 140.8 Select
0.000025 0.00025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9 10.9 140.8 Select
0.000025 0.0025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.9 10.8 140.7 Select
0.000025 0.025 GP 0.16 0 1.09 12 119.0 10.1 129.0 Choice
0.00025 0.000025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2 10.9 140.1 Select
0.00025 0.00025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2 10.9 140.1 Select
0.00025 0.0025 LWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 15 129.2 10.8 140.0 Select
0.00025 0.025 GP 0.16 0 1.09 12 118.1 10.1 128.1 Choice
0.0025 0.000025 GP 0.26 0 1.00 10 109.4 11.1 120.6 Choice
0.0025 0.00025 GP 0.26 0 1.00 10 109.4 11.1 120.6 Choice
0.0025 0.0025 GP 0.26 0 1.00 10 109.4 11.1 120.6 Choice
0.0025 0.025 GP 0.26 0 1.00 10 109.4 11.1 120.5 Choice
0.019 0.000025 DWP 0 0.40 0 13 66.9 30.6 97.5 Select
0.019 0.00025 DWP 0 0.40 0 13 66.9 30.3 97.2 Select
0.019 0.0025 DWP 0 0.40 0 13 66.9 28.0 94.9 Select
0.019 0.025 DWP 0.14 0.10 0.80 13 79.7 9.7 89.4 Select
1 LWP = Live-weight pricing; DWP = Dressed-weight pricing; and GP = Grid pricing. 
2 Contract parameters that are observed in current practice are represented by bold-faced numbers. 
3 Strategy 10: 60% corn, moderate implant; Strategy 11: 70% corn, moderate implant; Strategy 12: 80%
corn, moderate implant; Strategy 13: 30% corn, aggressive implant; Strategy 15: 50% corn, aggressive
implant.
Risk Aversion Certainty Equiv.
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form (not the contract parameters). From Table 7.5, live-weight pricing is preferable 
whenever the owner has low to moderate level of risk aversion and the feeder has less 
than very high risk aversion. Dressed-weight pricing is preferable only if the owner is 
very highly risk-averse. In all other risk preference scenarios, grid pricing is preferable. 
The highlighted contract coefficients indicate the situations when restricted contract 
forms such as yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts and cost-of-gain contracts are 
preferable. Thus, when the cattle owner chooses the pricing method but the feeder can 
choose to restrict the contract parameter space, a mix of traditional and modern fed cattle 
pricing methods and contract forms are likely to coexist in reality. The last column of 
Table 7.5 also indicates that average beef quality increases with the adoption of grid 
pricing.  
 
Rationalizing Results with Reality 
In current practice, only restricted contract forms such as yardage-fee-plus-feed-
cost contracts (with or without a markup on feed cost) and cost-of-gain contracts are 
observed. Obviously, from the optimization formulation, the cattle owner never prefers 
restricted contracts (Tables 7.2 and 7.3), but the feeder prefers restricted contracts when 
the owner is highly risk-averse. Cattle owners who retain ownership of their feeder 
animals through slaughter face substantial price and production risks (Popp et al., 2007; 
Marsh and Feuz, 2002). Moreover, given the small scale of beef production herds, high 
levels of risk aversion by cattle owners are likely in reality.54 Thus, the feeder has an 
incentive to restrict the contract parameter space. Moreover, it may be reasonable for the 
                                                 
54 In the United States, only about 10 percent of cow-calf operations have more than 100 head of breeding 
cows (Field and Taylor, 2002). A large number of cow herds are small, with less than 30 cows per 
operation (Ward, 1997).   
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feeder to insist on a reasonably simple contract form for administrative and decision 
making purposes. Given the contract form, the owner may choose contract parameters but 
has the prerogative to go to an alternative feedlot since she owns the cattle. As the cattle 
owner chooses the contract parameters, the feeder is left with only the accept or reject 
option. Certainly, the owner chooses the fed cattle pricing method since she owns the 
cattle. Thus, it is realistic to assume that feeders have control over restricting the 
parameter space while owners choose the contract parameters and fed cattle pricing 
method. With this assumption, the optimization results of this chapter can explain 
observed practices in contract cattle feeding and fed cattle marketing.  
The results presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that, in the absence of grid 
pricing, the cattle owner always prefers live-weight pricing as long as she is not very 
highly risk-averse (e. g., 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.0025). The cattle owner prefers dressed-weight pricing 
only if she is very highly risk-averse (e.g., y = 0.019). Given this preference structure, the 
feeder chooses unrestricted contracts if the owner has low to moderate level of risk 
aversion (i.e., 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.00025),  and restricted contracts if the owner is highly risk averse 
(e.g., 0.0025 ≤ y ≤ 0.019) but the feeder is not very highly risk averse (i.e., j < 0.025). In 
such cases, cost-of-gain contracts appear to be optimal (e.g., b = $0.40 with a = 0 and g = 
0). The feeder’s welfare improves with such a restriction on the contract parameter space. 
For example, with a highly risk-averse owner, restricted FCEs (e.g., $ 28.0 when y, j = 
0.0025) are substantially higher than unrestricted FCEs (e.g., $10.8 when y, j = 0.0025). 
However, even with the restriction on the contract parameter space, the owner prefers 
live-weight pricing if she is not very highly risk averse (e.g., y = 0.0025), but prefers 
dressed-weight pricing if she is very highly risk averse (e.g., y = 0.019). Thus, high 
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levels of risk aversion on the cattle owners’ part explain the traditional practices for 
marketing fed cattle using live- and dressed-weight pricing methods assuming feeders 
control the choice to restrict the parameter space.  
When grid pricing is introduced into these traditional practices, a highly risk-
averse cattle owner (i.e., y = 0.0025) no longer prefers traditional pricing methods with 
restricted contract forms. While the cattle feeder still prefers restricted contract forms in 
these cases, the highly risk-averse cattle owner prefers grid pricing as it improves her 
welfare (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Moreover, cost-of-gain contracts are replaced by yardage-
fee-plus-feed-cost contracts (e.g., a = $0.26,  b = 0, and g = 1) in these cases. Thus, the 
introduction of grid pricing decreases (increases) the scope of cost-of-gain (yardage-fee-
plus-feed-cost) contracts in commercial cattle feeding.55  
However, for a very highly risk-averse cattle owner (i.e., y = 0.019), dressed-
weight pricing with restricted contract forms is still preferable to grid pricing as long as 
the feeder is not risk neutral (j = 0) or very highly risk averse (j ∫ 0.025). Cost-of-gain 
contracts appear to be optimal only in this situation. Thus, with the introduction of grid 
pricing, a mix of yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost and cost-of-gain contracts and traditional 
and grid pricing practices are observed if cattle owners choose the pricing method and 




                                                 
55 In order to obtain information about contract cattle feeding practices, more than 30 feedlot operators in 
Iowa were directly contacted by telephone in 2005. Several of them reported that they had switched from 
using cost-of-gain contracts to yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts. None of them reported switching from 
yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts to cost-of-gain contracts.  
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7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the behavior of cattle feeders under alternative cattle 
feeding contract provisions, and the implications for contract parameter choice by cattle 
owners. The multitask principal-agent model presented in Chapter 4 yields a variety of 
testable hypotheses, which are evaluated by empirically determining the optimal 
incentive structure for cattle feeding contracts under alternative fed cattle pricing 
methods and risk preferences of cattle feeders and owners. The dynamic biophysical 
model for beef cattle growth presented in Chapter 6 was employed to simulate feedlot 
and carcass performance outcomes for a large sample of feeder steers under various 
ration-implant strategies. Simulated feedlot and carcass performance data were then 
combined with historical price series to calculate stochastic costs and returns of cattle 
owners and feeders with various degrees of risk aversion. The optimal (profit and utility 
maximizing) cattle feeding contract parameters for owners and corresponding production 
technologies (ration-implant strategies) chosen by feeders are then determined by 
performing a generalized search on a feasible contract parameter space. This was done, 
first, with the provision of cost sharing in addition to fixed fee and performance 
incentives and, second, without cost sharing provisions (i.e., restricting the parameter 
space to typical contract forms—yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts or cost-of-gain 
contracts). 
The optimization results validate the main hypotheses of the multitask model as 
well as hypotheses about the benefits and implications of grid pricing. First, results 
demonstrate that carcass yield and quality improving inputs are substitutes in the 
production technology of feedlots. Second, they show that overall beef quality increases 
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under grid pricing with optimal owner and feeder behavior. Third, the power of the 
optimal incentive scheme for cattle feeding (i.e., the degree of the incentive for cost 
saving) is lower under value-based grid pricing than under traditional live- and dressed-
weight pricing methods. Fourth, the power of the incentive scheme increases with the 
degree of cattle owners’ risk aversion. Fifth, compared to traditional pricing methods, 
value-based grid pricing better aligns the incentives of cattle owners and feeders under 
feeding contract structures in current use (yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts and cost-
of-gain contracts). Sixth, asymmetry in the premium-discount structure in current grids 
and the additional risk associated with carcass yield and quality under grid pricing are the 
main reasons for the continued use of live-weight pricing and apparent slowness to adopt 
grid pricing. Seventh, more balanced premiums and discounts in grid pricing may be 
required to achieve further expansion of grid pricing and overall improvement of beef 
quality and consistency. Eighth, if cattle feeders can limit the contract parameter space to 
traditional forms of contracts and owners choose the contract parameters, then typical 
forms of cattle feeding contracts can be rationalized by optimal behavior under plausible 
levels of risk aversion.. Finally, the introduction of grid pricing decreases (increases) the 





General Conclusions and Reflections 
 
The major results of this dissertation are based on feedlot and carcass 
performance outcomes simulated by a widely-accepted dynamic biophysical model of 
beef cattle growth. This research represents a unique approach to investigation of the 
optimality of various feeding contract forms in livestock production. In particular, this 
approach has the capability of representing a much wider variety of factors that reflect 
animal attributes and determine both quality and yield of meat production than typical 
revealed preference contract data has, even when it is (rarely) available. The model 
validation has revealed quite plausible simulation results for most but not all of the 
dimensions of productivity, although the results appear to be satisfactory subject to some 
rescaling of interpretation. Application of the biophysical growth model under contract 
optimization permits examination of contract parameter sensitivity to a rich set of issues 
in contract form as well as the preference structures of contract participants. Observed 
choices in reality can be rationalized within a subset of risk preference structures on the 
part of owners and feeders. 
With these results, future research along this line appears promising. However, 
model application is tedious given the need to evaluate the entire parameter space 
because of minor nonconcavities in the biophysical growth model. Several issues deserve 
further consideration. Most importantly, the model offers a valuable tool to evaluate 
alternative grids as pricing structures. Because this research highlights problems 





identifying a grid that would both be widely adopted and yet improve the quality and 
consistency of beef production. Further, this research could be helpful in determining 
optimal adjustments in grid pricing required under the actual risk aversion of contracting 
parties. Little information is available to determine which the various risk aversion levels 
examined in this dissertation are most appropriate. In particular, this research shows that 
aversion to risk in ex post pricing is a deterrent to adoption of grid pricing. Thus, some 
downward adjustment in pricing discounts and/or upward adjustment in premiums 
sensitive to common levels of risk aversion could serve to increase adoption of grid 
pricing, thus increasing the quality and consistency of overall meat production. 
Further, this study has assumed a traditional stopping rule for feeding (a target 
harvest weight), but this model can be further applied to determine the optimal stopping 
rule, which might involve a combination of traits. From a broader social perspective, 
these last few issues can be further developed in a model including consumers where a 
sound measure of the marginal benefits to consumers of beef quality and consistency is 
used to determine the socially optimal tradeoff between meat quality/consistency and the 
deadweight loss associated with risk under grid pricing. Thus, a rich research agenda 
remains to be explored with this unique general research approach to contracting issues.  
APPENDIX 6.1 
Step by Step Procedure for Biological Growth Simulation  
 
Step 1: Given the initial live body weight of an animal, calculate initial shrunk and empty 
body weights and the amount of initial empty body fat according to equations 1, 
2, and 37 in Appendix Table 6.1, respectively.  
Step 2: Determine the ration-implant strategy to be used during feeding the animal.  
Following the feed library of NRC (2000), determine energy and protein content 
of the feed on the basis of dry matter percentage (Table 6.3). Also, specify the 
type of growth promoting implant to be used and obtain the parameters for 
adjusting the expected final shrunk body weight and dry matter intake prediction.  
Step 3: From the frame score of the animal, determine expected final shrunk body  
weight (EFSBW) according to Fox et al. (1992). Adjust EFSBW for the use of 
implant (minus 45 kg for no implant, and plus 45 kg for the use of estrogen and 
Trenbolone Acetate), and calculate initial equivalent shrunk body weights for a 
target final empty body fat percentage (e.g., SRW = 478 kg for medium frame 
steers at 28 percent empty body fat).  
Step 4: Given energy and protein values of the ration, predict daily dry matter intake  
(DMI,  kg/day) of the animal with necessary adjustment for body fat, breed,  
implants, current weather condition, and mud depth at the feedlot (equations 5 to 
13 in Appendix Table 6.1).  
Step 5: Compute required energy for maintenance with necessary adjustment for  direct 
effect of cold or heat stress (equations 14 to 28 in Appendix Table 6.1). 
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Step 6: Calculate dry matter required for maintenance, dry matter available for  
 growth, and net energy available for growth (equations 29 to 31 in Appendix  
 Table 6.1). 
Step 7: Calculate shrunk weight gain and empty body gain according to equations 32  
 and 34 in Appendix Table 6.1.  
Step 8: Determine empty weight gain and the amount of protein and fat in empty  
 weight gain according to equations 35 and 36 in Appendix Table 6.1,  
 respectively. Add fat in gain to initial empty body fat on the previous day, and  
 calculate empty body fat percentage at the end of the day (Equation 37 in  
 Appendix Table 6.1).  
Step 9: Compute accumulated shrunk and empty body weights at the end of the day  
 according to the following equations: 
  ttt SWGSBWSBW += −1 ; 
 ttt EWGEBWEBW += −1 . 
Step 10: Calculate carcass weight following Garrett and Hinman (1969) (Equation 40  
 in Appendix Table 6.1). 
Step 11: Calculate empty body and carcass fat percentage following equations 38 and  
 39 in Appendix Table 2. Using the carcass fat percentage determine yield  
 grade following Fox and Black (1984) (Equation 41 in Appendix Table 5.1.  
 Also determine quality grade from the accumulated empty body fat percentage  







Step12: Repeat steps 4 to 11 for each additional day until the animal reaches target  
harvest body weight (simulation model 1), or predetermined days on feed are  
exhausted (simulation model 2).  
Step 13: Compute and save the number of days required to reach the target harvest  
body weight (simulation model 1) or total shrunk weight gain during the feedlot 
days (simulation model 2), average daily shrunk weight gain, total amount of dry 
matter consumed during the feedlot regime, and overall feed efficiency (dry 
matter consumed per unit of weight gain). Also, save final carcass weight, yield 
grade, and quality grade. 
Step 14: Repeat steps 2 to 13 for each of the available ration-implant strategies. 




Estimated Densities of Actual and Simulated (Model 2) Carcass Performance Data  
 










































        Figure A6.1a: Estimated kernel densities of actual      Figure A6.1b: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated final body weights (all cattle).         and simulated final body weights (all cattle).  










































        Figure A6.1c: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure A6.1d: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
        and simulated carcass weights (all cattle).           and simulated carcass weights (all cattle).  
 













































        Figure A6.1e: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure A6.1f: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated yield grades (all cattle).            and simulated yield grades (all cattle). 
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Figure A6.1g: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (October cattle). 
 










































        Figure A6.2a: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure A6.2b: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated final body weights (Oct. cattle).         and simulated final body weights (Oct. Cattle). 
 












































        Figure A6.2c: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure A6.2d: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated carcass weights (Oct. cattle).           and simulated carcass weights (Oct. Cattle).  
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        Figure A6.2e: Estimated kernel densities of actual         Figure A6.2f: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated yield grades (October cattle).            and simulated yield grades (October Cattle). 
 



















Figure A6.2g: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (October cattle). 
 












































        Figure A6.3a: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure A6.3b: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated final body weights (November cattle).    and simulated final body weights (Nov. Cattle). 
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        Figure A6.3c: Estimated kernel densities of actual        Figure A6.3d: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated carcass weights (Nov. cattle).           and simulated carcass weights (Nov. Cattle).  
 












































        Figure A6.3e: Estimated kernel densities of actual         Figure A6.3f: Quantile-quantile plot of actual  
        and simulated yield grades (November cattle).            and simulated yield grades (November Cattle). 
 



















Figure A6.3g: Estimated kernel densities of actual and simulated quality grades (November cattle). 
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       Figure A6.4a: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure A6.4b: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
       and simulated final body weights (Dec. cattle).         and simulated final body weights (Dec. Cattle). 
 














































        Figure A6.4c: Estimated kernel densities of actual      Figure A6.4d: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
        and simulated carcass weights (Dec. cattle).         and simulated carcass weights (Dec. Cattle).  
 













































         Figure A6.4e: Estimated kernel densities of actual       Figure A6.4f: Quantile-quantile plot of actual 
         and simulated yield grades (Dec. cattle).           and simulated yield grades (Dec. Cattle). 
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The Comparative Returns Search Model in Algorithmic Form 
 
Step 1: Save the means and variances of the outcomes of the biophysical growth  
 simulation model performed for each of the TCSCF cattle using 18 alternative  
 ration-implant strategies. For each of the ration-implant strategies, compute the  
 variance-covariance matrix for the dependent variables of interest across all the  
 cattle.  
Step 2: Obtain historical weekly averages of live and dressed weight prices of fed cattle,  
feeder cattle, grid premiums and discounts, corn, soybean meal, and alfalfa hay 
prices. Calculate corn silage prices from corn prices. Estimate the multivariate  
densities of the price series using a Gaussian kernel function and randomly draw  
10,000 price vectors from their multivariate distributions.  
Step 3: Estimate dressing percentage from the randomly drawn live weight and dressed  
weight  prices for fed cattle by linearly regressing the former on the later (without  
an intercept term). Calculate grid base prices per pound of beef from live weight  
prices and estimated dressing percentages according to the formula, Grid Base  
Price = 100 ä (Live Weight Price/Estimated Dressing Percentage) + 0.01.  
Step 4: For each individual animal and ration-implant strategy, compute the cattle  
 owner’s revenue from selling the fed cattle according to live, dressed and grid  
 pricing methods using the outcomes of the growth model and randomly drawn  




Step 5: Calculate the costs per pound dry matter of each of the rations using the  
 randomly drawn feed ingredient prices. From the total feed consumption data  
 generated by the growth simulation model and ration costs, calculate average total  
 feed cost for feeding each individual animal under alternative ration-implant  
 strategies. Calculate total feeding cost under alternative strategies by adding  
 implant and other costs to the total feed cost.    
Step 6: Compute the variance-covariance matrix of the revenues, costs, and feedlot  
 performance. 
Step 7: Calculate average partial profits (across all the cattle) of the owner under  
 alternative feeding strategies by subtracting corresponding average total costs and  
 the average value of the feeder cattle from the revenues under alternative fed  
 cattle pricing methods.  
Step 8: Determine the lower and upper bounds of the contract coefficients (a, b, and g)  
 from the minimum and maximum attainable profits by the feeder and owner.  
 Construct a parameter space with all plausible combinations of a, b, and g for an  
 increment of 0.01 within the corresponding intervals (0 ≤ a ≤ 0.49, 0 ≤ b ≤ 0.47,  
 and 0 ≤ g ≤ 1.45). Save the feasible combinations of a, b, and g in an array that  
 satisfy the participation constraints of the cattle feeder and owner. 
Step 9: For each combination of a, b, and g in the feasible parameter space, compute the  
 feeder’s net return and utility per animal head (and also per hundred pounds of  
 weight gain) for alternative cattle feeding strategies for a constant absolute risk  




and utility maximizing feeding strategies for each combination of ,α ,β andγ   
 under each j.  
Step 10: For a constant absolute risk aversion coefficients in the range 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.019,  
compute the cattle owner’s profit and utility per animal head (and also per 
hundred pounds of weight gain) under alternative fed cattle pricing methods that 
result from the feeder’s optimal strategies for all feasible combinations of a, b, 
and g. Search for the owner’s profit and utility maximizing a, b, and g, and 
corresponding optimal feeding strategy of the feeder.   
Step 11: Save the optimal combination of a, b, and g, corresponding feeding strategies,  
 and certainty equivalents of the cattle feeder and the owner for any particular  
 combination of j and y.  
Step 12: Repeat Steps 9-11 for all plausible combination of j and y with successive  
increments within the corresponding intervals of the risk aversion coefficients.  




Appendix Table 6.1: Equations used in the biophysical growth simulation model. 
Eq. No Conditions LHS1 RHS2
1 SBW t 0.96 × LBW t
2 EBW t 0.891× SBW t
3 AFSBW EFSBW  + IMPEFSBW
4 EqSBW t (SBW t  × SRW ) / AFSBW
5 Age ≤ 12 mos. DMI t (SBW t
0.75 × (0.2435 × NEm t  - 0.0466 × NEm t
2 - 0.1128))/NEm t
Age > 12 mos. DMI t (SBW t
0.75 × (0.2435 × Nem t  - 0.0466 × NEm t
2 - 0.0869))/NEm t
6 EqSBW t  ≥ 350 kg DMIBF t 0.7714 + 0.00196 × EqSBW t  - 0.00000371 × EqSBW t
2
EqSBW t  < 350 kg DMIBF t 1
7 Holstein DMIB t 1.08
Holstein × British DMIB t 1.04
All other DMIB t 1
8 No implant DMIMP t 0.94
Estrogen DMIMP t 1
Estrogen +TBA DMIMP t 1.03
9 CETI t 27.88 - (0.456 × Tc t ) + (0.010754 × Tc t
2) - (0.4905 × RHc t ) +
(0.00088 × RHc t
2) + (1.1507 × (1000/3600) × WSc t ) -
(0.126447 × ((1000/3600) × WSc t )
2) + (0.019876 × Tc t  × RHc t ) -
(0.046313 × Tc t × ((1000/3600) × WSc t )) + (0.4167 × HRSc t )
10 DMINC t (119.62 - 0.9708 × CETI t )/100
11 Tc t  ≤ - 20
oC DMIT t 1.16
20oC<Tc t  ≤ 20
oC DMIT t 1.0433 - 0.0044 ×Tc t  + 0.0001×Tc t
2
20oC<Tc t  ≤28
oC DMIT t ((1 - DMINC t ) × 0.75 + DMINC t )/100 + 1.05
Tc t  >28
oC DMIT t ((1 - DMINC t ) × 0.75 + DMINC t )/100 + 1
12 DMIM t 1 - 0.01 × Mud t
13 AdgDMI t DMI t  × DMIBF t  × DMIB t  × DMIMP  × DMIT t
14 PN t 0.8 + (BCS t  - 1) × 0.05
15 PETI t 27.88 - (0.456 × Tp t ) + (0.010754 ×Tp t
2) - (0.4905 × RHp t) +
(0.00088 × RHp t
2) + (1.1507 × (1000/3600) × WSp t ) -
(0.126447 × ((1000/3600) × WSp t )
2) + (0.019876 × Tp t  × RHp t ) -
 (0.046313 × Tp t  × ((1000/3600) × WSp t )) + (0.4167 × HRSp t )
16 Tp t  ≤ 20
oC a 2 (88.426 - 0.785 × Tp t + 0.0116 × Tpt
2 - 77)/1000
Tp t  > 20




Appendix Table 6.1 (continued )
Eq. No Conditions LHS1 RHS2
17 REM t SBW t
0.75 × ((a 1 × BE  × PN t ) + a 2)
18 SA t 0.09 × SBW t
0.67
19 RE t (AdjDMI t  - (REM t -1/(NEm  × IF ))) × NEg
20 HE t ((ME t  × AdjDMI t ) - RE t )/SA t
21 HideCode t  ≤ 2 MudME t (1 - HCCode t  - 2) × 0.2
HCCode t > 2 MudME t (1 - HCCode t  - 2) × 0.3
22 HideME t (1 - HideCode t  - 2) × 0.2
23 EI t (7.36 - (0.296× WSc t ) + (2.55× HD t )× MudME t × HideME t
24 TI t 5.25 + 0.75 × BCS t
25 IN t EI t  + TI t
26 LCTt 39 - (IN t  × HE t  × 0.85)
27 LCT t  > Tc t MEcs t SA t  × (LCT t -Tc t )/INt
LCT t  ≤ Tc t MEcs t 0
28 AdjREM t REM t  + (NEm t /ME t ) × MEcs t
29 DMFM t AdjREM t /(NEm  ×IF )
30 DMFG t AdjDMI t  - DMFM t
31 NEFG t DMFG t  × NEg
32 NEFG t > 0 SWG t 13.91 × (EqSBW t -1
-0.6837) × (NEFG t
0.9116)
NEFG t  ≤ 0 SWG t 0
33 SBW t SBW t -1 + SWG t
34 EWG t 0.956 × SWG t
35 PIG t 0.254 - 0.0271 ×(NEFG t /EWG t )
36 FIG t  0.123 ×(NEFG t /EWG t ) - 0.154
37 t  = 0 EBF t (0.00054 × EBW t
2 + 0.037 × EBW t - 0.61) × 0.85
t  > 0 EBF t EBF t -1 + FIG t  × EWG t  × 0.85
38 EBFPt 100 × (EBF t /EBW t )
39 CFP t 0.70 + 1.0815 × EBFP t
40 CW t 0.73 × EBW t  - 22.22     
41 YG t 0.15 × CFP t  - 1.7     
1 LHS=Left hand side of the equation; 2 RHS= Right hand side of the equation
Source: Tedeschi et al. (2004), NRC (2000), Fox et al. (1992), Garrett and Hinman (1969), and Fox and 





Adler, T.R. and R.F. Scherer. 1999. "A Multivariate Investigation of Transaction Cost  
 Analysis Dimensions: Do Contract Types Differ?" Journal of Applied Business  
 Research, 15(3): 65-79.  
Aghion, P., P. Bacchetta, and A. Banerjee. 2000. “A Simple Model of Monetary Policy  
 and Currency Crises. European Economic Review, 44(4-6): 728-738. 
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton. 1987. “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry.” American Economic  
 Review, 77(3): 388-401.  
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole. 1994. “The Management of Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of  
 Economics, 109(4): 1185-1209. 
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal  
 of Political Economy, 105(1): 1-29. 
Agricultural Marketing Service. 2000. Agricultural Market News, U.S. Department of  
 Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
Alchian, A.A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic  
 Organization.” The American Economic Review, 62: 777-95. 
Allen, D.W. and D. Lueck. 1992a. “The "Back Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets,  
 Reputation and the Structure of Farmland.” Journal of Law, Economics and  
 Organization, 8(2): 366-76.  
Allen, D.W. and D. Lueck. 1992b. “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture:  Cash Rent  
 Versus Crop-share.” Journal of Law and Economics, 35(2): 397-426.  
Allen, D.W. and D. Lueck. 1993. “Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare  
 Contracts.” The Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1): 78-100.  
227 
 
Allen, D.W. and D. Lueck. 1996. “The Transaction Cost Approach to Agricultural  
 Contracts.” In Agricultural Markets: Mechanisms, Failures and Regulations, ed.   
 D. Martimort. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science.  
Alston, L.J. and R. Higgs. 1982. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture Since the  
 Civil War: Hypotheses and Tests.” Journal of Economic History, 42(2): 327-53.  
Anderson, E. and D.C. Schmittlein. 1984. “Integration of the Sales Force: an Empirical  
 Examination.” The Rand Journal of Economics, 15(3): 385-395.  
Ainslie, S.J., D.G. Fox, T.C. Perry, D.J. Ketchen, and M.C. Barry. 1993. “Predicting 
 Amino Acid Adequacy of Diets Fed to Holstein Steers.” Journal of Animal  
Science, 71: 1312-1319.  
Arrow, K.J. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Hahnsson  
 Foundation. 
Baeta, F. C., N. F. Meador, M. D. Shanklin, and H. D. Johnson. 1987. “Equivalent  
 Temperature Index at Temperatures above the Thermoneutral for Lactating Dairy  
 Cows.” ASAE Paper 87-4015. Amer. Soc. Agric. Engr., St. Joseph, MI. 
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy. 2002. “Relational Contracts and the Theory of  
 the Firm.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1): 39-83. 
Bajari. P. and S. Tadelis. 2001. “Incentive versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of  
 Procurement Contracts.” The Rand Journal of Economics, 32(3): 387-407.  
Baker, G.P. and T. Hubbard. 2003. “Make versus Buy in Trucking Asset Ownership, Job  
 Design and Information.” American Economic Review, 93: 551-572. 
Barkema, A. 1993. “Reaching Consumers in Twenty-First Century: The Short Way  
 Around the Barn.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75: 1126-31. 
228 
 
Barkema, A., M. Drabenstott, and M. Cook. 1993. “The Industrialization of the U.S.  
 Food System.” Food and Agricultural Marketing Issues for the 21st Century, ed.  
 D. I. Padberg. Food and Agricultural Marketing Consortium, Texas A&M  
 University: 3-20. 
Barry, P.J., S.T. Sonka, and K. Lajili. 1992. “Vertical Co-ordination, Financial Structure, 
 and the Changing Theory of the Firm.” American Journal of Agricultural  
 Economics, 74(1): 1219-25. 
Bhattacharyya, S. and F. Lafontaine. “Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of  
 Share Contracts.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4): 761-81.  
Bindseil, U. 1997. “Vertical Integration in the Long Run: The Provision of Physical 
 Assets to the London and New York Stock Exchanges.” Journal of Institutional  
and Theoretical Economics, 153: 641-56.  
Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
Brester, G.W. and T.C. Schroeder. 1995. “The Impacts of Brand and Generic Advertising 
on Meat Demand.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 26, 969-979. 
CattleStore. http://www.cattlestore.com.  
Cai, H. 2003. “A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 
 34(1): 63-77. 
Che, Y.-K. and T-Y. Chung. 1999. “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments.”  
 The RAND Journal of Economics, 30(1): 84-105.  
Che, Y.-K., and D.B. Haush. 1999. “Cooperative Investments and the Value of  




Chiu, S. 1998. “Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership.”  
 The American Economic Review, 88(4): 882-901. 
Christian, K.R. 1981. “Simulation of Grazing Systems.” Pp. 361-377, in Grazing  
 Animals, ed. World Animal Science, B1: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company.  
Chung, T.-Y. 1991. “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing.”  
 Review of Economic Studies, 58: 1031-1042. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4(16): 386-405.  
Cody Feedlots. http://www.codyfeedlot.com.  
Cozzarin, B. P. and P.J. Barry. 1998. “Organizational Structure in Agricultural  
 Production Alliances.”  International Food and Agribusiness Management  
 Review, 1(1): 149-165. 
Cozzarin, B.P. and R.E. Westgren. 2000.  “Rent Sharing in Multi-Site Hog  
 Production.”  American Journal of Agricultural Economics,  82(1): 25-37. 
CRI Feeders of Guymon LLC. http://www.cri-feeders.com.  
Crickenberger, R.G. 1977. Effect of Cattle Size, Selection, and Crossbreeding in the  
 Utilization of High Corn Silage or High Grain Rations. Ph.D. Dissertation,  
 Michigan State University. 
Crocker, K. J. and S.E. Masten. 1988. “Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral  
 Options and Contract Length.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 19(3): 327-43. 
Crocker, K. J. and K. J. Reynolds. 1993. “The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An  
 Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement.” The RAND Journal of  




Cundiff, L.V., R.W. Koch, and G.M. Smith. 1981. “Characterization of Biological Types  
 of Cattle - Cycle II. IV. Post Weaning Growth and Feed Efficiency of Steers.”  
 Journal of Animal Science, 53: 332-346.  
Coulibaly, N. and B.W Brorsen. 1999. “Resolving the Conflict between Previous Meat  
 Generic Advertising Studies. Agribusiness, 15, 501-515. 
Dahl, C. A. and T. K. Matson. 1998. “Evolution of the US Natural Gas Industry in  
 Response to Changes in Transaction Costs.” Land Economics, 74(3): 390-408.  
Danner, M. L. 1978. The Effect of Feeding System on the Performance and Carcass  
 Characteristics of Yearling Steers, Steer Calves and Heifer Calves. M.S. Thesis,  
 Michigan State University, Lansing. 
Danner, M. L., D.G. Fox, and J.R. Black. 1980. “Effect of Feeding System on  
Performance and Carcass Characteristics of Yearling Steers, Steer Calves and  
Heifer Calves.” Journal of Animal science, 50: 394-404.  
De Fraja, G. 1999. “After You Sir: Hold-up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential  
 Investment.” Games and Economic Behavior, 26: 22-39. 
De Meza, D., and B. Lockwood. 1998. “Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate  
 Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm.” The  
 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 361-86. 
Duckett, S. K., D. G. Wagner, F. N. Owens, H. G. Dolezal, and D. R. Gill. 1996. “Effects  
 of Estrogenic and Androgenic Implants on Performance, Carcass Traits and Meat  
 Tenderness in Feedlot Steers: A Review.” The Professional Animal Scientist, 12:  
205-214.  
Duckett, S. K., F. N. Owens, and J.G. Andrae. 1997. “Effects of Implants on Performance  
231 
 
and Carcass Traits of Feedlot Steers and Heifers.” Pp 63-82 in 1997 OSU Implant  
 Symposium, Stillwater, OK.  
Edlin, A. S. and S. Reichelstein. 1996. “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and 
Optimal Investment.” The American Economic Review, 86(3): 478-501. 
Edwards, W. 2005. “Pricing Forage in the Field.” Ag Decision Maker, File-A165,  
 Available at http://www.extension.iastate.edu/AgDM/crops/pdf/a1-65.pdf. Iowa  
 State University Extension, Ames. 
Elfenbein, D.W. and J. Lerner. 2003. “Ownership and Control Rights in Internet  
 Portal Alliances, 1995-1999.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2): 356-69. 
Fares, M. 2004. “Contractual Solution to the Hold-up Problem in Agrifood Chains.”  
 Quality Assurance, Risk Management and Environmental Control in Agriculture  
 and Food Supply Networks: Proceedings of the 82nd Seminar of the European  
 Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE) held in Bonn, Germany on 14-16  
 May 2003 (Volumes A and B).  
Ferrier, P. and R. Lamb. 2007. “Government Regulation and Quality in the US Beef  
 Market.” Food Policy, 32: 84-97. 
Feuz, D. M., S.W. Fausti, and J.J. Wagner. 1993. “Analysis of the Efficiency of Four  
 Marketing Methods for Slaughter Cattle.” Agribusiness, 9(5): 453-63.  
Feuz, D. M. 1999. “Market Signals in Value-Based Pricing Premiums and Discounts.”  
 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 24(2): 327-341.  
Feuz, D. M. and W. D. Umberger. 2001. Results of a 1999 Survey of the Feeding and  
Marketing Practices of Cow-calf and Feedlot Producers in Nebraska. RB-342, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.  
232 
 
Feuz, D.M., C.E. Ward, and T.C. Schroeder. 2002. “Understanding Grid Pricing.”  
 In Managing for Today’s Cattle Market and Beyond, University of Nebraska,  
 Lincoln.   
Field, T.G. and R.E. Taylor. 2002. Beef Production and Management Decisions.  
 New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 
Forbes, T.D.A. and J.W. Oltjen. 1986. “Historical Perspective of Biological Simulation  
 with Special Reference to Beef-Forage System.” Pp. 1-12 in Simulation of Beef  
 Cattle Production Systems and its Use in Economic Analysis, ed. Spreen, T.H.  
 and D.H. Laughlin, Boulder and London: Westview Press Inc.  
Fortin, A., S. Simpfendorfer, J.T. Reid, H.J. Ayala, R. Anrique, and A.F. Kertz. 1980.  
 “Effect of Level of Energy Intake and Influence of Breed and Sex on the 
Chemical Composition of Cattle.” Journal of Animal Science, 51: 604-614. 
Fox, D.G. and J.R. Black. 1977a. A System for Predicting Performance of Growing and  
 Finishing Beef Cattle. Research Report No. 328, Michigan State University, East  
 Lansing.  . 
Fox, D.G. and J.R. Black. 1977b. “A System for Predicting Performance of Growing and  
 Finishing Cattle. 1. Development of a Model to Describe Energy and Protein  
 Requirements and Feed Values.” Feedstuffs, 49: 21-22. 
Fox, D.G. and J.R. Black. 1977c. “A system for predicting performance of growing and  
 finishing cattle. 2. Application of system for predicting performance.” Feedstuffs,  
 49: 20-21, 27. 




 “Protein and Energy Utilization during Compensatory Growth in Beef Cattle.” 
 Journal of Animal Science, 34: 310-318. 
Fox, D.G., T.R. Dockerty, R.R. Johnson, and R.L. Preston. 1976. “Relationship of Empty 
 Body Weight to Carcass Weight in Beef Cattle.” J. of Animal Science, 43:  
566-568. 
Fox, D. G. and J. R. Black. 1984. “A System for Predicting Body Composition and 
 Performance of Growing Cattle.” Journal of Animal Science, 58(3): 725-739. 
Fox, D.G., C.J. Sniffen, and J.D. O’Connor. 1988. “Adjusting Nutrient Requirements of  
 Beef Cattle for Animal and Environmental Variations.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 66: 1475-1495. 
Fox, D. G., C. J. Sniffen, J. D. O’Connor, J. B. Russel, and P. J. Van Soest. 1992. “A Net 
 Carbohydrate and Protein System for Evaluating Cattle Diets: III. Cattle 
 Requirements and Diet Adequacy.” Journal of Animal Science, 70: 3578-96. 
Fox, D. G., and T. P. Tylutki. 1998. “Accounting for the Effects of Environment on the 
 Nutrient Requirements of Dairy Cattle.” Journal of Dairy Science, 81: 3085-95. 
Fox, D.G., L.O. Tedeschi, and M.J. Baker. 2002. “Determining Post-weaning Feed  
 Efficiency in Beef Cattle.” Pp. 44-66 in Beef Improvement Federation, 34,  
 Omaha, NE.  
Fox, D.G., T.P. Tylutki, L.O. Tedeschi, M.E. Van Amburgh, L.E. Chase, A.N. Pell, T.R.  
 Overton, and J.B. Russell. 2003. The Net Carbohydrate and Protein System for  
 Evaluating Herd Nutrition and Nutrient Excretion: Model Documentation, Mimeo  




Frank, S.D. and D.R. Henderson. 1992. “Transaction Costs as Determinants of Vertical  
 Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries.” American Journal of Agricultural  
 Economics, 74(4): 941-950. 
Gallick, E.C. 1996. “Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration: The Efficiency of  
 Contracts in the Tuna Industry,” in S. E. Masten, (ed.), Case Studies in  
 Contracting and Organization, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford,  
 1996, 203-223. 
Garrett, W.N. 1980. “Energy Utilization by Growing Cattle as Determined in 72  
 Comparative Slaughter Experiments,”in Proceedings of Energy Metabolism, 8.  
 EAAP Publ. No. 26. Butterworths & Co., Cambridge:3-7. 
Garrett, W.N. 1987. “Relationship Between Energy Metabolism and the Amounts of  
 Protein and Fat Deposited in Growing Cattle,”in Proceedings of Energy  
 Metabolism, 8. EAAP Publ. No. 32. Rowman & Littlefield, Virginia: 98-101. 
Garrett, W.N. and N. Hinman. 1969. “Re-evaluation of the Relationship Between Carcass 
 Density and Body Composition of Beef Steers.” Journal of Animal Science, 28: 
1-5. 
Garrett, W.N., N. Hinman, R.F. Brokken, and J.G. Delfino. 1978. “Body Composition  
 and the Energy Content of the Gain of Charolais Steers.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 47(Suppl. 1): 417. 
Globerman, S. and S. Schwindt. 1986. “The Organization of Vertically Related  
 Transactions in the Canadian Forest Products Industries.” Journal of Economic  
 Behavior and Organization, 7: 199-212. 




the South African Forestry Industry.” The South African Journal of Economics 61  
 (1): 67-83 
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration. Packers and Stockyards  
 Statistical Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., Selected  
 years. 
Greiner, S.P. 2002. Beef Cattle Breeds and Biological Types. Extension Publication 400- 
 803, Virginia Cooperative Extension, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State  
 University, Blacksburg.  
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart. 1983, “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.”  
 Econometrica, 51(1): 7-45. 
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart. 1986. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory  
 of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 691- 
 719.  
Guiroy , P. J., D. G. Fox, L. O.Tedeschi, M. J. Baker, and M. D. Cravey. 2001. 
 “Predicting individual feed requirements of cattle fed in groups.” Journal of 
 Animal Science, 79: 1983-95. 
Hamilton, H. 1999. “Property Rights and Transaction Costs in Marriage: Evidence from  
 Prenuptial Contracts.” The Journal of Economic History, 59(1): 68-103.  
Hanson, G. 1995. “Incomplete Contracts, Risk and Ownership.” International  
 Economic Review, 36: 341-63. 
Harmalin, B.E. and M.L. Katz. 1991. “Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of 
 Renegotiation in Agency.” Econometrica, 59: 1735-53. 
236 
 
Harpster, H. W. 1978. Energy Requirements of Cows and the Effect of Sex, Selection,  
 Frame Size, and Energy Level of Performance of Calves of Four Genetic Types.  
 PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University. 
Harpster, H.W., T.A. Long, and L.L. Wilson. 1978. “Comparative value of ensiled cattle  
 waste for lambs and growing-finishing cattle.” Journal of Animal Science, 
46(l):238-247. 
Hart, O. 1989. “Incomplete Contracts.” Pp 163-179 in Eatwell, J., M. Milgate, and M.  
 Newman, eds., Allocation, Information, and Markets, New York: Norton.  
Hart, O. 1995. Firms Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.  
Hart, O. and J. Moore. 1990. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.” The  
 Journal of Political Economy, 98(6): 1119-1158.  
Hart, O. and J. Moore. 1999. “Foundation of Incomplete Contracts.” The Review  of  
 Economic Studies, 66(1): 115-38. 
Hart, O. and J. Moore. 1988. “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.” Econometrica,  
 56(4): 755-85. 
Hayenga, M., T. Schroeder, J. Lawrence, D. Hayes, T. Vukina, C. E. Ward, and W. D.  
 Purcell. 2000. “Meat Packer Vertical Integration and Contract Linkages in the  
 Beef and Pork Industries: An Economic Perspective.” American Meat Institute. 
Hendrikse, G.W.J. and C.P. Veerman. 2001a. “Marketing Cooperatives and Financial  
Structure: A Transaction Costs Economics Analysis.” Agricultural Economics, 26  
(3): 205-16. 




Incomplete Contracting Perspective.” Journal of Agricultural Economics, 52(1): 
53-64. 
Hennessy, D.A. and J.D. Lawrence. 2000. “Contractual Relations, Control, and Quality  
 in the Hog Sector.” Review of Agricultural Economics, 21(1): 52-67.  
Holmstrom, B. 1979. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics,  
10: 74-91.Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom. 1987. “Aggregation and Linearity in  
the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.” Econometrica, 55: 303-328. 
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom. 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive  
 Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics, and  
 Organization, 7(special issue): 24-52. 
Holzer, Z., and D. Levy. 1969. “The estimation of empty body weight of Israeli Friesian  
 and Hereford -Arab Crossbred Bull Calves.” Israel Journal of Agriculture and  
 Resource, 19: 195-198. 
Huffman, W. and R. Just. 2004. “Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land  
 Tenure Contracts.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(3): 617-642. 
Hueth, B., and J. Lawrence. 2003. “Information Transmission in Cattle Markets: A Case 
Study of the Chariton Valley Beef Alliance.” Iowa State University CARD  
Briefing Paper 02-BP 40. 
INRA. 1988. Ruminant Nutrition. Recommended Allowances and Feed Tables. Institut  
 National de la Recherche Agronomique, John Libbey Eurotext, Montrouge,  
 France. 




Texas. Available at http://imsonline.tamu.edu/Courses/Samples/102Applied 
SciandTech/AppliedSciTechDocs/8393_ST.pdf. 
Jenkins, T.G., and C.L. Ferrel. 1984. Output/Input Differences among Biological Types.  
 Pp. 15-37 in Proceedings of the Beef Cow Efficiency Symposium, East Lansing:  
 Michigan State University.  
Johnson, S.R. and T. Melkonyan. 2003. “Strategic Behavior and Consolidation in  
 the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry.” American Journal of Agricultural  
 Economics, 85(1): 216-33. 
Joshi, A.W. and R.L. Stump. 1999. “The contingent effect of specific asset investments  
 on joint action in manufacturer-supplier relationships: An empirical test of the  
 moderating role of reciprocal asset investments, uncertainty, and trust.” Academy  
 of Marketing Science 27(3): 291-305.  
Joskow, P.L. 1985. “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal- 
 Burning Electric Generating Plants.” Journal of Law, Economics, and  
 Organization, 1(Spring): 33-80.  
Joskow, P.L. 1988. “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships:  
 Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4(1):  
 95-117.  
 
Joskow, P.L. 1990. “Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal.”  
 Journal of Law and Economics, 31: 47-83.  
Kennedy, P.M., R.J. Christopherson, and L.P. Foldager. 1986. “Digestive Response to  




Milligan, W.L. Grovum, and A. Dobson, eds. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
 Hall.  
Kinnucan, H.W., H. Xiao, C.J. Hsia, and J.D Jackson. 1997. “Effects of Health   
Information and Generic Advertising on US Meat Demand.” American Journal of  
 Agricultural Economics, 79: 13-23. 
Klein, B., R.G. Crawford and A.A. Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable  
 Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics,  
 21(October): 297-326.  
Klosterman, E. W. and C. F. Parker. 1976. Effect of Size, Breed and Sex upon Feed  
 Efficiency of Beef Cattle. Ohio Agric. Res. Dev. Center Res. Bull. 1088. 
Knoeber, C.R. 1983. “An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability.”  
 Journal of Legal Studies, 12:333-43.  
Knoeber, C.R. 1989. “A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the  
Production of Broilers.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5: 271-
92. 
Knoeber, C. R. and W. N. Thurman. 1995.  “Don’t Count your Chickens...: Risk and  
 Risk Shifting in the Broiler Industry.”  American Journal of Agricultural  
 Economics, 77: 486-96. 
Lafontaine, F. 1992. “Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results.”  
 The Rand Journal of Economics, 23: 263-283.  
Lajili, K., Peter J. Barry, Steven T. Sonka and J. T. Mahoney. 1997. “Farmers'  
Preferences for Crop Contracts.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, 22(2): 264-280.  
240 
 
Lamb, R. and M. Beshear. 1998. “From the Plains to the Plate: Can the Beef Industry  
 Regain Market Share.” Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank at Kansas 
 City, Fourth Quarter, 1998. 
Lawrence, J.D., M.L. Hayenga, C. Ward, T. Schroeder, W. Purcell. 2002. “Contracting  
 in the U.S. Pork and Beef Industries: Extent, Motives, and Issues.” Canadian  
 Journal of Agricultural Economics, 48: 629-639.  
Lawrence, J.D., and M.L. Hayenga. 2002. “The U.S. Pork and Beef Sectors: Divergent  
 Organizational Patterns, Paradoxes and Conflicts.” In J.H. Trienekens and S.W.F.  
 Omta (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Chain and  
 Network Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry, pp. 512-21. A  
 conference held at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 6-8 June. Wageningen, The  
 Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers 
Libecap, G.D. and J.L. Smith. 1999. “The Self Enforcing Provision of Oil and Gas Unit  
 Operating Agreements: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Law, Economics, and  
 Organization, 15(2): 526548.  
Lilliefors, H. 1967. “On the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Normality with Mean and  
 Variance Unknown.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62:  
 399-402. 
Livestock and Grain Market News. Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of  
 Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
Lofgreen, G.P. W.N. Garrett. 1968. “A System for Expressing Net Energy Requirements  
 and Feed Values for Growing and Finishing Beef Cattle.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 27: 793-806. 
241 
 
Lofgreen, G.P., J.L. Hull, and K.K. Otagaki. 1962. “Estimation of the Empty Body  
 Weight of Beef Cattle.” Journal of Animal Science, 21: 20. 
Lomas, L.W. 1979. Effect of Anhydrous Ammonia Treated Corn Silage on the  
 Performance of Growing and Finishing Steers. PhD Dissertation, Michigan State  
 University, Lansing. 
Lomas, L.W., D.G. Fox, and J.R. Black. 1982. “Ammonia Treatment of Corn Silage. I.  
 Feedlot Performance of Growing and Finishing Cattle.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 55: 909-923.  
Lyons, B.R. 1995. “Specific Investment, Economies of Scale, and the Make-or-Buy  
 Decision: A Test of Transaction Cost Theory.” Journal of Economic Behavior  
 and Organization, 26: 431-433.  
MacDonald, J.M., J. Perry, M. Ahren, D. Banker, W. Chambers, C. Dimitri, N. Key, K.  
 Nelson, and L. Southard. 2004. Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the  
 Production and Use of Agricultural Commodities. Agricultural Economic Report  
 837, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington  
 D.C. 
MacDonald, J.M. and P. Korb. 2006. Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in  
 2003. Electronic Report from the Economic Research Service, United States  
 Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.  
MacLeod, W.B. and J.M. Malcomson.1993. "Investments, Holdup and the Form of  
 Market Contracts." American Economic Review, 83: 811-837. 
Madsen, L. 1996. “Livestock Contract Feeding Arrangements.” Extension Extra 5032,  
 College of Agricultural and Biological Sciences, South Dakota State University.  
242 
 
Mark, D. R., T. C. Schroeder, and R. Jones. 2000. “Identifying Economic Risk in Cattle  
 Feeding.” Journal of Agribusiness, 18(3): 331-344. 
Marsh, J.M. and D.M. Feuz. 2002. “Retained Ownership of Cattle: Factors to Consider.”  
 Managing for Today’s Cattle Market and Beyond. March 2002. Available at  
 http://ag.arizona.edu/arec/wemc/cattlemarket/Retained_Ownership.pdf [posted   
March 2002; accessed 29 June 2005; verified 1 Mar. 2007]. Univ. of Arizona,  
 Tucson. 
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole. 1999a. “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts.”  
 The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 83-114. 
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole. 1999b. “Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature.”  
 The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 139-49. 
Masten, S.E. 1984. “The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace  
 Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics, 27: 403-417.  
Masten, S.E. 2000. “Transaction Cost Economics and the Organization of Agricultural  
 Transactions.” Industrial Organization, 9: 173-95.  
Masten, S. E. and S. Saussier. 2000. “Econometrics of Contracts: An Assessment of 
 Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting.” Revue d'Economie  
Industrielle, 0(92): 215-36.  
Matouschek, N. 2004. “Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm.” 
The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 20(1): 125-147. 
McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan. 1987. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic  
 Literature, 25(2): 699-738. 
McBride, W. D. and N. Key. 2003. Economic and Structural Relationships in U.S. Hog 
243 
 
Production. Agricultural Economic Report 818, Economic Research Service, U.S.  
Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
Milgrom, P.R. and J. Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management,  
 Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.  
Minton, J.E. 1986. Effects of Heat Stress on Feed Intake of Beef Cattle. Pp. 325-327 in  
 Symposium Proceedings: Feed Intake by Beef Cattle, MP-121, F.N. Owens, ed.  
 Stillwater, Oklahoma: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station. 
Mirrlees, J.A. 1974. “Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty,” in  
 Essays on Economic Behavior and Uncertainty. Balch, M., D. McFadden, and S. 
 Wu, eds. Amsterdum: North-Holland.  
Mirrlees, J.A. 1976. “The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an  
 Organization.” Bell Journal of Economics, 7(Spring): 105-31. 
Monteverde, K. 1995. “Technological Dialog as an Incentive for Vertical Integration in  
 the Semiconductor Industry.” Management Science, 41(10): 1624-1638.  
Monteverde, K. and D.J. Teece. 1982. “Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical  
 Integration in the Automobile Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-213.  
National Animal Health Monitoring System. 2000. “Changes in the U.S. Feedlot  
 Industry: 1994-1999.” Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.  
 Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
National Research Council (NRC).1981. Effect of Environment on Nutrient Requirements  
 of Domestic Animals. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
National Research Council (NRC).1984. Nutrient Requirements of Beef Cattle, Sixth  
 Edition. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
244 
 
National Research Council (NRC).1996. Nutrient Requirements of Beef Cattle, Seventh  
 Edition. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
National Research Council (NRC). 2000. Nutrient Requirements of Beef Cattle, Seventh  
 Edition Update. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Noldeke, G. and K.M. Schmidt. 1998. “Sequential Investments and Options to Own.”  
 The RAND Journal of Economics, 29: 633-653.Peck, C. 2001. “The Alliance  
 Yellow Pages: Picking A Winner.” Beef, August, 2001: 20-25. 
Owens, F.N., D.R. Gill, D.S. Secrist, and S.W. Coleman. 1995. “Review of Some  
 Aspects of Growth and Development of Feedlot Cattle.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 73: 3152-3172. 
Perry, T. C. and D. G. Fox. 1997. “Predicting carcass composition and individual feed  
 requirement in live cattle widely varying in body size.” Journal of Animal  
 Science, 75: 300-307. 
Perry, T.C., D.G. Fox, and D.H. Beermann, D.H. 1991. “Effect of an Implant of  
 Trenbolone Acetate and Estradiol on Growth, Feed Efficiency, and Carcass  
 Composition of Holstein and Beef Steers.” Journal of Animal Science, 69: 4696- 
 4702. 
Pirrong, S.C. 1993. “Contracting Parties in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transaction Cost  
 Explanation.” Journal of Law and Economics, 36: 937-76. 
Popp, M., K. Coffey, W. Coblentz, Z. Johnson, D. Scarbrough, J. Humphry, T. Smith, D.  
 Hubbell, and J. Turner. 2007. “Empirical Analysis of Weaning and Pasture  
 Rotation Frequency with Implications for Retained Ownership.” Agronomy  
 Journal, 99(3): 747-54.  
245 
 
Purcell, W.D. 1990. “Economics of Consolidation in the Beef Sector: Research  
 Challenges.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72: 1210-1218.  
Purcell, W. 1999. The Source of Better Prices for Cattle Producers. Research Bulletin  
6-99, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing, Agricultural and Applied  
Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA. 
Purcell, W. D. 2000. “Measures of Changes in Demand for Beef, Pork, and Chicken,  
 1975-2000.” Research Bulletin 4-2000, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing,  
 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.  
Purcell, W.D. and W. T. Hudson. 2003. “Risk Sharing and Compensation Guides for  
 Managers and Members of Vertical Beef Alliances,” Review of Agricultural  
 Economics,  25(1):44-65. 
Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales. 1998. “Power in a Theory of the Firm.” The Quarterly  
 Journal of Economics, 113(2): 387-432. 
Read, R. 1983. “The Growth and Structure of Multinationals in the Banana Export  
 Trade” in Casson, Mark (ed.). The Growth of International Business  
 London/Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983. 
Regan, L. 1997. “Vertical Integration in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A  
 Transaction Cost Approach.” The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64(1): 41-62.  
Rime, T.G., G.P. Lardy, K. Maddock-Carlin, K.G. Odde, and W. Eide. 2006. “Survey of  
 Cattle Backgrounding and Finishing Feedlots in North Dakota.” Carrington  
 Research Extension Center Beef Report 2006, North Dakota State University.  
Rogerson, W. P. 1992. “Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem.” Review of  
 Economic Studies 59: 774-794. 
246 
 
Rumsey, T.S., A.C. Hammond, and J.P. McMurtry. 1992. “Response to Reimplanting  
 Beef Steers with Estradiol Benzoate and Progesterone: Performance, Implant  
 Absorption Pattern, and Thyroxin Status.” Journal of Animal Science, 70: 995- 
 1001.  
Saussier, S. 2000. “Transaction Costs and Contractual Incompleteness: The Case of  
 Electricite de France.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42:  
189-206.  
Schroeder, T.C., C.E. Ward, J.R. Mintert, and D.S. Peel. 1998. “Value Based Pricing of  
 Fed Cattle: Challenges and Research Agenda”. Review of Agricultural Economics  
 25 (1): 125-134. 
Schroeder, T. C. and E. E. Davis. 1999. “Fed Cattle Grid Pricing.” Agricultural  
 Experiment Station and Cooperative Extension Service. Kansas State University,  
 Manhattan, KS. 
Schroeder, T.C. and D.R. Mark. 1999. “How Can the Beef Industry Recapture Lost  
 Consumer Demand?” Paper presented at the Western Section American Society  
 of Animal Sciences Symposium, Provo UT, June 9, 1999. 
Schroeder, T.C., T.L. Marsh, and J. Mintert. 2000. Beef Demand Determinants. Report 
 prepared for the Beef Board Joint Evaluation Advisory Committee. 
Schroeder, T.C., J. Lawrence, C.E. Ward, and D.M. Feuz. 2002. “Fed Cattle  
 Marketing Trends and Concerns: Cattle Feeder Survey Results.” Agricultural  
 Experiment Station, Kansas State University. 
Schroeder, T. C., J. Mintert, C. E. Ward, and T. L. Wheeler. 2003. “Fed-Cattle  
 Grid-Pricing Valuation: Recommendation for Improvement.” Agricultural  
247 
 
 Experiment Station, Kansas State University. 
Shelanski, H.A. and P.G. Klein. 1995. “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost  
 Economics.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11(2): 335-61.  
Silver Creek Feeders, Inc. http://www.silvercreekfeeders.com. 
Simpfendorfer, S. 1974. Relationship of Body Type, Size, Sex, and Energy Intake to the 
 Body Composition of Cattle. PhD Dissertation. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 
Smith, G.M., D.B. Laster, and L.V. Cundiff. 1976. Characterization of Biological  
 Types of Cattle. II. Postweaning Growth and Feed Efficiency of Steers.” Journal  
 of Animal science, 43: 37-47.  
Spier, K. and M.D. Whinston. 1995. "On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages 
 for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation." RAND  
Journal of Economics, 26: 180-202. 
Sporleder, T.L. 1992. “Managerial economics of vertically coordinated agricultural  
 firms.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(5): 1226-1231. 
Stiglitz, J.E. 1974. “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping.” Review of  
 Economic Studies, 41(2): 219-56. 
Susmel, P., M. Spanghero, B. Stefano, C.R. Mills, and E. Plazzota. 1993. “Digestibility  
 and Allantoin Excretion in Cows Fed Diets Differing in Nitrogen Content.”  
 Livestock Production Science, 36: 213-222.  
Tedeschi, L. O., D. G. Fox, and M. J. Baker. 2003. “The Cornell value discovery system  
 model.” Model Documentation. Department of Animal science, Cornell  
 University, Ithaca. 
Tedeschi, L. O., D. G. Fox, and P. J. Guiroy. 2004. “A decision support system to  
248 
 
improve individual cattle management. 1. A mechanistic, dynamic model for 
 animal growth.” Agricultural Systems, 79: 171-204.   
Tri-county Steer Carcass Futurity Cooperative (TCSCF). Lewis, Iowa. Available at 
 http://www.tcscf.com.  
Tylutki, T.P., D.G. Fox, and R.G. Anrique. 1994. “Predicting Net Energy and Protein  
 Requirements for Growth of Implanted and Nonimplanted Heifers and Steers and  
 Nonimplanted Bulls Varying in Body Size.” Journal of Animal Science, 72:  
 1806-1813. 
Ulset, S. 1996. “R&D Outsourcing and Contractual Governance: An Empirical Study of  
 Commercial R&D Projects.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,  
 30(1): 63-82.  
U.S. Congress. 2002. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. 107th Congress,  
 2nd Session. Public Law 107-171. May 13. Available at: thomas.loc.gov. 
Vatn, A. 1998. “Input vs. Emission Taxes. Environmental Taxes in a Mass Balance and 
 Transactions Cost Perspective.” Land Economics, 74(4):514-525. 
Wang, S. and T. Zhu. 2000. “Contract Law and the Boundary of the Firm.” Unpublished  
 Manuscript, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. 
Ward C. 1993. “Market Structure Dynamics in the Livestock-Meat Subsector:  
 Implications for Pricing and Price Reporting.” Pp 8-54 in W. Purcell and J.  
 Roswell (eds.) Proceedings, Key Issues in Livestock Pricing: A Perspective for  
 the 1990's. Research Institute on Livestock Pricing, Blacksburg, VA.  
Ward, C. 1997. “Vertical Integration Comparison: Beef Pork, and Poultry.” Selected  
 Paper Submitted to the Western Agricultural Economics Association.  
249 
 
Ward, C.E. and T.J. Bliss. 1989. Forward Contracting of Fed Cattle: Extent, Benefits, 
 Impacts, Solutions. Research Bulletin 4-89, Research Institute on Livestock  
 Pricing, Virginia Tech, November 1989. 
Ward, C., T.C. Schroeder, J.D. Lawrence, M.L. Hayenga, W.D. Purcell, S.R. Kootz, and  
 D.M. Feuz. 2002. “Fed Cattle Marketing-Pricing Practices and Industry Issues: A  
 Feedlot Survey Summary.” Iowa Beef Center, Iowa State University, Ames,  
 Iowa.   
WeatherBank, Inc. Edmond, Oklahoma. http://www.weatherbank.com.  
Weimer, M.R., and A. Hallam. 1990. “Risk Sharing in Custom Cattle Feeding.” North  
 Central Journal of Agricultural Economics, 12 (2): 279-91. 
Weiss, A.M. and N. Kurland. 1997. "Holding Distribution Channel Relationships  
 Together: The Role of Transaction-specific Assets", Organization Science, 8:  
612-23.  
Wheeler, T.L., L.V. Cundiff, and R.M. Koch. 1994. “Effect of Marbling Degree of Beef  
 Palatability in Bos Taurus and Bos Indicus Cattle.” Journal of Animal Science,  
 72(12): 3145-3151. 
Wheeler, T.L, S.D. Shackelford, and M. Koohmaraie. 1999. “Tenderness Classification  
 of Beef: IV Effect of USDA Quality Grade on the Palatability of ‘Tender’ Beef  
 Longissimus when Cooked Well Done.” Journal of Animal Science, 77: 882-888. 
Whinston, M.D. 2003. “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration.”  
 Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 19(3): 1-23. 
Wilkerson, V.A., T.J. Klopfenstein, R.A. Britton, R.A. Stock, and P.S. Miller. 1993.  





 Journal of Animal Science, 71: 2777-2784.  
Williamson, O.E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of contractual  
 Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics, 22(October): 233-261.  
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, NY, The  
 Free Press.  
Williamson, O.E. 2000. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking  
 Ahead.” Journal of Economic Literature, 38: 595-613.  
Woodruff, C. 2002. “Non-contractible Investments and Vertical Integration in the  
 Mexican Footwear Industry.” International Journal of Industrial Organization,  
 20: 1197-1224. 
Woody, H.D. 1978. Influence of Ration Grain Content on Feedlot Performance and  
 Carcass Characteristics. PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, Lansing. 
Woody, H.D., D.G. Fox, and J.R. Black. 1983. “Effect of Diet Grain Content on  
 Performance of Growing and Finishing Cattle.” Journal of Animal Science, 57:  
 717-728.  
Young, B.A. 1986. Food Intake of Cattle in Cold Climates. Pp. 328-340 in Symposium  
 Proceedings: Feed Intake by Beef Cattle, MP-121, F.N. Owen, ed. Stillwater:  
 Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station.  
Young, B.A., A.W. Bell, and R.T. Hardin. 1989. “Mass Specific Metabolic Rate of Sheep  
from Fetal Life to Maturity.” Energy Metabolism Proceedings Symposium, 43:  
 155-158.  
Zhu, T. 2000. “Holdups, Simple Contracts, and Information Acquisition.” Journal of  
 Economic Behavior and Organization, 42(4): 549-60.  
